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The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life"
Actions
by
ICHAEL B. KELLY*
Legal remedies generally seek to put the plaintiff in her rightful
position:' the position she would have occupied but for the misconduct
that provided her a right to recover. 2 A court that attempts to return
a plaintiff to her rightful position in a personal injury case must rely
on money damages, an imprecise remedial tool that at best can ap-
proximate the rightful position. In fact, the assertion that a court can
put a plaintiff in the position she would have occupied often seems
completely fictional. 3 But careful attention to the rightful position pro-
vides a court with an ideal against which it can assess the appropri-
ateness of requested remedies.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.G.S. 1975,
Umversity of Michigan; M.A. 1980, Umversity of Illinois at Chicago; J.D. 1983, University
of Michigan. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Stephen Marsh, who enticed me into starting
this project and played a key role in the early years. Christopher Wonnell, Ed Ursin, Kristine
Strachan, Rodney Smith, Emily Sherwin, Virginia Nolan, Grant Moms, Stan Krauss, Paul
Horton, Gail Henot, Donald Dripps, Lynne Dallas, Joe Colombo, Kevin Cole, David Cham-
bers, Harriet Baber, and Larry Alexander all deserve thanks for their patient efforts to point
me in the right direction and keep me from straying too far afield on the way. Finally, I
appreciate the help of Dinyar Mehta, Patrick Flynn, Deryk Doty, Haven Courtenay, and
Amar Babu, who devoted their time to all the things that I could not bring myself to do.
1. "Rightful position" is a phrase coined by Douglas Laycock as shorthand for "the
position the plaintiff would have been in but for the wrong." D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AERaICAN
REmEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (1985).
2. 4 F HARPER, F JAm s & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 494 (2d ed. 1986);
REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 347 comment a (1981) (damages are intended to put
a plaintiff "in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed'.);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1979) ("the law of torts attempts primarily
to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to
the tort").
3. 4 F HARPER, F JAms & 0. GRAY, supra note 2, § 25.1, at 493. A quadriplegic tort
victim who receives a substantial monetary judgment is not in the same position she would
have been in but for the tort. For example, the money will not allow her to play tenis.
Theoretically, the award should be large enough to make the victim indifferent if she were
asked to choose between no injury and the injury plus the money judgment, which would
allow her to discover and participate in other activities that provide as much enjoyment as
tennis (and all other lost opportunities). See R. POSNER, ECON o C ANALYSis oF LAw § 12.5,
at 182 (3d ed. 1986). At least for serious injuries, our tort system only poorly approximates
the "indifference curve." Id., RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 903 comment a (1979).
[505]
In genetic counselling torts, 4 the rightful position standard pres-
ents courts with an enigma. Plaintiffs must claim that, but for the tort,
a child suffering from severe genetic defects would not have been born.5
Thus, the parents' rightful position is childless; 6 the child's rightful
position is lifeless, unborn.
Courts stumble when considering whether the plaintiffs' unen-
viable rightful position is better than their current situation. After in-
4. Genetic counselling torts are actions for medical malpractice. They differ from other
malpractice claims only in the nature of the injury alleged: the birth of a child suffering from
severe genetic defects. Genetic counselling torts popularly are referred to as "wrongful birth"
and "wrongful life" actions. "Wrongful birth" denotes a claim by parents that a genetic
counsellor, usually a physician or medical laboratory, provided misleading information con-
cerning the risk that the parents would conceive or had conceived a child that would suffer
from severe genetic defects. The inadequate counselling precluded the parents from exercising
the right to make certain procreative choices, such as to prevent conception or to terminate a
pregnancy, thus causing the birth of a severely impaired child. "Wrongful life" refers to a
similar claim by the impaired child, who alleges that the same inadequate counselling caused
her to be born with the defects.
The title of this Article notwithstanding, I have attempted to avoid the popular names of
these torts. Alexander Morgan Capron, University Professor of Law and Medicine at the
University of Southern California and a leading scholar in the area of liability for negligent
genetic counselling, pointed out more than a decade ago that these names obscure the central
wrong in these cases: the deprivation of the parents' right to make procreative choices,
considering the best interests of the family as a whole, including the potential child, who most
directly suffers the effects. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counselling, 79 COLum. L. Rav.
618, 634 n.62, 652-53 (1979). This Article does not address claims by parents of healthy
children who are born after negligently performed sterilizations, negligently filled prescriptions
for contraceptives, or negligently performed abortions.
5. Genetic counsellors do not actually cause the child's genetic defects. The parents
contribute genetic material containing the defects. The genetic counsellor's tortious conduct is
failing to detect the problem and warn the parents of the risk. This failure does not prevent
a cure because the defects involved in these cases are, by definition, incurable. The parents
have only two choices: prevent the birth or give birth to a severely impaired child. The genetic
counsellor's negligence deprives the parents of information critical to that choice. In a wrongful
birth action, the parents contend that, but for the genetic counsellor's negligence, the child
would not have been born.
Curable conditions pose no analytical problem. Since detection would induce treatment that
presumably would cure the condition, the child's rightful position is as a healthy baby. The
failure to diagnose a curable genetic defect does not differ from the failure to diagnose any
curable condition. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 231 n.8, 643 P.2d 954, 961
n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344 n.8 (1982). Special rules governing tortious injuries to the unborn
may impede recovery. See, e.g., Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts, Precon-
ception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New
Framework, 22 J. FAm. L. 677 (1984); Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries for Tort
Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries, and Wrongful
Life, 1978 Dulce L.J. 1401. The enigma noted in text, however, poses no obstacle to recovery.
6. More accurately, parents assert that they would not have had this child at this time.
If they already have other children, they of course would not be childless. In order to simplify
discussion, this Article frequently assumes that the parents have no other children. The
assumption generally does not affect the analysis of the remedies. But see infra notes 319-325
and accompanying text (discussing claims by siblings that they were injured by the birth of a
genetically impaired child).
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itially struggling with claims by parents, 7 courts now seem willing to
recognize that in some cases childlessness may be preferable to the joys
of parenthood. 8 Many states that allow the parents to recover limit
the remedy by excluding emotional distress9 and normal childrearing
expenses. 10
Only three states have recognized a child's genetic counselling
claim." These states limit recovery to extraordinary medical expenses
and exclude any recovery for pain and suffering or normal living ex-
penses.' 2
Judicial reluctance to embrace the child's claim often seems un-
justified. The child can allege the ordinary requirements for negligence
7. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Stewart v. Long Island
College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970).
8. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Moores v.
Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d
315 (1984); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 412 N.W.2d 232 (1987), appeal denied,
430 Mich. 860 (1988); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
9. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 261-62, 512 N.E.2d
691, 707 (1987) (parents were not in the zone of danger); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
413-14, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901-02 (1978) (policy grounds). See generally
Annotation, Recoverability of Compensatory Damages for Mental Anguish or Emotional
Distress for Tortiously Causing Another's Birth, 74 A.L.R.4th 798 (1989).
10. See, e.g., Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 260, 512 N.E.2d at 706; Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H.
231, 243-44, 513 A.2d 341, 349-50 (1986); Annotation, supra note 9. But see Robak v. United
States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (construing Alabama law).
11. These states are California, New Jersey, and Washington. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31
Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478
A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983); cf.
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (wrongful life action by a
healthy child of severely retarded parents in a state institution). Other intermediate appellate
courts have recognized wrongful life actions, only to be overturned by the state's court of last
resort. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Empire Cas. Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. App. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764
P.2d 1191 (Colo. 1988) (overruled by Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988));
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), rev'd, 315 N.C. 103, 337
S.E.2d 528 (1985); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), rev'd sub nom.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
Interestingly, none of the cases that ultimately permitted the child to recover were pure cases
of negligent genetic counselling. In Turpin, a physician failed to diagnose a hearing defect in
a child, thus depriving the parents of an opportunity to discover that the hearing defect was
genetic. The doctor was not a genetic counsellor and was not consulted (primarily) to diagnose
genetic risks to the later-born child who subsequently sued. In Cowe, the child was healthy
and sought damages for the period of time he was raised by retarded parents in a mental
institution prior to his adoption by other parents. In Procanik, the defect resulted from rubella
syndrome, not a genetic condition. Finally, the defect in Harbeson resulted from the mother's
use of dilantin during pregnancy. In fact, in Harbeson there would not have been a wrongful
life case at all if the child had alleged that if properly informed, the mother would not have
taken dilantin while pregnant and the child could have been born healthy.
12. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349; Procanik, 97 N.J.
at 354-56, 478 A.2d at 763-64; Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 482, 656 P.2d at 496-97.
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actions: duty, breach, causation, and damages. 3 Moreover, the courts'
rejection of the entire cause of action as a matter of law fails to serve
the principles of tort law and the public interest those principles seek
to protect.
Scholars have identified several policies that tort law advances. 14
Some urge a functional approach to tort law, emphasizing that damage
awards can help minimize the cost of accidents to society by optimally
deterring unreasonable conduct. 5 Others urge a normative approach,
13. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & J. SCHWARTZ, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 146 (6th ed.
1976). Generally, courts only discuss damage issues. Some courts imply concern for duty by
assuming it arguendo. See, e.g., Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1209; Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
Duty poses no significant obstacle. See Feinberg, Comment: Wrongful Conception and the
Right Not To Be Harmed, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 64-65 (1985). The physician clearly
owes the parents a duty to perform genetic tests according to the standards of practice within
the medical profession. That duty also flows to the unborn child who is a foreseeable plaintiff.
Even in cases in which the parents do not specifically inquire about possible birth defects,
their purpose in consulting a physician during pregnancy generally is to assure the health of
the child. Thus, even courts that reject the child's claim on other grounds recognize the
physician's duty to the child. See, e.g., Walker v. Mart, 164 Ariz. 37, 790 P.2d 735, 739
(1990); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988). But see James G.
v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985) ("duty to inform [parents] does not extend to
the unborn child"). Some courts recognize rather remote duties. E.g., Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at
229-30, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (physician owed duty to unconceived child
when testing the child's sibling for a hearing defect because the effect of a genetic hearing
defect on the parents and subsequent children was foreseeable).
It may seem anomalous to say that the physician owes the child a duty to permit the parents
to prevent her birth. That statement, however, slightly mischaracterizes the duty to the child.
The genetic counsellor owes the child a duty to provide the parents with accurate information
that they can use to make decisions that are in the child's best interests. Patients are entitled
to retain control over their medical care. See Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985). No matter how much a physician
feels the patient needs treatment, the ultimate control should remain in the patient's hands.
Id. at 222-23. But see Iafelice v. Zarafu, 221 N.J. Super. 278, 534 A.2d 417 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987) (denying claim that defendants wrongfully saved a mentally impaired child's
life by operating without informed consent). Parents exercise the autonomy over medical care
choices for their children. Capron, supra note 4, at 652-53; see, e.g., In re Guardianship of
Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (parents and guardian ad litem of 10-month-
old child in a permanent vegetative state obtained order permitting disconnection of ventilator);
see also Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 933 (Tex. 1984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring and
dissenting). Needless to say, parents also exercise the autonomy for unborn fetuses - even to
the extent of terminating the pregnancy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Many (perhaps
all) parents will make decisions that are in the child's best interests. See Shaw, Conditional
Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 109 (1984); Capron, supra note 4, at
654. Some parents may think only of their own burdens if they give birth to a genetically
impaired child. Some parents may believe that the child's best interest will always be served
by birth, regardless of the nature of the impairments with which she must live. Nonetheless,
the law currently places the responsibility for these decisions upon the parents, not the genetic
counsellor. The counsellor's role is to facilitate parental decisionmaking by providing parents
with accurate information. Id. at 626-29.
14. See, e.g., Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1986).
15. See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS oi AccIDENTs 68-75 (1970) (discussing a market
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
January 1991] WRONGFUL LIFE
"shifting the costs of an accident to defendants only where the de-
fendant acts in a 'blameworthy fashion." 1 6 Still others see tort law
as a means of spreading the costs of accidents, which may be cata-
strophic for the individual victim, among a larger portion of society.' 7
Each of these policies supports a child's recovery for negligent genetic
counselling.
The public interest demands accurate genetic counselling or at
least ,genetic counselling as accurate as genetic counsellors can provide
with reasonable care.'8 Parents can use accurate genetic counselling
to prevent the abortion of healthy fetuses, 9 in addition to the more
apparent (but less common)" use by parents who prefer not to bear
children who suffer from severe genetic impairments. 2' Inaccurate ge-
deterrent approach to accident cost avoidance based on deciding what the accident costs of
activities are and letting the market determine the degree to which, and the ways in which,
activities are desired given such costs); R. PosNER, supra note 3, § 6.1, at 147-48. See generally
Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence of Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975) (explaining what the
fault system and strict liability mean in terms of the goal of minimizing accident and accident
prevention costs); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) ("For the
negligence system to bring about an efficient level of accidents and safety the damage awards
must be equal to the costs of accidents resulting from negligent conduct."). Some of Calabresi's
views could support a strict liability standard. This Article does not explore that possibility.
16. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER, F. JAms & 0. GRAY, upra note 2, § 12.3, at 113; Epstein,
A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152-60 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. R-v. 537, 537-40 (1972); Zacharias, supra note 14, at
707.
17. See 4 F. HARPER, F. JAmes & 0. GRAY, supra note 2, § 25.1, at 494-95. Calabresi
identified numerous possible populations over which the cost may be spread. G. CALARRES!,
supra note 15, at 22.
18. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
see Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counselling
and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. Rav. 713, 745, 752-53 (1982). The public interest demands
that all persons hired to provide advice exercise reasonable care in that endeavor. RESTATEMEr
(SEcoND) oF TORTS § 552 (1977). That interest is particularly apparent in the provision of
medical care. Id. § 311 & comment b. Victims of genetic counselling torts may live with the
results of any carelessness for the rest of their lives.
19. Without genetic counselling, parents may choose to abort because to them the risk of
a genetically impaired baby seems too high, even though in reality that risk only effects a
relatively small number of fetuses. For example, risk of Down's syndrome for children born
to mothers over 45 (the highest risk group) is about 3.5%. Adams, Erickson, Layde & Oakley,
Down's Syndrome: Recent Trends in the United States, 246 J. A.M.A. 758 (1981). Tay-Sachs,
among the most serious (and invariably fatal) genetic defects, affects only 25% of children
born to parents who both carry the gene. See Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 409, 250
S.E.2d 825, 827 (1982). By assuring parents that their fetus is healthy, genetic counselling can
prevent an abortion. "More babies are born because of the availability of prenatal diagnosis
compared to the number of pregnancies terminated. Prenatal diagnosis is a life-giving, not a
life-taking, technology." Milunsky, Prenatal Diagnosis: New Tools, New Problems, in GENErCS
AND THE LAW III 335 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas ed. 1985).
20. Milunsky, supra note 19, at 335.
21. Several states have asserted a policy preference that disfavors abortion by enacting
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netic counselling prevents parents from preparing themselves for the
birth of a child who will need special care and love, and perhaps spe-
cial financial arrangements.
Tort law can protect the public interest by encouraging genetic
counsellors to take precautions in order to avoid careless mistakes.2
Optimal deterrence depends on imposing the full societal cost of such
mistakes on those who make them, 23 and rules or laws that limit li-
ability or damages decrease the deterrent effect of tort law. 24 Limiting
genetic counsellors' liability to a portion of the real harm their care-
lessness engenders externalizes some of the costs, providing a subop-
timal incentive to prevent accidents. 25
Normative principles suggest that one who creates excessive risks
that cause an accident, rather than the innocent accident victim, should
bear the costs of the accident. 26 Assuming a plaintiff can prove the
statutes that preclude liability for negligent genetic counselling if the complaint alleges that
accurate genetic counselling would have led the parents to abort the fetus. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 5-334 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (Supp. 1990); See also, Note,
Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HLv. L. Rav. 2017
(1987) (collecting similar statutes and arguing that they unconstitutionally restrict the parents'
rights concerning procreative choice). The assertion necessarily divorces the public interest from
the current state of constitutional law, which acknowledges the parents' right to make
procreative choices. Professor Capron noted the irony of a public policy that permits abortions
for no reason but prohibits abortions to prevent the birth of a child that suffers from severe
genetic defects. Capron, supra note 4, at 652. While society rightly insists that persons suffering
from handicaps possess equal dignity and humanity, to date society has not expressed a
preference that encourages the birth of children with genetic defects more strongly than the
birth of healthy children. The birth of an impaired child evokes universal expressions of
sympathy, an indication that, other things being equal, society prefers healthy children at the
same time it protects all children equally. Moreover, the argument that accurate genetic
counselling contravenes the public interest proves too much in that it ultimately suggests that
genetic counselling should be forbidden. Tolerating negligence merely permits mistakes to
affect a few parents severely, without significantly decreasing the number of abortions.
22. Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 696.
23. Faced with the choice of paying the cost of the accident or the cost of preventing it,
people take proper precautions to prevent accidents. See 0. CAIABRasi, supra note 15, at 73-
74.
24. Neither limiting liability nor limiting recoverable damages would make genetic coun-
selling mistakes costless to the physician. If a particular genetic counselor's reputation for
carelessness becomes known, she may attract fewer patients. In addition, negligent mistakes
may weigh heavily on a genetic counsellor's mind, adding a psychological cost of carelessness.
Professional pride also would suffer from negligent mistakes. The law, however, does not
accept these costs as sufficient to deter medical malpractice outside genetic counselling torts.
There seems little reason to believe that careless genetic counselling can be adequately deterred
without holding negligent counsellors liable for their errors and, once liable, imposing upon
them the full cost of their mistakes.
25. Capron, supra note 4, at 657-58; see Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239 n.15, 643
P.2d 954, 966 n.15, 182 Cal. Rptr. 343, 349 n.15 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98
Wash. 2d 460, 481, 656 P.2d 483, 496 (1983).
26. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 548.
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allegations of negligence,2 genetic counselling torts fit the normative
theories perfectly.28 By acting negligently, the genetic counsellor has
failed to live up to the standard of practice in the medical commu-
nity.29 All patients face the risk that a genetic counsellor, after ex-
ercising due care, may be wrong. What they need not accept is the
risk that a genetic counsellor may make a careless mistake. As a direct
consequence of the carelessness, a child is born suffering from severe
impairments. The child is the epitome of the innocent victim: she bears
no responsibility for her own condition. Justice requires that we hold
the negligent genetic counsellor responsible for the consequences of
her mistake.
Finally, tort law increasingly seeks to compensate accident vic-
tims, for whom the accident often is disastrous, and to spread the costs
to society at large, whose members can afford to bear a portion of
the cost of the injury.30 Often this principle results in liability without
fault, as in actions concerning abnormally dangerous activities. 31 The
policy should apply with equal force whenever plaintiffs can dem-
onstrate the defendant's negligence. Imposing the cost of negligent
genetic counselling upon physicians can spread the burden among all
consumers of genetic counselling services, purchasers of medical li-
ability insurance, and ultimately, those purchasers' patients.3 2
If taken seriously, these policies suggest that negligent genetic
counsellors (or their insurers) should pay the full costs their mistakes
27. Courts considering whether to recognize a child's cause of action have not discussed
the allegations of breach or negligence at any length. Many of the cases arise on motions to
dismiss the complaint. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547 (Ala. 1978); Lininger
v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Colo. 1988). In that procedural posture, the court must
assume that the allegations of the complaint can be proven if the case proceeds to trial. See,
e.g., Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1203; Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 408, 386 N.E.2d 807,
810, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (1978). The assumption is charitable; many plaintiffs may be
unable to prove negligence because some genetic misinformation may pass despite the best
precautions. The issue of negligence, however, is reserved for decision by the finder of fact
at trial.
28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
29. See R. PoSNER, supra note 3, § 6.3, at 153. The failure not only breaches a tort duty,
but also breaches an implied term of the contract between the patient and the physician. Id.
30. 4 F. HaPE, F. Jmams & 0. GRAY, supra note 2, § 25.1, at 494-95.
31. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 519 (1977).
32. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 481, 656 P.2d 483, 496 (1983).
Arguably, the consumers of genetic counselling services. could bargain for increased precautions
by genetic counsellors by offering to pay more for the services of more careful physicians.
See R. PosNER, supra note 3, § 6.3. Patients, however, often lack sufficient information to
bargain effectively for the medical services they purchase, which in turn undermines their
theoretical ability to achieve an efficient allocation of risk through market mechanisms. Cf.
Zacharias, supra note 14, at 705-06 (identifying similar information disparities between landlords
and tenants).
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impose upon society in general and their victims in particular. Yet
most courts fail to recognize claims by impaired children. They reject
such claims and hold as a matter of law that none of the evidence the
child could possibly present would be sufficient to establish a right
to recover.
The courts' decisions are essentially based on the difficulties they
perceive in framing the appropriate remedy. Yet careful attention to
the rightful position standard and to the damage rules it evokes would
satisfy these objections.
This Article offers three remedial approaches, any one of which
courts may employ as a principled means for recognizing the child's
claim for negligent genetic counselling. Part I examines the traditional
tort recovery rules over which courts faced with children's claims have
tripped for the last decade. Overall, court decisions emphasize the-
oretical obstacles more than is necessary. Careful application of com-
mon law damage principles can overcome the uncertainties, involved
in damage calculations and permit courts to implement the policies
of tort law by allowing the child to recover.
Part II proposes an alternative view of the rightful position that
is borrowed from misrepresentation cases. Courts have unduly con-
strained their view of the rightful position by looking only to tradi-
tional tort rules. This part illustrates that a slightly broader focus would
eliminate the courts' most troublesome concerns. This approach af-
fords the courts an opportunity to apply a completely familiar body
of law and, furthermore, to award plaintiffs a reasonable recovery
without stumbling on theoretical difficulties.
Part III explores an entirely new possibility: permitting the family
to sue as an entity. This decidedly untraditional proposal offers a pro-
cedural solution to the theoretical'problems courts confront. This pro-
cedural device raises some interesting possibilities, although it also raises
some new concerns that lawmakers must consider.
Each remedial approach offers the courts a slightly different view
of the rightful position and, consequently, a slightly different ideal
against which to measure the remedies for genetic counselling torts.
Yet each approach permits courts to follow the fundamental principles
of tort law by providing recovery for severely impaired children.
I. Recovery Under Traditional Tort Rules
The rightful position under traditional tort rules is the position
the plaintiff would have occupied but for the tort.33 In most cases,
33. E.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex. 1984).
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this is the position the plaintiff actually occupied before the tort.3 4
Thus, if a plaintiff suffered a broken arm in an automobile accident
that was caused by another's negligence, courts seek to restore the
plaintiff to the position of a person who did not have a broken arm.
Specifically, courts seek to return the plaintiff to the position of an
individual who did not incur medical expenses to treat a broken arm,
did not miss any days of work (and thus did not lose any pay) because
of a broken arm, and did not suffer any pain or emotional distress
caused by a broken arm. In easy cases, a comparison between the
healthy individual immediately before the injury and the unhealthy one
immediately afterward provides all the evidence needed to assess the
damages.
Genetic counselling torts require a different and more difficult
comparison. Many genetic defects cannot be cured regardless of when
they are detected. The failure to diagnose a genetic defect does not
mean a child who could have been born healthy is born with a genetic
defect instead. Rather, the assertion is that, but for the tort, the child
would not have been born at all. If the genetic counsellor informs the
parents of the defect, the parents must choose to abandon their pro-
creative efforts or proceed with the knowledge that the conceived child
or a future child may or will be born with a genetic defect.35 If the
parents choose to proceed, they knowingly accept the onus of the child's
impairment (or the risk of impairment), and have no cause of action
against the genetic counsellor.16 Similarly, if they terminate or prevent
the pregnancy the child would not be born. In both of these scenarios
the child would not have been born healthy.
From the parents' perspective, the comparison remains relatively
simple. They would have been childless but for the tort. Instead, they
not only have a child, but one who suffers from severe genetic im-
pairments'. The pecuniary loss suffered by the parents poses no dif-
34. Id.; REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToaTs, § 901 comment a (1979) ("the law of torts
attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to
his position prior to the tort").
35. The means of termination will vary with the timing of the discovery. Genetic coun-
sellors can diagnose some genetic dangers before conception. See, e.g., Naccash v. Burger,
223 Va. 406, 411, 290 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1982) (Tay-Sachs Disease). Parents then can decide
whether to avoid these risks by taking appropriate measures to prevent conception. When
diagnosis occurs after conception, parents face the choice of whether to abort the fetus.
36. The child who subsequently is born with a defect of which they were warned may
sue her parents. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165
Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980); Feinberg, supra note 13, at 72. 'Parents' constitutional protection
to make procreative choices probably precludes such a claim. See Walker v: Mart, 790 P.2d
735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc). Notably, in California a statute prohibits such claims. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982).
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ficulty. If the parents had prevented conception or birth, they would
not have incurred any expenses for the child-neither the expenses
associated with raising a healthy child nor the extraordinary expenses
associated with the specific impairment. 37 Even the nonpecuniary losses,
such as their emotional distress and the pain suffered during the preg-
nancy, although subjective, are no harder to assess under these cir-
cumstances than in any other case involving pain and suffering.38
Damage issues such as these do not prevent courts from recognizing
the parents' right to recover in such circumstances. 39
The child faces a more complex hurdle. But for the tort, she would
not have been born. To recover damages, the child must persuade the
fact finder that her birth with the severe impairments coupled with
her continuing suffering as a result of that birth constitutes a loss for
which she deserves compensation.
Courts balk at this claim. Society, and judges as members of so-
ciety, instinctively values human life, even life with handicaps, above
all else. That cherished value generates an intuitive reaction that an
impaired life is better than no life at all. Thus, regardless of how severe
her impairments or how painful her condition, courts rebel against the
notion that a child might suffer a loss by being born.
Through their holdings, courts express this instinctive reaction in
two ways.40 Some courts invoke the policy concerns that might arise
37. Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 243, 513 A.2d 341, 348 (1986). Interestingly, almost
every court to address the pecuniary loss issue has limited the parents' recovery to the
extraordinary expenses associated with the defect and has denied recovery for the cost of
raising a healthy child. Weiss, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions: In Search of a
Logical Consistency, 1987 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 507, 513 (1989); see also supra note 10. The
court in Smith characterized its departure from the traditional tort remedial rule as an
application of the expectancy measure commonly used in contract actions. If the parents had
achieved the "promised" result (a healthy child), they would have incurred the cost of raising
that child anyway. Only the extraordinary expenses exceed the parents' expectation. Smith,
128 N.H. at 244, 513 A.2d at 349; see Weiss, supra, at 513. The Smith court, however, neither
justified this departure from traditional tort remedies nor explained why it failed to apply the
"contract" expectancy measure to the child's claim. Weiss, supra, at 514. This last suggestion
will be explored at length in Part II of this Article.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 comment b (1979).
39. Courts disagree whether parents may recover for their emotional distress. Compare
Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1317-19 (D.S.C. 1983) with Smith, 128 N.H. at
246-47, 513 A.2d at 350-51. See generally Annotation, supra note 9 (compiling cases dealing
with recoverability of emotional distress). Only two courts, however, have denied the parents
any recovery on common law grounds. See Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc) (no proximate cause); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985)
(court refused to act without legislative guidance). Several state statutes preclude recovery by
parents, at least when an allegation that they would have aborted the child is critical to
establishing causation. See supra note 21.
40. See Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 239-40, 512 N.E.2d 691, 697
(1987).
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if a court announced that some lives are not worth living. 41 Others
express concern that insurmountable evidentiary hurdles preclude any
realistic proof of damages. 42 The two lines of reasoning produce the
same result-that the child's recovery is barred-but they do so in
significantly different ways. Decisions based on policy concerns pro-
duce judgments that announce, as a matter of law, that life is always
preferable to the alternatives regardless of the severity of the indi-
vidual's impairments and suffering. Decisions based on evidentiary
concerns express a more modest conclusion: because the fact finder
cannot know anything about nonexistence, she cannot compare it to
life with severe impairments and, thus, cannot evaluate whether the
child would have been better off never born. 43 In effect, the court finds
the damages speculative and uncertain, and therefore beyond the pos-
sibility of proof.44 Since the plaintiff cannot prove any damages, she
cannot prevail. 45
Neither the policy concerns nor the evidentiary concerns raise in-
surmountable barriers. In fact, the evidentiary concerns are simply
wrong. Despite human ignorance of conditions that precede concep-
tion or birth, traditional tort rules governing damages afford plaintiffs
ample means of demonstrating their loss.4 A court's willingness to
apply existing damage principles to a child's claim would reduce the
uncertainty that the courts now perceive to levels that courts routinely
accept in other torts. A court's reliance on policy concerns also over-
looks the fact that courts deal with similar policy issues in other cases,
most notably in right-to-die cases. 47 Policies based on the sanctity of
41. Id. at 235, 512 N.E.2d at 696; see also Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 260, 698 P.2d
315, 322 (1984); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 254, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (1986); Smith,
128 N.H. at 248-50, 513 A.2d at 352-53; Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 429-30, 404 A.2d 8,
12-13 (1979) (overruled by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984)).
42. See Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 744; Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12, 386
N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978); Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (1975); see also Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202,
1206-07 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Smith, 128 N.H. at 248, 513 A.2d at 352; Azzolino, 315 N.C.
at 109, 337 S.E.2d at 532-33; Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984).
43. Professor Feinberg points out the paradox of language that suggests the child would
have been better off if never born: if never born, the child would not have been at all and,
thus, would not have been better off. Feinberg, supra note 13, at 68. Not everyone shares
Professor Feinberg's confidence that nothing is until birth or conception. See 2 J. CAPBELL,
TAE MAsic oF GOD: ORmNrAL MYTHOLOGY 228-31 (Penguin ed. 1962) (describing Jainism).
In any event, the language, if artless, raises a real issue: would nonexistence be preferable to
the child's agonizing existence? See Feinberg, supra note 13, at 68-69. Please forgive any lapses
into paradox that my choice of words may create.
44. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 912 (1979).
45. Some courts try to differentiate injury from damages. That approach, however,
ultimately collapses into the policy approach. See infra notes 91-127 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 49-90 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 128-202 and accompanying text.
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human life demand not the blind and stubborn pronouncements of
today's courts, but a sensitive and thoughtful analysis.
Children's genetic counselling tort claims should be treated like
other torts. A court could recognize a child's cause of action by ap-
plying accepted remedial principles. A probing analysis of the courts'
policy and evidentiary concerns suggests that the courts either have
overlooked alternatives to their reasoning or have rationalized the rules
they favor for reasons that are not revealed in their opinions.4
A. Evidentiary Concerns
A thorough consideration of traditional premises of tort damage
recovery should dispel any evidentiary concerns and illustrate that the
traditional rules can accommodate most of the child's damages with
requisite certainty. 49 The child need not ask the jury to speculate about
or consider uncertain elements of damage any more than other tort
plaintiffs seeking recovery for pain or distress. Courts do not stumble
over uncertainty when assessing a child-plaintiff's proof of loss. Rather,
they balk when faced with the uncertainty of valuing the counter-
vailing benefits bestowed on the plaintiff as a result of her having been
born when, but for the defendant's actions, she otherwise would not
have been born. By denying recovery because the measure of the off-
setting benefits is speculative, courts allow the tail to wag the dog.
A child born with a genetic defect suffers pecuniary losses that
are easily ascertained. Like any child, she will require food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, and other necessities of life. The child would
not have incurred these expenses if she had not been born.50 While
48. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 4, at 647 n.138, 650 ("[C]ourts are not announcing
purely rational conclusions ... but are instead proclaiming their personal views on certain
value-laden 'facts."'); Rogers, supra note 18, at 754 (suggesting anti-abortion sentiment
underlies rejection of the child's claim); Comment, The Wrongful Life Claim-The Legal
Dilemma of Existence Versus Nonexistence: "To Be or Not to Be," 64 TuL. L. REv. 895,
917-18 (1990) (stating that "by leaving abortion rights to the states the [Supreme] Court
compounded the difficulty of the wrongful life plaintiff").
49. Some judges find certainty unnecessary. Juries may assess a reasonable amount of
damages even when the evidence will not permit precise calculation. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTs § 912 (1977); see, e.g., Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 748 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)
(Higgins, J., dissenting). Most courts, however, have not found this reasoning persuasive. See,
e.g., Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739-40 (Ariz. 1990) (en bane); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, 428, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979). This section of the Article, therefore, argues that damages
can be assessed with a reasonable degree of certainty. The next section challenges the arguments
courts use to avoid the well-established principle that damages need not be shown with absolute
precision. See infra notes 91-127 and accompanying text.
50. One can argue whether parents or children actually incur these expenses. When parents
meet their obligations to their children they pay these expenses. But the expenses originate
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a jury will need to project these expenses, they are easily imagined and
well within the realm of acceptable expert testimony.51 In fact, the
federal government regularly prepares a report of such likely ex-
penses.52 This projection calls for no more uncertainty or speculation
than awards of future lost earnings in a simple accident case.
Similarly, a child suffering from a severe genetic defect may incur
additional expenses over and above what a healthy child would re-
quire, such as medical care necessitated by the defect. Medical ex-
penses are a standard component of damage awards and, therefore,
estimates of future medical expenses seem acceptable. Other tort cases
sometimes come to trial before all treatment is complete. No greater
conceptual difficulty arises for the jury in genetic counselling cases.
Calculating pecuniary damages actually might be simpler in ge-
netic counselling cases than in other tort cases. A plaintiff who never
was born never would hold a job and, therefore, the jury will not need
to project her lost income.5 3 Nonpecuniary damages offer a similar
simplification. The jury need not calculate the "hedonic damages" for
the lost enjoyment of life.54 If the child had not been born, she would
not have enjoyed any of the benefits of life.
Other nonpecuniary losses pose no special problem for the jury.
A child born with severe genetic defects may endure pain and suf-
with and follow the child, not the parents. Thus, a child who is abandoned or put up for
adoption continues to incur these expenses even though the parents do not pay them. Within
a given family, it is immaterial whether the parents or child recover for this loss, as long as
one and only one recovery occurs.
51. See, e.g., Jones v. Malinawski, 299 Md. 257, 272, 473 A.2d 429, 436 (1984); Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 261, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520-21 (1971) ("a computation which is
routinely performed in countless cases"); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 66, 450
N.W.2d 243, 245 (1960) ("similar calculations are routinely performed in countless other
malpractice situations"); see also University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court,
136 Ariz. 579, 586, 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 (1983); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 50,
300 N.W.2d 727, 729 (1989) (affirming award of $57,000 for child rearing expenses).
52. Fitzpatrick & Doucette, The Estate Value of a Child, 25 J. Fm. L. 529, 530 n.1
(1987) ("Regularly updated tables are published in the USDA Agricultural Research Service's
Family Economics Review, a quarterly publication.").
53. Cf. Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 614, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 907-
08 (1984) (doctors' negligence does not cause loss of earning capacity since "one cannot lose
what one never had").
54. "Hedonic damages" is the (perhaps unfortunate) name given to efforts to measure
the nonpecuniary value of life. Note, Hedonic Damages in Section 1983 Actions: A Remedy
.for Unconstitutional Deprivation of Life, 44 WASH. & LE L. REv. 321, 326 (1987) (authored
by John Williamson). In death cases, the measure seeks to fill the gap left by pecuniary
measures that assume the only value of the deceased's life was the support she would contribute
to her survivors. R. POSNER, supra note 3, § 6.12. This class of damages seeks to include the
deceased's lost opportunity to enjoy life. For living plaintiffs, the lost opportunity for enjoyment
already may creep into awards for pain and suffering. See Murray, Hedonic Damages: Properly
a Factor Within Pain and Suffering Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 10 N. ILL. U.L. Ray. 37
(1989); Note, supra, at 328 n.45.
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fering. If unborn, the child would not have suffered that pain." Juries
typically include pain and suffering in their awards to tort plaintiffs. 6
The evaluation of distress and pain is subjective, but not so alien to
a jury that recovery must be denied completely.
Pain and suffering and other damages tell only half the tale. De-
spite the affliction, a child may enjoy some benefits of life. The cal-
culations become uncertain when the court tries to evaluate the child's
net position by balancing these alleged benefits against the damages.
The joy the child experiences is a unique contribution of the defendant
because without the defendant's tortious conduct the child never would
have lived. Moreover, we know nothing of the nonexistence that pre-
cedes birth or conception.17 If some aspect of a person (for example,
a soul) exists and is tormented in some way before the child is born,
the pain from which the soul is rescued as a result of the child being
born should offset some of the pain the child suffers because of birth. 8
The so called "benefits rule" provides a mechanism for courts
to offset the benefits the defendant confers upon the plaintiff against
the damages the plaintiff may recover. 9 Courts, however, find the
55. But see infra note 58.
56. See, e.g., F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 2, § 25.10 ("All courts allow
damages for conscious pain and suffering in personal injury cases.... The matter is frankly
committed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the jury ...." (footnotes omitted)).
57. E.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967) (Weintraub,
C.J., dissenting in part); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978).
58. Theoretically, some status may precede birth or conception. That status could involve
some pain or distress or it could involve untold joy from which we wrest the soul upon birth
and subject it to the torments of the world. E.g., J. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 228-31. Our
inability to assess nonexistence led one commentator to urge that we assess it at zero. See
Comment, A Cause of Action For "Wrongful Life": [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MNN. L.
REv. 58, 66 (1970). That approach would avoid what one of my colleagues refers to as the
"science fiction" sound of this footnote. Comments of Christopher Wonnell, Professor of
Law, Univ. of San Diego (August 1989). Once the possibility of any pain or joy before birth
is dismissed, the comparison required to fix benefits becomes unmysterious. It simply involves
determining whether the joy the individual experiences outweighs the pain. Both sides of the
comparison look at life, good and bad; neither requires a view of prelife experiences, if any.
Overlooking the possibility of preconception pain or joy, however, requires us to accept one
view of the world and reject others. The child's entitlement to recovery does not require a
limited world view. Courts need not embrace secular humanism (or another view that denies
preconception pain or joy) in order to recognize the cause of action. See also infra text
accompanying and following notes 109-112.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). The "benefits rule" seems more
properly addressed as the benefits exception to the rule that plaintiffs may recover all damages
caused by the defendant's tort. The first use of the phrase that I have uncovered is in Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 254, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971), a case involving the birth of
a healthy child after a pharmacist negligently filled a prescription for contraceptives with
tranquilizers. Even the Troppi court referred to the concept as the "so called 'benefit rule,"'
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child's benefits too speculative to permit a jury to evaluate them. Ac-
cording to one court, "[mI]an, who knows nothing of death or noth-
ingness, cannot possibly know" the relative value of the pain the
plaintiff suffers alive and the pain she would have suffered unborn. 60
Since the jury cannot evaluate these intractable benefits, some courts
refuse to permit juries to assess any damages at all, even those cal-
culable with certainty.
The result is assailable on numerous grounds. First, the benefits
rule should not permit a defendant to thrust unwanted benefits upon
a plaintiff. The Restatement (Second) of Torts never was intended to
govern unwanted benefits. 6' When the child comes to court pleading
that she would prefer never to have been born, the court's response,
in effect, exonerates the defendant because she bestowed upon the
plaintiff the very "benefit" the plaintiff does not want-in fact, the
very "benefit" the parents sought to avoid by consulting the genetic
counsellor in the first place.
This argument simplifies the situation somewhat because, in re-
ality, the child lacks the capacity to assert a preference for nonbirth
rather than impaired life. The child's infancy or impairments (or a
combination of both) compel the parents as next friend or a guardian
ad litem to express the child's preferences. 62 Parents or guardians may
misjudge the child's preferences. In a case in which the surrogate may
benefit from a damage award-as parents normally would-courts
might want to probe the allegations concerning the child's prefer-
ences. 63 Appointment of a disinterested guardian ad litem also might
be appropriate.
One thing, however, seems certain: the defendant is the last per-
son that one would expect to accurately assert the child's preferences.
although it did not indicate who originally coined the phrase. The concept itself is far older
than this case, and it appeared in the first Restatement of Torts as well. RrsTATEENT OF
ToRrs § 920 (1939). The Restatement drew illustrations from cases dating back to 1868. See
Murphy v. City of Fond du Lac, 23 Wis. 365, 99 Am. Dec. 181 (1868). See generally
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs appendix § 920 (1982) (citing cases supporting the proposition
that the damages allowable for a particular interest be diminished by the amount to which the
same interest has benefitted by the defendant's tortious conduct).
60. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 63, 227 A.2d at 711 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
61. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) op TORTS § 920 comment f (1979) ("This principle is intended
primarily to restrict the injured person's recovery to the harm that he actually incurred and
not to permit the tortfeasor to force a benefit on him against his will." (emphasis added)).
62. "The persons who might be expected to [prefer nonexistence] in their own case are
often so bad off that they are not even competent to form the opinion or express it, and it
must be expressed on their behalf by others." Feinberg, supra note 13, at 69.
63. A probing consideration of the child's preferences also might avoid claims based on
minor defects or the mere absence of a "preferred" trait. See infra notes 264-288 and
accompanying text.
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The defendant is every bit as interested in the outcome as the parents.
If knowledge of the plaintiff's views carries any weight,64 it is unlikely
that the defendant knows the child as well as the parents know her.
In fact the genetic counselor may have a physician's professional pre-
disposition toward valuing and prolonging life that might skew her
assessment of the plaintiff's preferences. 65 In addition, the person who
made the mistake in the first place may be inclined to contend that
everything worked out for the best regardless of the realities of the
situation. 66
Second, the speculative nature of the benefits should not obscure
the certainty of the loss the child suffers. The pecuniary loss and pain
and suffering are real and determinable. Juries can imagine them read-
ily and can reach an appropriate award. Only the benefits are spec-
ulative. The defendant's proof, rather than the plaintiff's, fails because
of its speculative nature. 67 To deny recovery because the defendant
cannot produce exculpatory evidence seems backwards. 6
Courts do not react this way when evaluating damages in the con-
text of other torts. Imagine, for example, a court denying recovery
in a survival action for pain and suffering prior to death because the
64. It might not, since the child's infancy and impairments may prevent formation or
expression of views to which a court could defer with any confidence.
65. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 308 (1986) (Compton, J., concurring) (suggesting that the medical profession may find a
way to harmonize the Hippocratic Oath's promise "to give no deadly medicine to anyone"
with "right-to-die" cases).
66. Capron identifies a similar rationalization: some genetic counsellors might try to cover
their mistakes by claiming that they intentionally withheld information from the parents for
therapeutic reasons. Capron, supra note 4, at 630-31 n.43. Professor Capron questions whether
the privilege has any realistic application in genetic counselling. Id. One may imagine, however,
circumstances under which a genetic counsellor seriously might believe that informing a mother
that she carried a severely impaired embryo might shock her into a heart attack.
67. Melinda Roberts further develops this argument and persuasively attacks the policy
arguments that courts have used to deny the child's claim. See Roberts, Distinguishing Wrongful
from "Rightful" Life, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 59, 67-69 (1990).
68. The risk of uncertainty should fall on the party with the burden of proof, which in
this instance is the defendant. See Roberts, supra note 67, at 69. At best, the balance of losses
and benefits raises a question of fact for the jury. Placing the burden on the defendant may
seem unfair, given the speculative or at least difficult-to-prove nature of the benefits bestowed.
Id. at 69-70. In some circumstances, courts have relieved the defendant of the onus of
producing exculpatory evidence in open court. See, e.g., Molerio v. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (government secrets doctrine freed FBI from
burden of proving in open court that plaintiff was denied employment for failure to obtain
security clearance rather than discrimination against Cubans; court reviewed the evidence in
camera before accepting the defense). In genetic counselling torts, however, the evidence merely
would offset some of the damages and would not exculpate the defendant. In addition, judicial
resolution of the uncertainty against the plaintiff when evidence is unavailable or purely
speculative subverts the entire purpose of placing the burden on the defendant.
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benefits to the decedent upon her ascension to heaven might outweigh
the damages incurred .69 Courts should neither speculate concerning the
existence of heaven and the salvation of the decedent's soul nor permit
a defendant to thrust an unsought benefit on the decedent. The limits
of the benefits rule, so apparent in the context of actions following
death,70 should apply equally to genetic counselling actions following
birth.
Third, the benefits rule as currently formulated will not produce
a total offset in any event. The rule permits a defendant to reduce
damages to one interest, for example a pecuniary interest, by illus-
trating the benefits that are bestowed on that same interest.7' In genetic
counselling cases, defendants cannot point to any pecuniary benefit
bestowed upon the plaintiff.7 2 Thus, pecuniary losses should be re-
coverable even if the nonpecuniary benefits reaped completely offset
the plaintiff's nonpecuniary distress and pain.73 At most, these evi-
dentiary concerns should lead courts to limit recovery for pain and
suffering.7 4 By rejecting the cause of action in its entirety, the courts
overreact to a manageable problem.
Fourth, courts should not apply the benefits rule to deny children
support. A putative father cannot defend a paternity action on the
ground that the benefits of life to the child outweigh any injury caused
by his failure to contribute to her support. 75 Yet to exculpate genetic
69. Notably, the argument is not stronger if phrased in terms of fairness to the defendant,
who cannot adduce proof of the possible benefits. See supra note 68.
70. The application to actions following death seems so plain that research reveals no
appellate decisions in which courts have been called upon to discuss the issue.
71. REsTATEMENT (SacoND) or TORTS § 920 & comment b (1979) ("Damages resulting
from an invasion of one interest are not diminished by showing that another interest has been
benefitted.").
72. This statement assumes that the plaintiff's impairments will preclude gainful employ-
ment at any time during the child's life. This seems likely for any plaintiff who can establish
that she would have been better off never born. If the plaintiff earns income during her life,
that benefit can offset any pecuniary losses she suffers since she never would have earned
income if she had not been born. Other circumstances might produce similar offsets. For
example, if the plaintiff is at birth the beneficiary of a trust set up by a grandparent, income
from the trust could offset pecuniary damages.
73. The rule admits some flexibility in defining the "interests" subject to both benefit
and harm. For instance, Professor Capron suggested that in the parents' cause of action the
joys of parenthood would offset both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages suffered by the
parents as parents, but that the cost, pain, and distress suffered during pregnancy would not
be subject to offset since it did not affect their "parental interest." Capron, supra note 4, at
638-39, n.91. The Restatement, however, seems to offset pecuniary interests only with pecuniary
benefits. RETATEMENTr (SEcoND) op TORTS § 920 comment b, illustrations 4-6 (1979).
74. Some scholars may prefer abolishing this limitation on the benefits rule. See, e.g., D.
LAycocK, supra note 1, at 141.
75. In fact, the earliest use of the-term "wrongful life" occurred in paternity cases in
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counsellors based on the benefits rule would produce much the same
result. The genetic counsellor, like the putative parent, caused the
child's birth: but for her negligence, the child would not have been
born. 76 Why permit the genetic counsellor to evade the obligation to
contribute to the support of the child whose life she caused when a
putative parent could not evade liability on the same ground?
At least one answer suggests itself: Paternity actions are creatures
of statute, not common law tort suits. 77 The issue in a paternity action
is support, which is not a question of fault. 78 In addition, not only
do different rules for damages apply to paternity actions, but support
orders may not be termed "damages" at all.79 This is because ulti-
mately the support obligation never completely shifts: both the plain-
tiff/mother and defendant/father must contribute to the child's
support.80 In tort cases a finding of liability potentially could shift the
which a healthy child born out of wedlock sued her putative father for the "defect" of
bastardy. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963). In Cowe v.
Forum Group, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. App. 1989), the court recognized an action for
wrongful life by a child against the state in similar circumstances when a healthy child was
born to mentally retarded, institutionalized parents. See also Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d
481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966). But see Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d
1, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983) (rejecting the child's claim on facts similar to Cowe).
76. The genetic counsellor cannot dispute the causation without forfeiting any defense
under the benefits rule. Only if the genetic counsellor's acts or omissions caused the child's
birth can she claim credit for the benefits of life. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920
comment d (1979).
77. "At common law, the mother of an illegitimate child, being presumptively entitled to
custody, was exclusively responsible for its support. The father had no obligation to provide
support." S. GREEN & J. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS § 5.33 (1984)
(footnotes omitted). The common law rule has "been invalidated as an improper discrimination
between legitimate children ... and illegitimate children . . . ." W. STATSKY, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS: LAW AoND SKILLS 450 (1978); see Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). Many states
recognized the support obligation by statute long before they were compelled to do so by case
law. R. COOLEY, TIFFANY ON DoMEsTIc RELATIONS § 115(c) (1921). Courts have maintained
support obligations as distinct from tort recoveries. See Hobbs v. Christenson, 243 Cal. Rptr
633 (1988) (not published per Cal. Rule of Ct. 976); In re Jane Doe, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1546 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); accord A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439, 507 P.2d 468 (1973);
State ex rel. Carrington v. Schutts, 217 Kan. 175, 535 P.2d 982 (1975); State ex rel. Larimore
v. Snyder, 206 Neb. 64, 291 N.W.2d 241 (1980); Barnhart v. Madvig, 526 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn.
1975).
78. For example, fraud by the mother will not relieve a father of the duty to support.
See S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 77, § 5.24 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (citing Stephen K. v.
Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980)); Faske v. Bonanno, 137 Mich.
App. 202, 357 N.W.2d 860 (1984); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 59 N.Y.2d 1, 449 N.E.2d 713,
462 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1983)); Hughes v. Hutt, 500 Pa. 209, 455 A.2d 623 (1983).
79. See, e.g., UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY § 1: "The father of a child which is or may
be born out of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock
... for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the
education, necessary support and funeral expenses of the child."
80. "[T]he two basic theories for establishment of child support guidelines are the 'cost-
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support obligation completely to the defendant/loser. Support judg-
ments" also vary with the defendant's ability to pay.81 Often support
judgments apply prospectively, stated as a certain sum per month, 2
and they are subject to reopening if circumstances, such as the father's
income or the child's needs, change.8 3 Tort damages, on the other hand,
typically take the form of a lump sum judgment that, outside of set-
tlement or appeal, becomes fixed regardless of changing circum-
stances.4
The rightful position standard can explain these differences if one
uses ingenuity when framing the remedy for such cases. In paternity
cases, the rightful position may not be the absence of the child, but
rather the birth of a child to a married couple. The wrong consists
not of producing offspring, but of doing so without accepting marital
and parental responsibilities. The remedies outlined above approxi-
mate the position the parties would have occupied if the parents" had
married before producing the child. Fault would have been insignif-
icant; only support would matter. While married parents might divide
responsibility differently, s they would share responsibility for the
child's support. Neither parent's obligation to contribute would exceed
his or her capacity to contribute. Both parents would provide support
continuously as they obtained the means, not in a lump sum at birth
or shortly thereafter. 86 Up to a point, then, paternity actions and tort
suits may inv6lve similar remedial principles.8 7
sharing and income sharing approaches."' 2 S. ScHATraN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS
§ 28.05[2] (4th ed. 1989) (footnote omitted). "The financial resources ... of each parent"
"should be considered in establishment of child support .... ." Id.
81. The primary factors influencing support awards are the child's needs and the parent's
ability to pay. Id.
82. UNimoRfx ACT ON PATERNITY § 11.
83. Id. § 5.
84. See, e.g., D. DoBBs, REMEDIES § 8.1 (1973); F. HARPER, F. JAMEs & 0. GRAY, supra
note 2, § 25.2.
85. If married, both parents might hold jobs while someone else provided child care
services. Alternatively, one parent might work outside the home while the other provided
household services. In either case, each parent contributes significantly to the support of the
child.
86. Another difference that may have influenced these rules is the availability of insurance.
If fathers could insure against liability in a paternity action-in the same way a genetic
counsellor may obtain professional liability insurance-limits on the size and timing of the
award might have evolved differently. Certainly the transaction costs of collecting support
awards could be avoided, to the great benefit of all concerned, if an insurer paid the entire
judgment up front. Of course, one can understand the reluctance of insurance companies to
offer such policies.
87. The analogy may break down. Support awards do not compensate children for the
distress of growing up without one parent or for the lost love and affection that the absent
parent would have provided. See Hobbs v. Christenson, 243 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 n.4. (1988)
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To some extent, this view of paternity actions undermines the
initial analogy. Courts need not apply the benefits rule in paternity
suits because, unlike in genetic counselling torts, the rightful position
(a married family) includes the child's life. Since the child would have
been born in either case she receives no benefits to offset, and the only
difference would be the marital status of the parents.8 8 The benefits
rule thus becomes irrelevant to paternity actions, but not to genetic
counselling torts.
The benefits defense recedes, however, only if the courts show
an imaginative willingness to tinker with the rightful position in order
to achieve a fair and appropriate result. Lawmakers could just as easily
say that the wrong was the premarital intercourse, but for which the
child would not have lived.8 9 Under that simpler and perhaps more
realistic approach, the benefits rule would cloud claims for child sup-
port. The law avoids that cloud simply by expanding the notion of
the rightful position beyond the most obvious and conventional ap-
proach.9
Avoiding that cloud means ignoring causation. In paternity suits,
the law provides for support without regard to whether, but for the
intercourse out of wedlock, the parties would have married. Requiring
such proof might preclude support awards in a great number of cases.
Even when causation is true, proof might be impossible. The law ap-
pears willing to accept a fictional rightful position: one that might
never have occurred, but that serves the ends of justice.
Part II of this Article suggests an alternative rightful position for
genetic counselling torts that competes with the conventional wisdom.
(ordered not published per Cal. Rule of Ct. 976). The rightful position described in text could
support such recovery-assuming that, if the parents had married, the child would have
received love from the missing parent and that the parent's presence would have alleviated
distress rather than caused more. That assumption calls for substantial speculation. Id. Whether
the law should make an assumption either way or permit the parties to present their proof,
the analogy drawn in the text seems close enough to supply a useful criticism of the application
of the benefits rule to the child's claim in genetic counselling torts.
88. While the father lacks the benefit of raising the child, that does not justify reducing
the award. The benefits rule adjusts awards based on benefits bestowed on the plaintiff, not
benefits foregone by the defendant. When the defendant's decision to forego the benefit-that
is, to abandon the child and eschew the joys of parenthood-is the very decision that gives
rise to liability, an offset for the benefits foregone seems absurd.
89. Indeed, some courts come dangerously close to such statements. In Hobbs, the court
noted that "[h]ere, we have an action by a daughter against her father who, despite his
subsequent conduct, did give her life." Hobbs, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 635. This candor is noteworthy
and helps explain judicial thought. But the unorthodox expression probably contributed to the
California Supreme Court's decision to depublish this case.
90. In the area of child support, the statutory provisions announce the recovery rules
without explicitly identifying the rightful position upon which they are based. By implicitly
rejecting any offset for the benefits of life, the statutes in effect choose the "married" over
the "unborn" rightful position.
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Borrowing from misrepresentation law, courts could seek to put the
plaintiff in the position she would have occupied if the counsellor's
diagnosis had been correct-as a child who does not suffer from ge-
netic impairments. This rightful position offers courts the same kind
of useful fiction that support awards seem to require. The willingness
of courts to employ the alternative view might eliminate much of the
philosophical confusion that has characterized actions by children
seeking recovery for genetic counselling torts. The court may compare
the impaired child to a healthy child, awarding expenses the impaired
child incurs that the healthy child would not incur and compensating
for pain and suffering the impaired child suffers that the healthy child
would not endure. Before exploring that alternative in detail, tradi-
tional tort principles deserve further exploration.
B. Damages or Injury?
Tort damage principles seem capable of resolving any uncertainty.
The common law has produced and continues to refine principles that
courts can apply to genetic counselling torts to assess damages rea-
sonably without recourse to sympathy and uncertainty on the one hand
or rejection of provable damages on the other.
Some courts, however, try to differentiate injury from damages
and treat them as separate elements of the child's case that require
distinct proof under different standards. 91 By failing to recognize or
intentionally overlooking the ability of damage principles to resolve
the uncertainty-or at least to reduce it to manageable levels-courts
bypass traditional damage principles by postulating injury as a sep-
arate element of genetic counselling torts.92 The uncertainty of the nec-
91. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1209-10 (Colo. 1988) (en banc);
Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 248, 513 A.2d 341, 352 (1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 411-12, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978); Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918, 925 (rex. 1984); cf. Walker v. Mart, 164 Ariz. 37, 42, 790 P.2d 735, 739-40
(1990) (en banc) (suggesting that the difficult problem of quantifying damages should not
prevent courts from awarding such damages if in fact there was an injury); Bruggeman v.
Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 254, 718 P.2d 635, 643 (1986) (drawing a distinction between injury
and damages, but not relying upon it to decide the case).
92. To date, no court deciding a wrongful life case has employed the method suggested
in Part I.A. as a means of proving damages with certainty. The greatest obstacle courts have
confronted is the possibility of permitting a jury to estimate uncertain damages. See, e.g.,
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979):
[W]e would be extremely reluctant today to deny the validity of Sharon's complaint
solely because damages are difficult to ascertain. The courts bf this and other
jurisdictions have long held that where a wrong itself is of such a nature as to
preclude the computation of damages with precise exactitude, it would be a "per-
version of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured [party],
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts."
Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12 (citations omitted) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 284 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)).
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essary comparison between impaired life and nonexistence prevents the
courts from finding that an injury exists, and absent injury, the courts
refuse to consider damages. The courts reason that they need not per-
mit an estimation of damages because "it is impossible to rationally
decide whether the plaintiff has been damaged at all." 93
We can reject the last assertion because, at least on one level, the
comparison is possible. 94 By breaking down the comparison into man-
ageable component parts using time honored rules governing the as-
sessment of damages, courts and juries can compare life with the
alternative. The damage rules only fail us on one small part of the
comparison-with the offsetting benefits, not with harm, whether that
harm is called "damage" or "injury."
Since no court has considered the method of assessing damages
proposed in Part I.A., none has rejected it for failure to demonstrate
injury. Courts only have used the injury distinction to prevent juries
from estimating damages when the court believed damages were so
speculative that no one could tell if they equalled or exceeded zero. 95
If damage rules are applied systematically to produce a recovery with-
out undue speculation, the expressed concern disappears. 96 Courts that
accept the suggested application of damage rules may relinquish the
distinction between injury and damages.
Courts may not relinquish the injury/damage distinction for an-
other reason. A number of judicial decisions imply that the courts have
a different concern-a concern that life with impairments really is bet-
ter than no life at all and that the benefits really do outweigh any harm
the plaintiff suffers. 97 This view, however, does not implicate a con-
cern about injury or damages, but rather embodies the courts' un-
derlying policy judgment on the value of life. If that masked sentiment
remains strong, the existence of a technique to circumvent the ex-
pressed reasoning-that damage and injury are one and the same-will
not change the result. Courts will persist in distinguishing injury from
93. Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925.
94. The assertion also may be challenged on a more general level. See infra notes 109-
114 and accompanying text.
95. For example, in Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
900, the court held that there was no cognizable injury, but went on to conclude that the
damages were impossible to estimate. When it is impossible to tell whether or not damages
are zero, one can understand why the courts try to protect defendants from speculative
recoveries, which ultimately may be based only on the jury's sympathy.
96. Once confident that damages exceed zero, the precise amount of damages is a fact
question for the jury. Concern for verdicts based on sympathy remains, but it is within the
normal realm that courts can supervise by remittitur. See Roberts, supra note 67, at 70 &
n.38.
97. See, e.g., Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 254, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (1986);
Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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damages or seek a different rationale for the rejection of the child's
claim.
If this is how the courts reason, however, the injury argument
collapses into the policy concerns addressed below. 98 The idea that the
b~nefits really offset the entire harm expresses a judgment about rel-
ative values. The problem is not the plaintiff's failure to prove injury,
but the court's refusal to allow her to try. The courts do not express
a modest concern for the impossibility of the comparison, but rather
a fear that plaintiffs might make persuasive comparisons. Courts,
therefore, cut short the inquiry by concluding, as a matter of law, that
the comparison always favors life with impairments, no matter how
severe the impairments might be.
The use of the injury argument to mask the underlying policy
concerns has been obvious to some commentators for years, 99 yet courts
continue to phrase their decisions in terms of injury rather than forth-
rightly admit that they are making policy judgments.' 00 Perhaps, then,
the point that courts equate the injury with policy concerns requires
elaboration. The remainder of this section will attempt to remove any
doubt that this is how the courts evaluate the child's claim.
Initially, one should question whether any useful distinction be-
tween injury and damages exists. 01 Injury and damages are not in-
dependent concepts, but two sides of the same coin. The coin has the
same value no matter which side lands face up. Damages (the mon-
etary award) are designed to equal injury (the harm done).'02 The
98. See infra notes 128-202 and accompanying text.
99. Capron, supra note 4, at 647 n.138; Rogers, supra note 18, at 735.
100. Cornwell, Wrongful Life and the Problem of Euthanasia, 23 GoNz. L. REV. 573, 586
(1987).
101. In some areas of law, injury is treated as a separate element. In antitrust law, for
example, a plaintiff must prove "fact of damage" as an element of liability. Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 101 (1969). Similarly, a plaintiff must plead
damages to recover for fraud. See Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 793 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984); Cohen v. Brown, Harris, Stevens, Inc., 64
N.Y.2d 728, 731, 475 N.E.2d 116, 118, 485 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747 (1984); 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMEs
& 0. GRAY, supra note 2, at 590-91. In both contexts, the courts appear to reject nominal
damages by requiring evidence of actual damages, but not to reject claims when the plaintiff
has proven damages solely because some undefined "injury" was missing. Zenith, 395 U.S.
at 114 n.9 (burden met by minimal showing of damage); see 1 F. HARPER, F. JAmEs & 0.
GRAY, supra. An inquiry into the question of damages rather than injury seems the appropriate
inquiry in personal injury cases. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. ScawARTz, supra note
13, at 146.
102. D. DOnBS, supra note 84, § 8.1 ("In theory, at least, ... the damages awarded in
personal injury actions are aimed at compensating the victim or making good his losses"); see
D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 16.
Courts sometimes use damage and injury interchangeably. See, e.g., White v. Schnoebelen,
91 N.H. 273, 274, 18 A.2d 185, 186 (1941). White sets forth the unremarkable proposition
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plaintiff receives a benefit that equals, as closely as can be measured,
the burden of the injury. If conventional damage rules produce zero
recovery, then there is no injury. To deny that injury is ascertainable
when the damage rules produce a fairly large recovery-as is the cir-
cumstance in a wrongful life action-creates a remarkable paradox:
a coin whose value we can ascertain if it falls on the "heads" (or
that the statute of limitations on negligence does not begin to run until an injury occurs. Id.
at 274, 18 A.2d at 186. In so holding, the court's opinion used the words "injury" and
"damage" interchangeably. For example, in one instance the court first noted that "there is
no cause of action unless and until there has been an injury" and thereafter stated that,
"[tihere being then no actual damages, there could have been no recovery, since the theory
that there may be a right of action for negligence resulting in merely nominal damages is
repudiated here." Id. (emphasis added). No distinction between injury and damage emerges
from this opinion. Yet White is the only authority cited by the court in Smith v. Cote, 128
N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986), when it emphatically noted that injury is "a crucial problem
[because] . .. [i]t is axiomatic that there is no cause of action for negligence unless and until
there has been an injury." Id. at 248, 513 A.2d at 352 (quoting White v. Schnoebelen, 91
N.H. 273, 274, 18 A.2d 185, 186 (1941)).
In Johnson v. Sovereign Camp, 125 Tex. 329, 83 S.W.2d 605 (1935), in the process of
holding that the plaintiff had failed to perfect an appeal, the court stated that "[a]n action
for negligence cannot be maintained unless some damage has resulted therefrom." Id. at 335,
83 S.W.2d at 608. What has this to do with injury? Consider Justice Robertson's treatment
of Johnson in his concurring opinion in Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 929 (Tex. 1984):
This calculation cannot rationally be made, as man knows nothing of nonexistence,
and can assign it neither a positive nor a negative value. Unfortunately, the fact of
injury is a prima facie element in a cause of action for negligence. It is not fatal to
a cause of action in negligence that a plaintiff cannot prove the quantum of injury;
but a plaintiff must always establish the existence of injury.
Id. at 929 (Robertson, J., concurring) (citing Johnson v. Sovereign Camp, W.O. W., 125 Tex.
329, 83 S.W.2d 605 (1935)). Not only did the Johnson court fail to distinguish between the
existence and quantum of injury, but it spoke only in terms of damage and did not mention
injury at all. To find support in Johnson, Justice Robertson must think that injury and damage
are identical terms. That is particularly strange here when he was attempting to build an
argument that they are distinct. The Justice's usage could only be explained if he believed that
the Johnson court was confused and that when it said damage it really meant injury.
The majority in Nelson fared no better than Justice Robertson. It fashioned an argument
clearly aimed at damages, refuted it, then required a separate element of injury yet described
the element with the word damage:
All courts, even the ones recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life, have
admitted that this calculation is impossible. ...
Our holding is not based on a mere difficulty of assessing a dollar amount of
damages. It has long been held that imprecision of damages is not a bar to recovery.
But this is not just a case in which the damages evade precise measurement. Here,
it is impossible to rationally decide whether the plaintiff has been damaged at all.
Id. at 925 (citations omitted). The confusion makes it easy to understand how the court in
Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988) (en bane), could attribute injury arguments
to several courts that spoke only of the inability to calculate damages. Compare Lininger, 764
P.2d at 1210 n.10 with Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
and Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (1984) and Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975).
Regardless of whether a particular court prefers to use "damage" or "injury," the overall
imprecise use of terms by numerous courts implies that they believe there is more kinship than
distinction between the two.
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damages) side, but whose value becomes impossible to ascertain when
it lands on its "tails" (or injury) side. While merchants would quickly
learn how to flip the coin over and look at the other side, courts have
been slower to do so.
One also might inquire exactly what the other side of the coin
looks like. Just what makes the comparison between impaired life and
nonexistence for purposes of determining injury so difficult that courts
refuse to permit juries to make? How does it differ from a comparison
that is guided by the damage rules? Most court decisions do not answer
these inquiries. Rather, they merely denounce the comparison as an
"impossible" one. The New York Court of Appeals flatly announced
the impossibility of making the comparison in a passage that has sub-
sequently been cited by other courts as gospel:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been
born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be
left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can assert
no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the very
nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has placed
on human life, rather than its absence. 03
The comparison of injury and damage in this context, however, must
involve something other- than mere application of traditional damage
rules. Otherwise why would the courts carefully distinguish damages
from injury?1°4
Ultimately, courts provide us with only one identifying trait of
this comparison: its lack of definition. Injury apparently requires a
gestalt comparison, without any subdivision into subsidiary questions
or component issues. Courts address the question in its most general
form, on its face, without recourse to any detailed analysis.'05 Courts
do not state what an injury is, how to identify it, or how to differ-
entiate an injury from absence of injury. Their approach-almost
"we'd know an injury if we saw it, but we don't see it here"-smacks
of tautology, ipse dixit in the first degree. Because the comparison
seems too difficult to answer, the courts throw up their hands in de-
spair. They proclaim the comparison impossible and the child's claim
103. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978). Many subsequent decisions quote the passage in text. See Moores, 405 So. 2d at
1025; Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 II. 2d 230, 243, 512 N.E.2d 691, 698 (1987);
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 250-51, 718 P.2d 635, 640 (1986); Azzolino v. Dingfelder,
315 N.C. 103, 109-10, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1985); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 248, 513
A.2d 341, 352 (1986); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984).
104. If the comparison equates with that performed under the damage rules, then the
arguments, raised if the preceding Section of this Article fully dispose of the question of
whether the plaintiff was injured. See supra notes 49-90 and accompanying text.
105. See Smith, 128 N.H. at 248, 513 A.2d at 352; Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d
at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900; Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925.
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fails based on plaintiff's manifest inability to prove an injury.
One court has attempted to explain in more detail the difficulty
in assessing injury. In Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 106 the Colorado Supreme
Court broke injury down into three subsidiary steps: "Our finding of
such an injury would require first, that we value Pierce's present sta-
tion in life; second that we ascertain the value to Pierce of his not
having been born; and finally, that we determine that the latter value
is greater than the former."' 10 7 Although this approach to assessing
injury sounds quite analytical, the.court would not dream of applying
it in any other tort situation.
Imagine, for example, applying this formulation to a slip and fall
case in which plaintiff suffered a broken arm. Would the court de-
termine the value of the plaintiff's present station in life-that is, as-
sign a value to life with a broken arm-and then evaluate the plaintiff's
life without a broken arm? How would a court assess the value of life
with or without a broken arm? The court in Lininger implied that these
questions require resort to direct comparison and cannot be answered
in the abstract form in which they are phrased. 08 Thus, the court's
approach, which on its face appears rhetorical, boils down to no more
than yet another bald assertion that the comparison is impossible.
Courts cannot reach their preferred result without phrasing the
question of injury as a gestalt. If the question is broken down into
component parts-such as pecuniary losses, and pain and suffering-
the comparison becomes manageable. Only by keeping the question
at its most general level does it remain daunting.
Even if viewed at the most general level, however, nonexistence
may not differ significantly from many other conditions that juries
evaluate without personal knowledge. As one commentator has noted,
"[the fact that we have not experienced these afflictions does not
preclude us from imagining, albeit imperfectly, any one or several of
these states, informed by other sense experiences (or deprivations of
sense experiences) which provide approximations of blindness, deaf-
ness, paralysis, and retardation."109 Given that "there was a time when
[all persons, and therefore each juror] did not exist," one even might
posit that nonexistence is easier for a juror to imagine than many of
the conditions jurors are already asked to evaluate." 0
Admittedly some differences make nonexistence harder to eval-
uate than other human conditions. If jurors did not exist before con-
106. 764 P.2d 1202, 1209-10 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
107. Id. at 1210.
108. Id.
109. See Cornwell, supra note 100, at 575-76.
110. Id. at 575.
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ception or birth,' they did not sense or record that condition and thus
cannot call it to mind. Even if some part of a person (such as the soul)
existed before conception or birth, that existence may have differed
so greatly from our current form that few persons could remember
and describe it."2 Thus, neither personal experience nor testimony can
help jurors imagine and compare nonbirth to the child's condition.
On the other hand, if we did not exist before conception, non-
existence may be nothing more than the absence of things we know
in our present post-birth existence. To the extent we can imagine the
absence of each sense and ability independently, as we must when called
upon to assess damages for a plaintiff negligently deprived on one or
more senses or abilities, why not permit jurors to imagine the absence
of all senses or abilities simultaneously?
Ultimately, a comparison between our present living state and our
preconception state only presents a daunting obstacle if some form
of existence precedes conception. In that case, "nonexistence" no longer
accurately describes our state of being lrior to conception since that
state of being by definition consists of more than just the absence of
senses and abilities. What that "more" is, and whether it is good or
bad, no one can say without asking others to accept their assertions
on faith. Courts, however, demand evidence. Thus, by silently positing
some "more" existence that precedes birth and by insisting that jurors
compare that status to the plaintiff's condition at the most general
level and without particularization, courts "create" a comparison that
jurors are ill-equipped to handle. The courts' critical decision to create
this comparison remains hidden because they do not discuss or explain
why they choose to ask the question at that level of generality.
When courts call the question "injury," they feel comfortable
addressing it on a general or broad level and in asserting that its res-
olution is impossible. If they confronted the issue as one of "dam-
ages," they would face a series of smaller, more manageable inquiries
that would present questions of fact for the jury. Equally important,
the smaller questions would divide the risk of failure to persuade among
the parties. The plaintiff would bear the risk of failure to persuade
the jury as to the losses. But the defendant, who must prove the off-
setting benefits she claims accrued to the plaintiff as a result of her
negligence, would bear the risk of nonpersuasion on that issue. When
the issue is framed as one of injury, the risk of uncertainty rests only
on the plaintiff, who must prove injury. By calling the issue injury,
courts silently reallocate the burden of proof to the plaintiff and pack
111. See supra note 58.
112. But cf. S. MAcLAUn, OUT ON A LDa (1983).
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the harms, benefits, and uncertainty into a single gestalt issue called
injury. In so doing, the court need not even acknowledge that it is
making these judgments. Rhetoric on the inability to decide the gestalt
issue ends the inquiry without any call to explain the real judgments
being made.
The policy concerns the courts express lie behind the courts' near
unanimous decisions to pack the questions up in the injury issue."'
Although most courts use language relating to injury to mask or
at least preface the real basis for judgment, some courts expressly re-
veal their reliance on policy concerns. For example, Smith v. Cote"4
seems entirely grounded on policy concerns. The Smith court men-
tioned injury separately from damages or policy concerns and quoted
decisions which held that it is impossible to compare life with im-
pairments to nonexistence.' 5 The court, however, stated no conclusion
on the injury issue and immediately proceeded to discuss the policy
reasons for denying the child's claim.1 6 The court expressed reluctance
to decide "whether a given person's life is or is not worthwhile," con-
cern that such a declaration might erode the rights of living handi-
capped people, and concern for defendants who might lose such suits
even if unjustly accused." 7 Thus, while injury played a role in the
rhetoric, the court relied primarily on policy objections and, to a lesser
extent, on the evidentiary difficulty of making the required compar-
ison.
The court's analysis in Smith followed the reasoning of and relied
on the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Becker v. Schwartz."8
In addressing injury, the Becker court coined the oft-quoted abdi-
cation to "philosophers and theologians" to decide whether it is better
not to be born at all than to be born with deficiencies." 9 The court
immediately appealed to "the very nearly uniform high value which
the law and mankind has placed on human life rather than its
113. Arguably, attorneys have failed to help the courts unpack the issues by themselves
failing to address the individual issues and to point out the hidden judgments. If such is the
case, that leaves the courts to follow a path driven by unexamined intuitions. Again, I suspect
the intuitions driving the courts' judgment relate to the value of life and animosity towards
abortion.
114. 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986).
115. Id. at 248, 513 A.2d at 352 (citing Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex.
1984), and Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978)).
116. Smith, 128 N.H. at 248-50, 513 A.2d at 352-53.
117. Id.; see also infra notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
118. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978).
119. Id. The court anticipates no resolution by philosophers and theologians. The abdication
is complete and final, not a referral to some other tribunal.
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absence"2°-a clear reference to policy concerns. The court concluded
its argument by pointing to the "staggering" implications of recog-
nizing an injury, thereby suggesting a further policy rationale based
on the classic slippery slope concept.1 21
There are substantive reasons to put aside the semantic haggling
over the label that should attach to the injury/damage issue and to
permit the cases to proceed to judgment on the merits. Recognizing
the child's cause of action would serve the policies that tort law seeks
to advance."" Moreover, recognizing the child's cause of action would
reduce the inconsistency between the way courts treat right-to-die cases
and genetic counselling torts.'2
Even courts that wish to reject the child's claim should hesitate
to rely on the absence of injury as the basis for that rejection. By so
holding, the courts imply that even if a genetic counsellor intentionally
misled the parents, the child could not recover. No matter how heinous
the genetic counsellor's lies, the courts cannot permit the child's re-
covery because she was not injured.' 24 Courts may wish to preserve
a child's right to recover for intentional misconduct even if they seek
to avoid expanding negligence claims against the medical community.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers an approach by which
courts can address the issue of the child's right to recover without
120. Id.
121. Id. Courts' concerns regarding the slippery slope problem are addressed later in the
Article. See infra notes 264-288 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 128-202 and accompanying text.
124. One might expect that intentional misconduct would justify a punitive damage award
in the parents' action. See Capron, supra note 4, at 631 n.43. Such additional recovery might
offset the child's inability to recover if the parents are available to sue and elect to use the
award for the child's benefit. In addition, the prospect of punitive damages may deter such
fraud. The measure of punitive damages, however, would bear no particular relationship to
the amount necessary to compensate the child for its damages (not injury-by hypothesis, the
child suffered no injury even if the damages are measurable). Thus, punitive damages may
overdeter or underdeter. See R. PostNR, EcoNowc ANALYsIs OF LAW § 6.12, at 143 (2d ed.
1977) [hereinafter R. PoSNER, SECOND EjrmoN]. Since insurance may not cover punitive
damages, collecting the award may be problematic. In addition, the overall concept of punitive
damages and their appropriateness is under attack from the scholarly community and the
legislature. See, e.g., Grass, The Penal Dimension of Punitive Damages, 12 HAsTwGS CONsT.
L.Q. 241 (1985); Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA.
L. Rnv. 139 (1986); Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons
From History, 40 VA". L. REv. 1233 (1987); Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damage
Awards Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1699
(1987) (authored by Andrew Kenefick); Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amend-
ment: An Analytical Framework for Determining Excessiveness, 75 Cmn'. L. Ray. 1433 (1987)
(authored by Lyndon Bittle). One cannot count on their continued availability. Recovery by
the child would craft the common law of tort in such a way that punitive damages are not
necessary to perform a compensatory role.
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embroiling themselves in the distinction between injury and damages.
The Restatement defines the elements of a cause of action for neg-
ligence without reference to either injury or damages, but rather re-
quires only the "invasion of an interest" that "is protected against
unintentional invasion.'1 25 Confusion between injury and damage thus
disappears along with the use of the terms. Any negative effect on an
interest would seem to satisfy the requirement of an "invasion." In-
vasion replaces "injury" in determining liability. Any further inquiry
relates to the amount of recovery, or damages.
The child can easily identify interests that have been invaded. Cer-
tainly the child has an interest in her person. Birth with severe genetic
impairments implicates that interest, and by causing the birth, the ge-
netic counsellor caused the invasion. The child also has an interest in
having fully informed parents. Proper information would have ena-
bled them to make health care and procreative decisions in her best
interest. 126 Negligent failure to properly advise the parents invaded that
interest.
Courts have pondered whether a child has an interest in remaining
unborn. 127 The question deserves little attention here. An interest in
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 281 (1965).
126. Some confusion may arise between two different uses of the word "interest": one
referring to an "interest" the law protects against invasion; the other referring to a decision
that produces the best results from the child's standpoint, Le., a decision in her best "interest."
The legally protected interest-an interest in having fully informed parents-exists regardless
of whether those fully informed parents would have made their procreative decision in an
effort to achieve their own personal goals or the results most favorable to the child (assuming,
arguendo, that the parents' goals may differ from the child's).
The genetic counsellor's invasion of the legally protected interest is complete once she
misleads the parents. At that point, the child's interest in having fully informed parents has
been fully compromised. In order to establish causation, the child must prove that the parents
would have prevented her birth if properly informed. See supra text accompanying notes 35-
36. That the parents might have acted for the "wrong" (i.e., their own) reasons does not
exculpate the negligent genetic counsellor. Medical care decisions generally, and procreative
choices specifically, belong to the patients/parents, not to the physicians. See supra note 13.
A defense based on abuse of choice by the parents reverses this presumption. The genetic
counsellor in effect argues that she accidentally produced a better procreative choice than the
choice the parents would have made if fully informed. The highly hypothetical reasoning runs
as follows: If the counsellor had fully informed the parents, they would have decided to
prevent the child's birth based on their own convenience, which differs from the child's best
interests because the child is better off alive than she would have been if not born. Thus, the
court should not make the counsellor pay for the child's expenses and pain because the best
procreative choice emerged, even though she negligently made the choice instead of allowing
the parents to exercise informed judgment. As long as the law entrusts procreative choices to
parents, it cannot empower physicians to make superior choices accidentally-or, for that
matter, intentionally.
127. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 248, 513 A.2d 341, 352 (1986).
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being born and in experiencing the joys of life cannot, and should not,
defeat the reality that a number of the child's other interests have been
invaded. These countervailing interests do require a balancing by the
parents when making procreative choices and by the jury in assessing
damages. Yet ultimately the interest in being born does not trump the
child's other interests; it merely lays the basis for evaluation of off-
setting benefits.
Concern regarding the inability to measure the child's "injury"
should not impede recognition of the child's claim. The child's in-
terests have been invaded in ways that established damage rules can
measure. By insisting upon an unexamined gestalt statement of the
injury issue, the courts cloud what is a workable analysis with rhetoric.
As briefly noted above, the rhetoric, however, ultimately collapses into
policy concerns. We now turn to a fuller discussion of those policy
concerns.
C. Policy Concerns
Although courts state their policy concerns in a variety of ways,
they all essentially balk at making the fundamental comparison be-
tween life with severe impairments and no life at all. Courts feel that
permitting a child to recover on such a claim amounts to a judicial
decree that handicapped life is not worth living.'u As one court noted:
"[T]he public policy ... to protect and to preserve the sanctity of
all human life ... militates against the-judgment that an individual
life is so wretched that one would have been better off not to exist.' ' 29
Thus, courts deny the child any recovery.
128. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 11. 2d 230, 251, 512 N.E.2d
691, 702 (1987). Some courts overstate the concern, eschewing any ruling that would imply
that handicapped life was less valuable than any other life. See, e.g., Smith, 128 N.H. at 249,
513 A.2d at 353. That stdtement, however, would suggest that any personal injury short of
the plaintiff's death is not compensable, since the person's life with the injury is not less
valuable than her life without the injury. To my knowledge, no court fias accepted that
consequence of the policy analysis, perhaps because no defendant has been bold enough to
suggest it.
129. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 251, 512 N.E.2d at 702; cf. Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253,
260, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (1985) (emphatically stating that "to recognize wrongful life as a tort
... is completely contradictory to the belief that life is precious"); Bruggeman v. Schimke,
239 Kan. 245, 254, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (1986) (emphasizing that regardless of whether a person
is in perfect health or not, "the person's life is valuable, precious, and worthy of protection");
Smith, 128 N.H. at 248-49, 513 A.2d at 352-53 (citation omitted) (identifying dual concerns
to avoid involvement in "deciding whether a given person's life is or is not worthwhile" and
to avoid denigrating the "growing public awareness that the handicapped can be valuable and
productive members of society"); Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 429-30, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979)
(discussing various authorities that confirm the fact that life is more precious than non-life).
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The policy concerns engender passionate rhetoric. In Bruggeman
v. Schimke, 130 the court fervently proclaimed that "[it has long been
a fundamental principle of our law that human life is precious. Whether
the person is in perfect health, in ill health, or has or does not have
impairments or disabilities, the person's life is valuable, precious, and
worthy of protection.' ' 3' Similarly, in Blake v. Cruz, 32 the court de-
clared: "As a society ... our laws have as their driving force the pur-
pose of protecting, preserving and improving the quality of human
existence. To recognize wrongful life as a tort would do violence to
that purpose and is completely contradictory to the belief that life is
precious.' ' 33 Thus, the court rejected the child's claim as a "repu-
diation of the value of human life.' '1 34
This rhetoric is directed at a straw man. Recognition of genetic
counselling torts does not in any way undercut the legal protection
afforded the disabled or anyone else. Recognizing genetic counselling
torts does not proclaim that impaired life is not worth living. Rather,
doing so provides certain disabled individuals a money award. Rec-
ognition of the tort merely permits those suffering the impairments,
if they choose, to attempt to prove their loss.
Courts that have made this assertion fail to identify a specific
consequence for the disabled that might follow logically from rec-
ognition of genetic counselling torts. Nor does any court argue such
recognition will start the courts' slide down a slippery slope of eroding
protection for the disabled. 135 The policy rationales stand uncontested,
and perhaps uncontestable, as statements of our society's fundamental
principles. Yet ultimately, no one has identified the "violence" done
to these principles by permitting those who suffer from severe im-
pairments to recover damages in tort. 36
130. 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (1986).
131. Id. at 254, 718 P.2d at 642.
132. 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984).
133. Id. at 260, 698 P.2d at 322.
134. Id. at 259, 698 P.2d at 321.
135. To some extent, slippery slope arguments lose much of their persuasiveness when
courts can draw appropriate or even "arbitrary" lines between the case under review and the
cases they fear. See Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. Rv. 361, 379-80 & n.51 (1985).
Given the substantial body of legal protection for the disabled, courts seem unlikely to
encounter difficulty drawing lines that prevent an erosion of the rights of the living. In
addition, recourse to slippery slope arguments "necessarily contains the implicit concession
that the proposed resolution of the instant case is not itself troublesome." Id. at 368-69.
136. In fact, as one court has noted:
[I]t is hard to see how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering
child would "disavow" the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is not
entitled to the full measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to
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Furthermore, courts do not apply these policy concerns consis-
tently. The law now recognizes that life is not always preferable to
death. 37 Courts have enforced decisions by competent adults to forego
life sustaining treatment.3 8 Most states have enacted statutes that re-
spect a patient's expressed desires regarding whether she wishes to con-
tinue life-prolonging treatment. 39 Withholding treatment often results
in death when the person could have lived longer. A patient's decision
to forego treatment thus reflects a judgment that, under some cir-
cumstances, life is not preferable to death.
Courts acquiesce in, and sometimes actively endorse, those judg-
ments. Public opinion also appears to support that view.40 While ide-
ologues argue that any life must be preserved at any cost, their argument
frequently fails.'14 The state's interest in preserving life often takes a
back seat to the individual's right to refuse treatment despite the fact
that such refusal may result in imminent death.' 42 The right to refuse
life-prolonging treatment may even be protected by the United States
Constitution. 43
Even without concrete evidence of the individual patient's desires,
the law sometimes permits withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging
all members of society.
Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 233, 643 P.2d 954, 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344-45
(1982).
137. Cornwell, supra note 100, at 576-77; Tucker, Wrongful Life: A New Generation, 27
J. Fa. L. 673, 684 (1988).
138. See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (D.D.C.
1985) (noting that Roe v. Wade enunciated the principle that a competent adult has a paramount
right to control the disposition to be made of his or her own body); Camp v. White, 510 So.
2d 166, 169-70 (Ala. 1987) (Alabama Natural Death Act respects individual's decision to
withhold life sustaining procedures); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (1986) (competent 28-year-old quadriplegic obtained order that feeding
tubes be removed); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978) (refusal to submit
to amputation, which would result in death by gangrene).
139. UN I. RIGHTs OF TH TERmAuY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 609 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
Eight states have adopted the Uniform Act. Thirty-three others and the District of Columbia
have adopted some law permitting "living wills" or "natural death."
140. A. MEEL, THE RIGHT-TO-Dm § 1.4 (1989).
141. See, e.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
142. See, e.g., id.; In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (child died within
30 minutes after life support discontinued under court injunction).
143. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), based
the right to die on the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Id. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at
662-64. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that "a competent person [has] a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 2852. The court held,
however, that Missouri's clear and convincing evidence test for substituted judgment did not
encroach upon the assumed right. Id. at 2853-54. Justice Scalia wrote separately to declare
that no constitutional right to die exists. Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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treatment.' Proxies may act on behalf of an individual who cannot
competently make a judgment or express her wishes about life-pro-
longing medical care. 45 In cases involving a patient who reached the
age of consent before losing competence, prior expressions by the in-
dividual patient that she would not have chosen to live under those
circumstances increase judicial confidence in the surrogate decision
maker's exercise of discretion."4 When the patient is a young child
or is mentally incompetent, the court may accede to the decision of
a parent or guardian. 47 Courts expect parents to make decisions in
the best interests of the child and not purely for their own conven-
ience. 14
8
These decisions are not easy for the parents or for the courts. But
parents and guardians make them and courts give them legal effect.
The law understands and accepts that, under some circumstances, it
may be better to die than to go on living. 49
144. The Cruzan opinion, for all its notoriety, did not change the law in this regard. The
United States Supreme Court held that Missouri could require persons seeking to withdraw
medical care to produce clear and convincing evidence of the patient's express wishes. The
opinion, however, did not compel states to employ this standard. The ruling has no effect on
states that, as a matter of state law, permit substituted judgment or follow a "best interests"
approach. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
145. See, e.g., Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (parents and guardian ad litem of 10-month-old child
in permanent vegetative state obtained order permitting disconnection of ventilator); L.H.R.,
253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (parents and guardian of newborn child in chronic vegetative
state obtained order protecting removal of life support systems).
146. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 493 (1983); McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn. Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596, 604-
05 (1989); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 427, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (1987); see generally Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
147. Barry, 445 So. 2d at 370-71; L.H.R., 253 Ga. at 442, 445, 321 S.E.2d at 718-19, 722;
In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (La. 1982).
148. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 223, 741 P.2d 674, 690 (1987); Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713, 721 (Super. Ct. 1984);
L.H.R., 253 Ga. at 259, 321 S.E.2d at 722; Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 748, 379
N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (1978). Courts sometimes suggest that parents should inquire as to what
the patient would want if she were informed and could decide. Under this approach, the
parents must attempt to reconstruct the patient's judgment, rather than act in whatever manner
the parents themselves deem to be in the patient's best interest. See L.H.R., 253 Ga. at 259,
321 S.E.2d at 722. In decisions involving children, the difference between the substituted
judgment approach and the best interests of the patient approach may be nil. Rarely will a
surrogate or a court conclude that one decision would serve a child's best interests, but that
the child would (irrationally) choose another course. Such anomalies seem plausible only if a
patient has made prior competent statements of preference. Even then, courts may hesitate to
give effect to an earlier expressed preference when, under the circumstances, the court believes
the preference would produce an irrational result.
149. In light of the number of people who consciously make that decision by attempting
suicide in the face of obstacles far less serious than the impairments suffered by a child born
with a severe genetic defect, a reasonable juror could conclude that, in some cases, death
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If courts are willing to accept that death may be preferable to life
in some circumstances, it follows ineluctably that never being born
also may be preferable in some instances. If "the public policy ...
to protect and to preserve the sanctity of all human life" nonetheless
permits "the judgment that an individual life is so wretched that one
would [be] better off [dead]," then the force of that policy to "mil-
itaten against the judgment that an individual life is so wretched that
one would have been better off not to exist' ' 150 wanes or even dis-
appears. Human life is precious and deserves protection. Some con-
ditions, however, so thoroughly deprive the individual of the means
of appreciating the value of life that we accept the possibility that
death might be preferable. Unless death presents a better alternative
than never being born, the policy exception in right-to-die cases applies
with full force to genetic counselling torts.'5 '
The basic inconsistency between recognizing a right-to-die and
rejecting the child's claim in a genetic counselling tort has been rec-
ognized for years. The California Supreme Court noted the incon-
sistency in 1982 when it decided Turpin v. Sortini,152 the leading case
recognizing the child's action. Surprisingly, subsequent decisions, even
those that distinguish Turpin, virtually ignore the right-to-die cases-
even as they hold, as a matter of law, that life with severe impairments
is always preferable to the alternative.- 3
Only one court has analyzed the apparent inconsistency between
right-to-die decisions and rejection of actions by impaired children for
genetic counselling torts. In Smith v. Cote, 15 4 the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court distinguished cases in which an individual expresses a
wish to die-a wish that the court honors-from cases in which, it
says, the court must "assess[] the 'worth' of the child's life.' ' 5 5 The
would be preferable to impaired life. If so, the court should not reach the contrary conclusion
as a matter of law.
150. Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ili. 2d 230, 251, 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (1987).
151. This Article will suggest shortly that death seems a greater harm than never being
born. See infra notes 166-184 and accompanying text.
152. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 233, 643 P.2d 954, 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 345 (1982).
153. See Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 815 (1984) (without citing Turpin);
Siemieniec, 117 I11. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987) (citing Turpin); Bruggeman v. Schimke,
239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (1986) (citing Turpin).
154. 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986). Two other courts have referred to the issue
without contributing to the analysis. One court merely summarized the analysis in Smith and
Turpin without discussing either case or indicating which line of reasoning, if either, it found
more persuasive. See Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 51, 412 N.W.2d 232, 240 (1987)
(affiriing summary judgment for defendants). Another court dismissed the analogy in one
sentence because the child had no choice whether to be born. Walker v. Mart, 164 Ariz. 37,
45, 790 P.2d 735, 741 (1990) (en banc).
155. Smith, 128 N.H. at 249, 513 A.2d at 353.
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court concluded that "[i]t has no business declaring that among the
living are people who never should have been born."' 56
The Smith court overgeneralized the right-to-die cases in a way
that fit the distinction it sought to draw. 5 7 Many right-to-die cases
involve explicit evidence that an individual, when competent, ex-
pressed a preference concerning the use of extraordinary measures to
prolong life, but many do not. 58 Courts have permitted relatives or
legal guardians to substitute their judgment for that of a person unable
to express a preference. 5 9 Other courts have applied a "best interests
of the patient" analysis to determine whether life-prolonging measures
should continue.16
The courts' willingness to let others exercise their judgment on
behalf of a patient, and to allow them to assert the patient's right to
die without the express consent or evidence of the express wishes of
the patient, does not necessarily constitute a judicial pronouncement
that the patient's life is not worth living. The courts, however, go
farther than this when they acquiesce to that substituted judgment and
issue orders that enforce that judgment. They order persons: to with-
draw life-prolonging treatment; 16 not to begin life-prolonging treat-
ment; 16 2 not to interfere with efforts to withdraw life-prolonging
treatment; 63 and not to prosecute persons who withdraw life-pro-
longing treatment. '6 In short, courts issue orders that cause death and
refuse to issue orders that would prevent death. The depth of the courts'
involvement in these right-to-die decisions cannot be blithely passed
off as mere acquiescence in an individual's exercise of personal au-
tonomy.
When right-to-die cases employ a "best interests of the patient"
standard, the resulting inconsistency emerges even more clearly. The
implication that death might be in the best interests of the patient
certainly suggests a judicial pronouncement about the value of the life
involved-or the value of life relative to death. These opinions not
156. Id.
157. In fairness to the Smith court, it should be noted that some of the right-to-die cases
cited later in this paragraph were decided after 1986, when Smith was decided. Others, however,
were decided in 1984 or earlier.
158. See, e.g., supra note 147; Cornwell, supra note 100, at 577.
159. See supra note 145.
160. See supra note 148.
161. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298
(1986).
162. Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 714, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).
163. In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 447, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (1984).
164. A. MEISEL, supra note 140, § 14.6, at 437 (describing the Infant Doe case, which did
not result in any published opinions).
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only implicitly compare the relative value of life and death to the in-
dividual, some of them resolve the issue against continued life. 1 65
In genetic counselling torts, plaintiffs seek a much more modest
judgment: they ask to be allowed to persuade a jury that the child
would have preferred never to have been born.16 A court can recognize
the cause of action without reaching any conclusion regarding the value
of life. A court need only acknowledge that, under some circumstances
(not necessarily the circumstances before the court) a reasonable jury
could conclude that the plaintiff more likely than not would have pre-
ferred not to have been born rather than to suffer life with the im-
pairments she faces. 67 In so holding, the court does not impose a
societal judgment concerning the value of any particular person or any
class of persons. Rather, it accepts (arguendo) the allegation of the
child's legal representative.
Two striking differences should make genetic counselling torts
much easier than right-to-die cases. First, in a genetic counselling tort
case, the court's decision in favor of the plaintiff will not affect the
child's life expectancy. In right-to-die cases, the court's decision in
favor of the plaintiff hastens the death of a person. One might expect
extreme caution from courts when, as a consequence of the decision,
a living person may die. Yet courts have concluded that death may
be preferable to life, and have achieved a degree of confidence in that
conclusion that makes them bold enough to authorize or even order
that a person be killed. 16 In a genetic counselling tort case, even if
165. See supra note 148.
166. Or, if the Smith court is correct, the plaintiffs ask to be allowed to persuade a jury
that the child would have been better off (objectively) if she never had been born. See Smith
v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 249, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (1986); see also Feinberg, supra note 13, at
69 (arguing that the questions are identical).
167. Feinberg, supra note 13, at 69.
168. Some prefer the euphemistic "allowed to die" over the word "killed." Right-to-die
cases require human intervention to withdraw life-prolonging measures. Because tfiat interven-
tion is a "but for" cause of person's death, the term "killed" seems accurate, if somewhat
harsh on the tongue (or pen). See Cornwell, supra note 100, at 582-83; cf. Fletcher, Prolonging
Life: Some Legal Considerations, in KILLNo AND LEMrNG DIm 45 (B. Steinbock ed. 1980).
One might assume that judicial confidence in this judgment springs from legislative enact-
ments sanctioning living wills and other devices that authorized individuals to control their
own medical care decisions. But courts embarked upon this course without awaiting such
legislative approval. The Quinlan court twice noted the "paucity" of legislative and judicial
guidance. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 42, 47, 355 A.2d 647, 664-65, 667 (1976). The court
confronted not mere legislative inaction, but assertions by the state that the murder statutes
required a contrary result and medical objections to the discontinuance of treatment. Id. at
42-52, 355 A.2d at 664-70. The court rested its decision only upon state and federal consti-
tutional interpretations of the right to privacy. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. Subsequent legislative
action has confirmed the popularity of the general principle announced by the court. See supra
note 139. But courts initially set aside the policy favoring the sanctity of human life without
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a court has less confidence that a particular plaintiff would have pre-
ferred never to have been born, the relatively mild (and, if necessary,
reversible) consequences of the decision support permitting a jury to
evaluate that assertion. 69
Death critically differentiates right-to-die cases from genetic coun-
selling torts in a second way. Courts have concluded not that mere
nonexistence might be better than life, but that death might be better.
Dying itself is an injury people instinctively seek to avoid at almost
any cost. 7 0 One cannot say with confidence either that dying is in-
herently painful or that it is not. Once alive, a being will go to great
lengths to avoid dying. Even if life provided a person absolutely no
joy, no redeeming pleasure, but only tedium or even pain, a person
still might prefer not to die. Whether because of our biological or
genetic wiring or our training from birth, dying seems much harder
to accept than never having been born. 7'
the crutch of favorable legislative guidance. They can show equal confidence in setting aside
the policy in genetic counselling tort cases.
169. Courts may mistrust the ability of a jury to reach a reasonable conclusion. To the
extent that the mistrust arises from the nature of the issue, it merges with the evidentiary
concerns discussed above. To the extent that courts simply mistrust juries as finders of fact
in cases involving highly sympathetic plaintiffs or complex facts, courts should address the
concerns more generally. Rejecting the child's cause of action for genetic counselling torts is
at best underinclusive because sympathy can arise in a broad array of cases including, but not
limited to, torts. It is probably overbroad as well, in that some plaintiff may meet the standard
of proof required without recourse to inflamed emotions.
170. "Surely in most cases of suffering and impairment we think of death as even worse.
This is shown by the widespread human tendency to 'cling to life at all costs."' Feinberg,
supra note 13, at 69. Professor Feinberg appears to equate a preference for nonexistence with
a preference for death. The forces that he describes that motivate one to prefer a painful
existence to death might provide the same motivation even if one truly preferred never to have
been born. Id.
171. The strength of humanity's instinct for self-preservation is familiar to the law, which
has gone so far as to build presumptions regarding contributory negligence around that instinct.
See Baltimore & P. R.R. v. Landrigan, 191 U.S. 461 (1903). The Supreme Court in Landrigan
noted, "We know of no more universal instinct than that of self-preservation-none that so
insistently urges to care against injury. It has its motives to exercise in the fear of pain,
maiming, and death." Id. at 474. Other courts echo this realization.
"Self-preservation" has been termed the first law of nature. It is of the most ancient
origin; it antedates all constitutions and statutes made by man. It is the law under
which we live, move, and have our being. It is a law governing all persons, natural
and artificial. High and low, rich and poor, wise and foolish, old and young, are
subject to its inexorable sway.
Del Ponte v. Societa Italiana di M.S. Guglielmo Marconi, 27 R.I. 1, 6, 60 A. 237, 239 (1905).
Direct evidence comparing humanity's fear of death to its views toward not being born is
difficult to find. The following paragraphs of text try to muster the arguments that reason
can contribute, along with sufficient authority that the reader will not dismiss the point as
fanciful, the author's own drunken delusion. Ultimately, however, this argument appeals not
to authority, but to intuition. Those who share my intuition need no further authority. Those
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Nonexistence, never having lived, seems mild by comparison to
death. 72 Death typically evokes images of pain (in varying degrees);
never being born evokes the absence of pain-or any other experience.
The preference for nonexistence as compared to death was recognized
in Biblical times: "And I thought the dead who are already dead more
fortunate than the living who are still alive; but better than both is
he who has not yet been, and has not seen the evil deeds that are done
under the sun.' 1 73 A rational person might prefer never to have been
born, yet elect to continue living rather than face dying. 74 A pref-
erence never to have experienced the pain of life does not necessarily
equate to a preference to undergo a second, perhaps greater injury by
experiencing death.
Certainly the law views consciously preventing conception (or es-
sentially what might be called "nonbirth") as a lesser harm than caus-
ing death. Americans can, without state interference, prevent
conception by any number of means. 175 At this writing, American
women also may abort a fetus during the first two trimesters of preg-
nancy with limited interference from the state. 76 In the eyes of the
inclined to reject it seem unlikely to be swayed by the quotation of others who do share the
intuition. All authorities succumb to the same unanswerable challenge: "How do they know?"
Fortunately, the success of this Article does not rise or fall on the success of this one point.
The position is stronger if people perceive death as harsher than never being born. But as
long as no one contends that never being born is harsher than death, the challenge of
inconsistency retains its bite against the policy arguments under discussion. I doubt that anyone
inclined to urge that death is the milder alternative will have better success at mustering
authority or reason to establish that point.
172. Oddly, some commentators and courts speak of death as if it were interchangeable
with never having been born. See, e.g., J. MAsoN, MEDIco-LEGAL ASPECTS OF REPRODUCTION
AN PARENTHOOD 136 (1990).
173. Ecclesiastes 4:2-3 (Revised Standard Version).
174. Roberts, supra note 67, at 67.
175. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
One might suggest that right-to-die statutes or decisions produce the same legal result for
death as nonconception. The argument misses the distinction between the party acting and the
party affected. Griswold permits people the uninhibited right to prevent someone else from
being conceived. Statutes against homicide prevent individuals from killing someone else, except
under severely constrained circumstances such as self-defense. Right-to-die rulings generally
protect the individual's right to elect death for herself. When these statutes or decisions permit
others to make the election for an incapacitated person, they again severely limit the circum-
stances in which the surrogate can kill another. See, e.g., In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 448,
321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (1984) (holding limited to infants in a permanent vegetative state with
no chance of regaining cognitive function if diagnosis is confirmed by two independent
physicians); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(applying similar limitations). Right-to-die cases clearly do not establish the proposition that
death equates to non-conception. The differences between the conditions that have produced
decisions authorizing death and the conditions that arise in genetic counselling tort cases are
addressed later in this Article. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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law, then, the injury suffered by a potential person who is not born
is significantly less than the injury suffered by a person who dies.
That difference between killing and preventing birth seems in-
tuitively correct. Very few people would equate nonconception with
death. Even those who might say it is a sin against God to take such
life decisions into one's own hands might be reluctant to say that the
harm done to the potential individual who would have been conceived
is as great as that which would be done if the individual were born
and subsequently (intentionally or negligently) allowed to die. 77 One
could expect substantially greater disagreement over the abortion is-
sue. Many outspoken opponents refer to abortion as "killing ba-
bies, '178 implying that they find no moral difference between the two
acts. That view, however, probably does not capture the entire spec-
trum of opinion against abortion. Objections to abortion on demand
do not necessarily equate to objections to abortion under any cir-
cumstances. 79 Even before Roe v. Wade180 constitutionalized the abor-
tion issue, many states permitted abortions to prevent the birth of a
severely deformed child.'8' While that may represent an effort to com-
promise the competing demands of pro-life and pro-choice elements
in society, it also may reflect a moral line drawn by people who do
not fall into the extremes of either camp. 182
A court willing to accept a substituted judgment that will lead to
death ought to accept a substituted judgment that, if supported by the
evidence, will lead to a money judgment. Given the differences that
make right-to-die cases more troubling morally than genetic counsel-
177. One might posit that preventing a soul from entering a body so it can live, become
a believer, and hence have a chance to obtain salvation may be a greater harm than death
after the person has become a believer. Courts, however, have yet to establish that particular
position.
178. See, e.g., Barker, Abortion Protesters to March Here Tomorrow, Wash. Post, Jan.
21, 1990, at C3; O'Connor, 300 Activists Square Off on Abortion in Fullerton, L.A. Times,
Dec. 10, 1989, at B2, col. 5 (Orange County ed.); Meisel, A Battle of Symbols over Substance,
Chicago Trib., July 13, 1989, Perspective, at 21 (north sports final ed.); Shenon, Outside the
Quiet of the Court, Deeply Held Beliefs Collide Noisily, N.Y. Times, April 27, 1989, at B14,
col. 2.
179. One poll found that 57% of Americans believe abortion should be legal under some
circumstances. Should the Supreme Court Reverse its Decision on Abortion, THE GALLUP
REPORT No. 281 (Feb. 1989). Of those, 60% believe abortion should be legal "[i]f there is
any chance the baby will be born deformed." Id. A more moderate question, such as a
probable defect rather than "any chance," might have produced greater acceptance of abortion.
Even if the poll is wildly inaccurate, it seems plausible that some significant percentage of
Americans hold a moderate view on abortion.
180. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
181. See Note, supra note 21, at 2027; Special Project, Survey of Abortion Law, 1980
ARiz. ST. L.J. 67, 106-11.
182. See supra note 179.
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ling torts,' 83 this modest conclusion may be justifiable even in states
that do not recognize substituted judgment when a human life is at
stake. 18
Policy discussions frequently invoke a considerable amount of
rhetorical legerdemain. For instance, in Smith v. Cote'85 the court
transformed the injury issue-whether "it would have been best for
Heather if she had not been born"186-into a policy declaration that
such individuals "never should have been born."18 7 The court did not
have to declare that the child should not have been born. That decision
is reserved to the parents, who are in a better position to consider all
the circumstances surrounding the specific child's prospective life and
to decide whether, all things considered, life would be a blessing or
a curse to the child. A court need not second guess a decision made
by fully informed parents. When negligence prevents an informed de-
cision, however, the court must address the child's allegation that she
would have preferred never to have been born.
Similarly, in Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital,'88 the Il-
linois Supreme Court stated that addressing the issue of whether the
child should not have been born "would essentially require us to pos-
sess the divine ability to determine what defects should prevent an
embryo from being allowed life."' 189 Genetic counselling torts involve
no such issues. The question has nothing whatsoever to do with whether
the child should be allowed to live. The child lives and should be
"allowed" to live as long as nature permits. The question is whether
the life the child leads might be worse than no life at all.
Some courts seek solace by understating the effect of their rulings.
They pretend not to decide the issue either way, as if they were leaving
the issue open. In Becker v. Schwartz,190 the New York court relegated
the question to "philosophers and theologians."' 91 In Smith the New
183. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
184. In right-to-die cases, judgments have less effect on the interests of other parties.
Unlike wrongful life cases, no defendant is branded negligent or ordered to pay money to the
patient. In this context I intentionally omit the health care provider's pecuniary interest in
continuing to render care to the individual asserting the right to die, which is an opportunity
cost arguably similar to a money judgment. The difference in the effect these judgments have
on the interests of other parties, however, has nothing to do with policy concerns for the
value of life.
185. 128 N.H. 231, 248, 513 A.2d 351, 352 (1986).
186. Id. at 248, 513 A.2d at 352.
187. Id. at 249, 513 A.2d at 353. -
188. 117 Ill. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987).
189. Id. at 242, 512 N.E.2d at 698.
190. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
191. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The court undoubtedly intended
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Hampshire court stated that courts "halve] no business" considering
the question. 192 The effect of each decision, however, is to hold as a
matter of law that children may not recover for genetic counselling
torts.
The court cannot legitimately avoid the issue by claiming that it
is none of its business. The court's business is to decide controversies
put before it.193 A wrongful life complaint alleges that the child would
have been better off never born. The court must accept or reject that
allegation. By failing to address it, or to let a jury address it, the court
in effect decides as a matter of law that any life, no matter how hor-
rible, is better than no life at all. The result is a classic demonstration
of the axiom "not to decide is to decide."
One can sympathize with the court's reluctance to consider whether
no life might be worse than life. Right-to-die cases are much easier
when they can be decided on the basis of the individual's autonomous
choices. Genetic counselling torts do not offer that alternative. The
child, as a minor, lacks the capacity to make a competent choice be-
tween life and never having been born. Even after she reaches the age
of consent, the impairments that arguably deprive life of its benefit
frequently will affect the plaintiff's competence to make and express
a choice. 194 In addition, unlike the right-to-die cases, the child's de-
cision is completely hypothetical. The choice, even if competently made
and expressed, cannot be effectuated. That reality may affect the choice,
giving rise to suspicion that the plaintiff really prefers life but sees a
chance to recover a judgment. That suspicion increases when the par-
ents, not the child, express the judgment.
Similar incentives to misrepresent the patient's wishes, however,
inhere in right-to-die cases. When considering a substituted judgment,
one wonders if the individual really would have made the same de-
cision, or whether the family reached the decision it preferred without
regard for what the patient would have preferred. When considering
expressions by the patient, one may wonder whether the patient really
made the statements or whether others invented them to advance their
own preference. Even when the statements are beyond dispute, one
might wonder whether the patient would have reached the same con-
that the question remain unanswered. There is no hint in the opinion or in those opinions
that quote it with approval, see supra note 103, that the court would accept the answer of
philosophers or theologians if they could provide one.
192. Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 248, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (1986).
193. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169, 171, 177-78 (1803) (proclaiming
the "duty of thle] court" to decide cases, to give judgment, and to determine which rules of
law govern a case).
194. Feinberg, supra note 13, at 69.
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clusion if she had considered all the facts and circumstances at a time
when the decision was a real one, rather than a hypothetical situation
that she hoped would never arise.1 95
Such doubts, however, must be resolved by the finder of fact. The
state court of last resort cannot answer them once for all possible cases.
To duck the issue is to avoid the court's duty to decide cases. To decide
that, as a matter of law, life is preferable to death or nonexistence
is the height of hubris. When death is at issue, courts show more mod-
esty. That same modesty should be demonstrated in genetic counselling
tort cases.
I want to emphasize the rather limited impact of the argument
to this point. In light of modem case law recognizing that, under some
circumstances, death may be preferable to life, courts cannot consis-
tently maintain that, under all circumstances, life is preferable to never
being born. Thus, courts should reject a blanket holding against chil-
dren seeking recovery for genetic counselling torts and instead begin
identifying those circumstances under which a reasonable jury could
conclude that the child would have been better off never born.196 Courts
should abandon rulings that, as a matter of law, preclude recovery
by children.
That conclusion leaves considerable room to argue about the types
of cases in which recovery may be justified. Many of the right to die
cases limit relief to persons who suffer terminal illnesses, irreversible
comas, or persistent vegetative states. 97 Since death is irreversible,
courts sensibly have limited the right-to-die to the most extreme con-
ditions, especially those in which the patient lacks any cognitive func-
tion. Arguably, any ability to enjoy life-to read a book, have a
conversation, or even enjoy holding hands with a loved one-might
justify efforts to preserve life.
Conditions like Down's syndrome differ substantially from these
circumstances. The child with Down's syndrome suffers mental re-
tardation and some physical deformities of varying severity, yet re-
mains conscious and able to love and be loved. 9 8 Even with severe
195. These concerns explain why some states impose a higher standard of proof on those
seeking to end a life. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852-54
(1990).
196. Subject, of course, to the evidentiary concerns discussed supra at notes 49-90 and
accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 137-148.
198. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979) ("Notwithstanding her
affliction with Down's syndrome, Sharon, by virtue of her birth, will be able to love and be
loved and to experience happiness and pleasure-emotions which are truly the essence of life
and which are far more valuable than the suffering she may endure.").
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health complications, some capacity for joy during the child's life ex-
ists. Similarly, a congenital hearing defect may severely limit the child's
ability to enjoy life, but one wonders whether the limitations make
the life worthless. Thus, it may be surprising that the cases that rec-
ognize the child's action involve these relatively less severe condi-
tions. 9
The difference between death and never being born may warrant
allowing a genetic counselling tort case to proceed on facts that might
not support the right to die. When the living are permitted to die, a
restriction to the most severe cases may be justified. But if non-birth
injures the potential person less than death injures a living person,
perhaps genetic counselling torts should be found in a greater range
of cases. Since at least one court has recognized that even Down's
syndrome may justify withholding treatment from a living child,2°° the
distinction between the right to die and the right not to have been born
may not be as important in this regard. But even if that case is wrong,
there is room to recognize genetic counselling torts.
Traditional common law principles justify allowing severely im-
paired children to recover for genetic counselling torts. The damage
rules pose no inherent obstacle to measuring the child's recovery. Ef-
forts to convert damage rules into a separate injury requirement col-
lapse into either the evidentiary concerns or the policy concerns, adding
no independent reason to deny the child's claim for relief. Policy con-
cerns raised by courts pose a barrier courts already have surmounted
in the context of right-to-die cases. If consistency has value in the
common law, the child's claim deserves recognition.
Courts, however, avoid the kind of detailed analysis proposed in
this Article. The Becker v. Schwartz2 1 court unselfconsciously an-
199. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 223-24, 643 P.2d 954, 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337,
339 (1982) (hereditary deafness); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 344, 478 A.2d 755,758 (1984)
(congenital rubella syndrome, which produced "eye lesions, heart disease, and auditory
defects"); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 463, 656 P.2d 483, 486 (1983)
(mother used Dilantin during pregnancy and the children suffered from "mild to moderate
growth deficiencies, mild to moderate developmental retardation, wide-set eyes .... (drooping
eyelids), hypoplasia of the fingers, small nails, ... and other physical and developmental
defects").
200. A. MEISEL, supra note 140, § 14.6. Professor Meisel describes the Infant Doe case in
which parents decided not to authorize physicians to surgically correct a tracheal-esophageal
fistula, which prevented the child's food from reaching the stomach. In re Infant Doe, No.
GU8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe Cty., Ind., Apr. 12, 1982). The court permitted the parents'
decision to stand, and local child welfare authorities decided not to appeal. The juvenile court
denied the district attorney's petition to determine that the child was neglected. See also In re
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979) (court dismissed state's petition to
have Down's syndrome child made dependent child of the court because parents would not
allow him to be operated upon, since operation would have greater than average risk); A.
MEISEL, supra, at 437.
201. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
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nounced that the "resolution of this question transcends the me-
chanical application of legal principles.""' The policies favoring
deterrence, compensation, and fairness require permitting the child to
recover. To achieve those goals, more imaginative approaches that
transcend the mechanical application of rules deserve consideration.
The next Parts of this Article suggest variations on the rightful po-
sition that permit courts to circumvent the philosophical obstacles to
recovery by the child.
H. The Rightful Position in Misrepresentation Cases
In cases of misrepresentation, some courts identify a different
rightful position. Instead of looking at the position the plaintiff would
have occupied but for the wrong (that is, if the defendant had told
the truth), courts look to the position the plaintiff would have oc-
cupied if the defendant's statement had been true.23 The former is
analogous to the traditional tort rule discussed above: if the defendant
had told the truth, the plaintiff would not have relied on any mis-
information and would not have suffered the loss. 204 The latter offers
an alternative. The misrepresentation is taken as true and the defen-
dant becomes, in effect, the guarantor of the truth of the statement.
Thus, the plaintiff receives the benefit of the bargain.20 5
202. Id. at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
203. Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 247, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248-49
(1977); Williams v. American Title Ins. Co., 83 Mich. App. 686, 701, 269 N.W.2d 481, 488
(1978); Eno Brick Corp. v. Barber Greene Co., 109 N.H. 156, 160, 245 A.2d 545, 548 (1968);
Vandehey v. City of Appleton, 146 Wis. 2d 411, 414-15, 437 N.W.2d 550, 551-52 (1988). See
generally 37 AM. JuR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 342 (1962) (stating that many cases support the
rule that a person who has been defrauded in acquiring property is entitled to the benefit of
the bargain).
204. In the standard case in which misrepresentation precedes a sale, two results are
possible: but for the misrepresentation, the plaintiff may have paid less or may not have made
the deal at all. In either case, the plaintiff, because of the misrepresentation, is out of pocket
a certain amount (up to 100% of the price). Thus, the rule frequently is called the "out of
pocket" rule. See, e.g., Kramer v. Chabot, 152 Vt. 53, 54, 564 A.2d 292, 293 (1989); Dresser
v. Sunderland Apartment Tenants Ass'n, 465 A.2d 835, 840 n.18 (D.C. App. 1983): It justifies
either rescission and refund of the amount the plaintiff spent or a partial refund of the amount
the plaintiff was overcharged.
205. Some courts do not use the benefit of the bargain rule. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343, 347 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("benefit of the bargain" theory has no place
in securities fraud litigation); Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 552-53, 124 N.E. 144, 146 (1919).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recommends use of the benefit of the bargain rule only in
cases of intentional fraud, using the out of pocket rule when negligent misrepresentation is
actionable. Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 549(2) (1977) (fraudulent misrepre-
sentation in business transaction entitles victim to recover additional damages sufficient to give
him the benefit of the contract) with id. § 552B(2) (damages recoverable for negligent
misrepresentation do not include benefit of the contract).
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Courts could reframe the rightful position in genetic counselling
torts along similar lines. The wrongs involved in genetic counselling
torts involve misinformation. In some cases, the counsellor will make
a false statement that the parents do not carry (or the embryo did not
receive) a particular genetic defect. In other cases the counsellor may
fail to disclose material information, such as the risk of particular
genetic defects appearing in the child or the availability of a test that
would detect a genetic defect in either the parents or the embryo. In
rare cases, a counsellor may neglect to inform the parents of the results
of a test or inform them so cryptically that they misunderstand the
information. In each scenario, the parents proceed to conceive or carry
a child to term because of a misimpression the genetic counsellor could
have corrected with better information. 20 7 These similarities suggest
that the rightful position employed in misrepresentation cases would
harmonize well in a genetic counselling tort setting.
Plaintiffs may find efforts to plead an action for misrepresen-
tation problematic; the child may not satisfy the elements of that cause
of action. For instance, courts may require an explicit false statement
as an element of an action for negligent misrepresentation. 20 8 As noted
previously, many genetic counselling torts arise from a failure to com-
municate rather than a false statement. Some courts limit negligent
misrepresentation to a business context, an artificial barrier that may
preclude recovery on a straight misrepresentation theory. 209 Some states
may deny recovery for emotional distress or pain and suffering in ac-
tions for misrepresentation. 21 0
206. The variety of ways in which genetic counsellors may mislead prospective parents has
been expounded in more detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 4, at 626-30; Healey,
The Legal Obligations of Genetic Counselors, in GENETICS AND THE LAW II 69, 72-75 (1980);
Milunsky, supra note 19 at 62-66; Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful
Life and Wrongful Birth, 14 J. FAm. L. 15, 21-30 (1980).
207. Of course, some misimpressions are not the fault of the genetic counsellor. In such
cases, liability will not result because negligence will be absent.
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
209. Illinois law, for example, limits recovery for negligent misrepresentation to persons
who seek advice from others for the handling of their business affairs. See National Can
Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F. Supp. 147, 150 (N.D. I11. 1981). The stated rationale rests,
in part, on § 552 of the Restatement. Id. Because genetic counselling torts involve personal
injuries to the child, they more appropriately fall within § 311 of the Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311, comment b (1965). The barrier to recovery may
disappear if the appropriate analysis can be applied.
210. This restriction also stems from § 552B of the Restatement, although it may not be
applicable to misrepresentations that produce a risk of physical injury. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 comment a (1965) (noting the "somewhat broader liability" for
misrepresentations that risk physical harm when compared to misrepresentations that produce
pecuniary loss). On the other hand, states that recognize the child's action for genetic counselling
torts uniformly deny recovery for emotional distress or pain and suffering. See supra note 12.
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Other apparent obstacles may not matter. The genetic counsellor
made no misrepresentation directly to the child or in her presence, the
statement was not communicated to the child, and the child did not
rely on the misrepresentation to make any decision. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts, however, permits recovery by persons injured as
a result of a misrepresentation, even if they are strangers to the com-
munication. 21
This Article does not suggest that malpractice actions should be
recharacterized as actions for misrepresentation. 2 2 Courts, however,
may borrow the view of the rightful position employed by misrep-
resentation law and apply it to genetic counselling torts. This small
step in the evolution of common law remedies requires no more cre-
ativity than lawmakers exercised in framing a remedy in paternity ac-
tions. 213 Courts possess ample authority to change common law
remedies. 214 In light of the tort policies involved, courts have ample
reason to exercise that authority. 215
Refraining the rightful position offers several advantages. Evi-
dentiary concerns virtually disappear. If the misrepresentation had been
true, the plaintiff would have been born without the genetic defect. 21 6
211. One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
information, where such harm results
(b)
to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 311 (1965). Because comment f incorporates by reference
comments c and d of § 310, third persons are included in the class of possible plaintiffs. Id.
212. To some extent, the misrepresentation rules idehtified in § 311 of the Restatement
apply with particular force to physicians. See id. § 311 comment b.
213. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CAIn. L.
Rv. 497, 519-36 (1979) (outlining the recent changes in tort law damages initiated by the
California Supreme Court); Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
229 (1981) (discussing recent judicial creativity in making major changes in tort law).
215. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
216. Some examples of this as applied to particular cases clearly reveal the usefulness of
the rightful position used in misrepresentation cases. If, for example, negligent performance
of a test produces incorrect results, and a genetic counsellor tells parents the child will be
healthy, the misrepresentation is the focal point of the tort. In other cases, it will be harder
to identify a "statement" to take as true. For example, negligence that consists of the failure
to reveal material information requires some abstraction. Negligent nondisclosure can be
understood as a statement that the child is healthy; parents seem likely to assume that the
child is healthy unless the genetic counsellor alerts them to any risks. Leaving a misbelief
intact when one has a duty to speak roughly equates with creating a misbelief by a positive
misstatement. See, e.g., Minish v. Huey, 482 F.2d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1973); Tetuan v. A. H.
Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, 465-66, 738 P.2d 1210, 1228-29 (1987). But see Wonnell, A Theory
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Juries can easily compare a healthy child21 7 to an impaired child be-
cause jurors are familiar with the comparison. The case takes on the
simplicity of cases in which a negligent treatment causes a defect that
otherwise would not have existed or in which negligent diagnosis pre-
vents treatment of a curable condition.
Furthermore, the comparison does not raise any of the policy
concerns courts have expressed. Nothing in the judgment implies that
disabled people would be better off never having been born. Rather,
it merely expresses that they would be better off without disabilities-
a judgment that, while not flattering, seems relatively noncontrov-
ersial. A plaintiff frequently recovers when a defendant's negligence
causes an injury resulting in a permanent disability, for example in
an automobile accident. Recovery in such cases raises the same policy
implications. No one suggests that a damage award to a paraplegic
accident victim contravenes public policies favoring the disabled.
Borrowing the rightful position rules from misrepresentation cases
will produce a different recovery than would application of traditional
tort rules. The misrepresentation approach limits recovery of pecu-
niary damages. Costs that would have been incurred by a healthy child
would not be recoverable, since the child or the parents would have
incurred those expenses if the misrepresentation had been true. Only
the extra costs that result from the genetic defect itself would be re-
coverable. 218
of Misrepresentation, 41 CAsE W.L. Rev. (forthcoming 1991). The position the plaintiff would
have occupied if the misimpression created by the genetic counsellor had been accurate can
serve as a useful indicator of the rightful position.
217. Throughout this section, I refer to a "healthy" child. I use this word as a shorthand
for the more precise description "a child born without the specific defect in question." Few
doctors warrant the health of a prospective baby. Explicit misrepresentations probably will
resemble statements such as: "the fetus does not suffer from Down's syndrome," or "neither
parent carries the gene for Tay-Sachs disease." Even when a genetic counsellor's negligence
consists of failing to inform parents of a medically indicated test such as amniocentesis, it
seems fair to infer from this failure a mistaken impression that the child does not suffer from
a specific detectable defect. At most, the physician's failure to recommend the test could imply
that the test was not needed because none of the conditions it would detect are present.
218. These costs may be significant. Children who suffer from genetic defects may require
substantial medical care over and above what healthy children require. Children who suffer
severe mental impairment may require special education and training to achieve their potential.
Some children may require substantially greater supervision than the parents or other available
caregivers can provide. The cost of providing this supervision, if it exceeds that required by a
healthy child, also should be recoverable. See Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309,
1317 (D.S.C. 1983) (awarding parents nearly $400,000 for custodial care required by child with
Down's syndrome); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Colo. 1988) (en banc)
(parents may recover extra medical and education expenses related to the child's blindness);
Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 245, 513 A.2d 341, 350 (1986) (parents entitled to compensation
for extra time and effort expended in caring for child born with congenital rubella syndrome).
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This measure accords with the result most courts reach in cal-
culating pecuniary recoveries in genetic counselling torts. Courts that
have recognized a cause of action by the child generally have limited
the recovery to the extra expenses caused by the genetic defect. 219 Courts
that have recognized only the parents' cause of action similarly have
limited the recovery to the additional costs related to the defect.? By
denying the costs of raising a healthy child, courts implicitly reject the
traditional tort approach to remedies.'" They do not put plaintiffs in
the position they would have occupied but for the wrong-childless
for the parents in a wrongful birth action or never born for the child
in a wrongful life action, and thus without any of the expenses in-
curred by the child or on her behalf. Thus, at least for pecuniary losses,
the appropriateness of recharacterizing the rightful position as akin
to that used in misrepresentation cases seems firmly established by the
existing case law of genetic counselling torts.m
The misrepresentation approach, however, carries additional im-
plications that courts have not accepted.? Under this view of the
rightful position, nonpecuniary recoveries would expand. The child
should recover for any pain and suffering she would not have ex-
perienced had she been born healthy. Similarly, the child should re-
cover for any emotional distress related to the genetic defect above
the distress of healthy life. To the extent a jurisdiction permits separate
recovery for loss of enjoyment of life, that amount also should be
awarded.?4 These elements require subjective judgments, but judg-
ments that are no more subjective than for any other tort that pro-
duced the same effects. The comparison is completely familiar and
traditionally within the jury's discretion.
The potential recovery for lost income poses more difficulty. If
the child had been born healthy, more likely than not she would have
grown up, obtained a job, and earned some income. For the moment,
let us set aside the possibility that the child might have died or suffered
219. See supra note 12.
220. See supra note 10.
221. Weiss, supra note 37, at 513-14.
222. According to Smith v. Cote, "most courts" limit pecuniary damages to extraordinary
costs. Smith, 128 N.H. at 244, 513 A.2d at 349. In fact, only one court has awarded normal
child rearing expenses following the birth of an impaired child. See Robak v. United States,
658 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1981). While Smith is the only court to admit that it has
applied a misrepresentation measure, see Smith, 128 N.H. at 244, 513 A.2d at 349, the near-
universal use of that approach emerges clearly from the cases. See Weiss, supra note 37, at
513-14.
223. I do not say courts have rejected them, for it is not clear that any court except the
Smith court even is aware that its rulings abandoned the traditional tort principles.
224. See supra note 54.
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a disabling accident before obtaining employment. 225 Estimating the
amount of lost income still would require enormous speculation. 226 A
jury has no clue whether the hypothetical healthy child would have
been an unemployed vagrant, a wealthy business tycoon, a lawyer, or
a farmer. The speculation required to pick an occupation, let alone
project the degree of success within that field, suggests the complete
unpredictability of lost income under any remedial approach.227
The benefits rule may pose another obstacle to recovering lost
income. Should the lost potential income be offset by the benefit the
plaintiff receives as a result of not having to work because of her de-
fect? 228 The resulting increase in leisure time would be of some value
to the healthy child. An impaired child, however, may lack some of
the ability to enjoy leisure time. Perhaps this can be viewed as an un-
wanted benefit that the defendant may not thrust upon the plaintiff.2 9
In other tort cases, courts do not offset damages for lost income by
increases in leisure time. 0 Moreover the argument does not note the
joy of accomplishment that some plaintiffs might have received from
their work.2 1'
225. Such possibilities should pose no greater problem for juries than life expectancy figures
do in any case in which the jury must assess lost income for a permanent disability or wrongful
death.
226. The problem arises in any prenatal tort, not just genetic counselling torts. Thus,
courts can apply to genetic counselling torts rules developed in cases in which the defendant
inflicts any prenatal injury. The wrongful death of a child may pose less difficulty, since some
education or test scores may be available to help predict earning potential. S. SPEISER, REcOVERY
FOR WRONGFuL DEATH Ao INJuRY: EcoNo c HAND3OOK §§ 7.1-7.2 (3d ed. 1988).
227. One commentator proposes sidestepping the issue "by using a fixed schedule to
determine compensation." Sieradzki, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater: Reform in
the System for Compensating Obstetric Accidents, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 538, 543 (1989).
Others point to census data on expected lifetime earnings. S. SPEISER, supra note 226, § 7.3,
at 201-12; Fitzpatrick & Doucette, supra note 52, at 532 & n.5.
228. Cf. R. POsNER, supra note 3, § 6.11 n.2 (discussing part of time spent at home by
housewife as nonpecuniary leisure income). I set aside, at least for the moment, the argument
that the income is a pecuniary loss that is not subject to an offset for benefits to other
interests, such as increased leisure time. The direct connection between increased leisure time
and not having to work to earn income displays the benefits rule as currently framed in its
worst light.
229. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
230. Research reveals no appellate decision in which the court reduced the amount of
recovery for lost wages by the benefit of increased leisure time or reduced workload. If courts
have recognized this as a possible source of overcompensation at all, they apparently have
declined to openly evaluate the benefit.
231. My colleagues have suggested that the joy of accomplishment may be atypically high
among those who earn their pay writing law review articles. They feel that many other people
work only for the money and gladly would abandon their trade if offered the same salary not
to work. Without endorsing Marxist theory of alienation of labor in contemporary capitalist
society, I admit that the joy of work might vary between zero and some positive number,
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Successful attainment of the 'rightful position, however, requires
at least one more element of compensation. Lost income could meet
that need. Because pecuniary recovery does not include the cost of
maintenance (food, clothing, and shelter), the child may have no means
for support during her adulthood. The parents, of course, must pro-
vide the child's necessities during childhood.212 In some states parents
are legally liable for a child's support past the age of majority if the
child cannot support herself233-the usual case for genetic counselling
torts. Under these circumstances, the parents incur costs that they would
not have incurred if the child had been born healthy and they should
recover them in their own cause of action.3 4 In other states, however,
an important discrepancy arises. The parents are not liable for support
after the child reaches the age of majority, 3 5 but the child cannot earn
her own support.
A healthy child probably would have been able to support herself.
Thus, some means of support during her adult years must be built into
the award. A calculation of lost income could fulfill this function.2 6
leaving the jury the difficult task of deciding how much to offset the award. The lack of any
work history or personal preferences in genetic counselling torts makes the difficulty even
more extreme in this context.
232. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 196,' 196(a) (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40
1101 (Smith-Hurd 1980); MiCH Cown. LAws ANN. §§ 722.1(b), 722.3 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAw § 32(3) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
233. See, e.g., Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 259, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (1985); Smith v.
Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 245, 513 A.2d 341, 350 (1986); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872,
882-83 (W. Va. 1985).
234. Blake, 108 Idaho at 259, 698 P.2d at 321; Smith, 128 N.H. at 245, 513 A.2d at 530;
James G., 332 S.E.2d at 882. But see infra note 296. In this situation, however, parents may
be unavailable to sue or may face other barriers to recovery such as the statute of limitations.
See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 355-56, 478 A.2d 755, 764 (1984).
235. E.g., Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 808, 505 N.E.2d 947, 948, 513 N.Y.S.2d
382, 383 (1987).
236. See Sieradzki, supra note 227, at 543 (suggesting lost income could be compensated
by providing in-kind services through, for example, a state agency). The state could support
those who cannot support themselves and whose parents no longer support them. This approach
would serve tort policies favoring cost-spreading. Policies based on deterrence or fairness,
however, imply that the wrongdoer should bear these expenses. Ultimately, parents may provide
for their disabled children out of a sense of moral obligation even if they are not legally
bound to pay these expenses and their or the child's award does not cover them. This realistic,
possibility suggests that the award should include the cost of necessities during the adult years
in order to accomplish cost-spreading objectives. Provisions that would permit the state to
recapture this award from parents who shirk their moral obligation would avoid unfairness.
Another realistic note makes this point somewhat less significant. Many of the children who
are likely to recover for genetic counselling torts may not survive to the age of majority. J.
MASON, supra note 172, at 140; see, e.g., Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110, 111 (1977) (child died of polycystic kidney disease at age two and one-half), rev'd, Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 415, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 907 (1978); Naccash
v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 409-10, 290 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1982) (child died of Tay-Sachs disease
January 1991] WRONGFUL LIFE
Limiting lost income to the expenses the child will incur as an adult
avoids speculating about the child's hypothetical career. 2 7 But it re-
tains sight of the rightful position and seeks to fill a gap that otherwise
might prevent the remedial scheme from achieving its goals.
The rightful position in misrepresentation cases captures the un-
derlying and hidden concerns that courts have applied to genetic coun-
selling tort damages. By applying the measure consciously, courts can
avoid the perplexing evidentiary and policy concerns that impede clear
analysis under traditional tort rules. One might hope courts would
welcome the chance to advance tort policies by applying this measure
to claims by children. It seems reasonable, however, to anticipate some
objections to this remedy.
A. Unjust Enrichment, or "Whose Rightful Position?"
One objection to the misrepresentation-based approach is that it
appears to unjustly enrich the plaintiff child. The child never could
have been born healthy. Refraining the rightful position as the position
of a healthy child seeks to put the child in a position she never could
have occupied. Thus, the recovery may seem to overcompensate the
plaintiff.
To some extent, overcompensation is pure fiction. Because money
does not (indeed cannot) make the child healthy and fully able, the
award does not put the child in a position she never would have oc-
cupied. The jury may be instructed to award an amount that would
make the child indifferent to the choice between a healthy life on one
hand and an impaired life with the additional money on the other.
We must recognize, however, that no sum of money can replace good
health. 21 Overcompensation does not identify a real objection.
at age two and one-half). Depending on the scope of genetic impairments that satisfy the
liability threshold, see supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text, cases involving lost income
or adult expenses may be rare.
237. Of course, speculation will remain concerning how long the child will live and what
necessities will cost in those future years. But these forms of speculation also infect lost income
calculations in wrongful death cases and many other tort actions that result in disability. We
are tolerant of the problems in those contexts and should be tolerant in genetic counselling
torts as well.
238. Although a monetary judgment for pain and suffering cannot make [the child]
... "whole," any more than it actually does for most injured persons, it may
provide some balm for the inner wounds of congenitally defective children if it is
spent so as to bring some compensating joy, and the feeling of being "special" in
a good sense, into their lives.
Capron, supra note 4, at 655. I am tempted to single out hedonic damages for separate
rejection on grounds of unjust enrichment. While compensation for pain and suffering seem
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Concern for unjust enrichment does not prevent courts from con-
doning expectancy recoveries in other settings. Warranty remedies may
permit buyers to net benefits they could not have obtained if the seller
had accurately described the goods. 239 In fraud cases, the same rule
applies. 24° If a defendant/seller misrepresents that land for sale is ocean-
front property, the buyer can recover money to make up the difference
between the actual value of the land received and the value of ocean-
front property.2A' In effect, the plaintiff'gets the monetary equivalent
of ocean-front land, even if the defendant never could have sold the
buyer such land. To the extent this is unjust enrichment, it arises nat-
urally from treating the misrepresentation as true. Courts tolerate this
legal fiction whenever they award the plaintiff the benefit of the bar-
gain, or the expectation interest, and not merely the out-of-pocket
loss, or the reliance interest.
rational in this context, compensation for the lost joys of life may go too far, stretching the
fiction past the breaking point. Whether this reaction constitutes arbitrary line drawing,
excessive moderation, or a negative reaction to hedonic damages in any circumstances I leave
for the reader to determine. See generally Murray, supra note 54 (discussing the positive and
negative aspects of hedonic damages and concluding that they are an appropriate part of the
pain and suffering award but not when sought as separate compensation).
239. For example, in Chatlos System v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304,
1306 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982), the plaintiff purchased a computer and
software for approximately $46,000 based on representations that it would perform functions
that could be performed only by a computer system costing over $200,000. The court awarded
the plaintiff approximately $200,000 without any evidence that plaintiff would have purchased
a $200,000 computer even if properly informed. The Uniform Commercial Code implicitly
sanctions that result by focusing on the "value [the goods] would have had if they had been
as warranted" rather than the contract price. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1989) (remedy for breach of
warranty in regard to accepted goods). Thus, when the buyer gets a great deal, she can argue
that the value of the goods greatly exceeded the price. Such cases will be rare. Ordinarily, the
contract price will equal the value of the goods as warranted-the amount that a willing seller
would seek and a willing buyer would (land did) agree to pay for the goods. But in some
circumstances, like Chatios, the seller may incorrectly warrant that goods have qualities that
the buyer could not have obtained without spending considerably more money. In those cases,
a willing seller never would have agreed to sell goods that actually had those properties at the
contract price. The contract price is a product of the seller's mistaken belief (or perhaps
conscious deceptioh) concerning the goods under discussion, not a willingness to sell better
goods at a steep discount. When that happens, the buyer can obtain a benefit via damages
that she never could have obtained via bargaining if the seller had accurately communicated
the nature of the goods. Properly informed, the buyer would have been forced either to pay
more for the goods with those properties or accept goods that lacked them. The false warranty
gives the buyer the benefits at an otherwise impossibly low price.
240. RSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 549 (1977).
241. See First Interstate'Dev. Corp. v. Ablanedo, 476 So. 2d 692, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985). If the price paid equals the value if the representation had been true-which it will in
an efficient market-then that price minus actual value (out-of-pocket loss) equals the value
as represented minus actual value (the benefit of the bargain). But a benefit of the bargain
recovery can include profits the plaintiff would have made if the representation had been true.
See Earle, McMillan & Niemeyer v. Dekle, Inc., 418 So. 2d 97, 100 (Ala. 1982); REsTATEmNT
(SEcoND) oF TORTS § 549 illustration'4 (1977).
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Even in genetic counselling torts, courts look to the expectation
interest in measuring the parents' damages. They limit the pecuniary
recovery to the difference between the cost of raising a healthy child,
which the parents expected and were willing to pay, and the cost of
raising an impaired child, which the parents did not expect. 2A2 The
courts' willingness to look at the expectation interest in the context
of a parent's lawsuit suggests that there is nothing inherently wrong
with applying this legal fiction to children's suits for professional neg-
ligence, or at least to those cases that are analogous to misrepresen-
tations.23 Genetic counselling torts are reasonably suited for the rightful
position from misrepresentation cases.
Perhaps, however, we should question the initial assumption that
the child really receives something more than she would have received
but for the tortious act. This question can be addressed in two ways.
First, if one looks at the position of the child on its most fundamental
level and in light of the most immediate consequences, but for the tort
the child would not have been born. According to this view, putting
the child in the position of a healthy child puts the child in a position
she never could have occupied. Yet, take one step back and look at
what the consequences might have been over a slightly longer period
of time if no tort had occurred. In this longer view, many parents,
once warned of the defect, would elect not to begin or not to continue
this pregnancy. Presumably the parents want children.244 Probably they
would try again, perhaps producing healthy offspring in a later year.25
242. See supra note 37.
243. Of course, awarding the expectation interest in the parents' action produces under-
compensation-or, at least, less pecuniary compensation than the out of pocket rule would
provide. The expectation measure limits parents to recovery of extraordinary expenses and
denies recovery for expenses they would have incurred if a healthy child was born. See supra
notes 10, 37. The Restatement responded to the possibility of undercompensation under an
expectation rule by allowing plaintiffs to elect the more favorable remedy. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 comment g, at 114-15 (1977).
244. This presumption probably underlies the decision of courts to deny parents recovery
for ordinary child-raising costs. The court in Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 244, 513 A.2d
341, 349-50 (1986), expressly based its conclusion on this premise.
245. In some cases, such as rubella during pregnancy or Down's syndrome, both of which
have a fairly low incidence, parents have a fairly high chance of conceiving normal offspring
in subsequent attempts. The incidence of Down's syndrome, even among high risk mothers
over the age of 45, is less than 35 per 1000 live births, or 3.5%. Adams, Erickson, Layde &
Oakley, supra note 19, at 758. Congenital rubella syndrome now appears in only 0.03 births
per 100,000, or 0.00003% of live births. Rubella and Congenital Rubella Syndrome-United
States, 1985-1988, 261 J. A.M.A. 2179, 2180 (1989). Even before improved genetic counselling
and widely available abortions reduced the incidence, congenital rubella syndrome struck less
than two children in 100,000, or 0.002%. Id. In other cases the chance of conceiving a second
impaired child might deter parents from further attempts. Capron, supra note 4, at 656.
Parents, however, might resort to alternative means of producing offspring, such as artificial
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But for the tort, the family would consist of the parents and a healthy
child born in a later year,2 instead of the parents and an impaired
child born this year. The difference between the misrepresentation
measure and the longer view of traditional tort rules amounts only to
timing-the year in which the healthy child arrives. Little or no over-
compensation therefore results from allowing the impaired child to
recover an amount that would put the family in this rightful posi-
tion.247
This longer view seems more in keeping with traditional tort rules.
When the plaintiff in an accident case suffers an employment disability
as a result of defendant's negligence, she may argue that she would
have received raises, promotions, and other forms of increased com-
pensation in the future. The law does not limit the jury to a simple
comparison of her income before and after the accident. The plaintiff
can demonstrate for the jury what, more likely than not, would have
occurred but for the tort. In this sense, the longer view of what would
have happened to the plaintiff comports with standard tort damage
practices.
The longer view, however, is subject to one immediate and ob-
vious criticism: the two potential children are not the same person.
The child who sues developed from the embryo that would have been
aborted or not conceived in year one, not the embryo that might have
been conceived and born in a later year. The child who sues never
could have been the child who might have been born healthy.249 The
insemination or surrogacy. These procedures allow parents the potential to avoid a genetic
problem inherent in only one of them. Of course, adoption would permit the parents to have
genetically normal offspring regardless of their own genetic misfortune. See Robertson, Genetic
Alteration of Embryos: The Ethical Issues, in Gaanrcs AND TE LAW III, supra note 19, at
115, 119.
246. The relatively low incidence of genetic disorders, even in the self-selected population
of women who undergo an amniocentesis, suggests that a subsequent child more likely than
not would not suffer from a genetic defect. See Milunsky, supra note 19, at 335 (approximately
50% of women undergo amniocentesis, of whom less than 3% discover genetic abnormalities).
247. This approach could produce a very complicated damage calculation. Normal child-
rearing expenses are incurred earlier than they would have been if the parents had abandoned
the first attempt and pursued an alternative. The parents thus suffer a loss of the time value
of the money they would have spent to raise a normal child born at a later date. This loss
can be calculated easily and included in the recovery. Similarly, the parents' pain from the
defect is suffered today, but the joy of a healthy life would have been received in the future.
An award that failed to discount the offsetting benefits would underestimate the recovery by
exaggerating slightly the future benefits. The same analysis applies to the pain and distress a
healthy child would encounter (a loss suffered sooner by the existing child than by the
hypothetical future child), but with more difficulty in calculating the amounts involved.
248. Capron, supra note 4, at 656-57.
249. This point is particularly clear if parents allege that they would not have conceived a
child if they had been properly informed. In effect, this denies that they would have conceived
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healthy child would have developed from a different egg and sperm, 250
becoming a different genetic individual and, perhaps, a different per-
sonality. The plaintiff's claim that "I should have been my sibling"
must overcome substantial intuitive obstacles.
These facts are undisputable. Even if there is a slight chance that
the child might have received precisely the same genetic contributions
from each parent except for the defect, the parents would have been
differently situated by the time the later birth could occur. The parents
would be a year older, they would have lived through another year
of events that would shape their personalities, their finances, their
possessions, and their relationship. Everything about them would be
at least subtly changed. Thus, they would react to the child in different
ways, and ultimately produce a child who would grow to be a different
individual.25' And the assumption of identical genetic makeup posited
above is wildly improbable. A child born later could be different in
ways that would affect (either genetically or environmentally) the child's
identity. For instance, there is only a fifty percent chance that the
subsequent child would be of the same gender, a difference with po-
tentially far reaching consequences for the child's development.
Concerns for the identity of the embryo miss the thrust of my
contention. I do not contend that the child could have been or should
a child in a later year by normal means (assuming the couple is risk averse throughout life
and would not later change their minds). Only use of alternatives such as artificial insemination,
surrogate motherhood, or adoption-all of which avoid the genes of at least one of the
parents-would produce a healthy, older child. That child, having different genetic parents,
would have been different from the child who was born with the severe genetic defect-
barring, that is, an extraordinary coincidence likely to occur in less than one in 3 billion cases.
See Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 MICH.
L. REv. 1379, 1383 (1983).
250. Males produce a new supply of sperm every 74 hours. Rothstein, supra note 249, at
1392-93. It would be extraordinary for a sperm living at the time of the first conception to
remain alive at the time the later conception would have occurred. It may be possible for the
later sperm to have the same genetic components as the first. The chances seem pretty slim.
See supra.
Females are born with every oocyte (egg that has not yet undergone maturation) they will
ever produce. Of the 40,000 that remain at puberty, about 400 will become fertile eggs. Once
ovulated, each egg is irreplaceable. The subsequent egg cannot be the egg that ovulation
produced earlier. Of course, the same slim chance remains that the subsequent egg will be
genetically identical to the earlier egg.
251. Cf. Parfit, Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Identity Problem in ENERGY
AND THE FUTURE 166, 167-68 (D. MacLean & P. Brown ed. 1983) (discussing future conse-
quences of present decision to have, or not have, a child). From a religious standpoint,
different views of when a soul enters an embryo or a child and whether the soul entering the
second child might be the same as the one that would have entered (or did enter) the first
would take on significance. Although I lack the theological training to discuss this matter
intelligently, I suspect that because of first amendment concerns a court should not, and would
not, base its ruling in these matters on any particular religious view. See U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
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have been the later-born healthy child. I contend only that a measure
of damages based on the fiction that the child could have been born
healthy in a later year does not unjustly enrich the child. The fiction
captures an important element of reality: a healthy child could have
become a family member in a later year if the impaired child had not
been born. The fiction identifies the rightful position far more ac-
curately than the self-imposed myopia employed to date.
The fiction serves deterrence goals by capturing the total cost to
the family and to society of, the defendant's conduct. The family and
society would have consisted of a healthy younger child rather than
an impaired older child. The total cost of that difference should be
assessed against the defendant, who caused the difference. 257 By as-
sessing the total cost to society against the person best able to prevent
the mistake-the genetic counsellor-the law can encourage that party
to take the appropriate precautions. 253 The identity of the plaintiff,
and in fact "that the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an
economic standpoint, a detail."'  Measuring the harm to society seems
to require the broader view of the rightful position, which would com-
pare the family and society as it would have existed (with a healthy
but younger child) to the family and society as it does exist (with an
impaired child). A narrower view overlooks the costs to the family and
society that the defendant could have prevented.2 5 A fiction that limits
recovery of pecuniary losses and allows recovery for some nonpe-
cuniary losses better measures the amount the defendant should pay.
The concern for identity implies that the award compensates the
wrong person. Arguably, the "real" injured party is not the child who.
was born with a severe genetic defect, but the child who would have
been born healthy at a later time. The defendant's negligence pre-
vented that later birth and thus prevented a happy and productive life.
252. Capron, supra note 4, at 657-58; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
253. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239 n.15, 643 P.2d 954, 966 n.15, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 349 n.15 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 481, 656 P.2d
483, 496 (1983) (quoting Turpin) ("permitting recovery of these extraordinary out-of-pocket
expenses ... should ... provide a comprehensive and consistent deterrent to negligent
conduct."); R. POSNER, supra note 3, § 6.10.
254. R. POSNER, SECOND EDMON, supra note 124, § 6.12, at 143. But see, R. POSNER,
supra note 3, § 6.10. Posner's discussion of this point in his third edition softens his position
in the second edition (in which he relegated the discussion to a footnote) since it emphasizes
the importance of this detail.
255. The parents in their own action frequently can recover a portion of the injury: the
extraordinary pecuniary costs that they must pay during the child's dependency or minority.
But a large portion of the costs may go completely uncompensated unless the child can recover.
Professor Capron points out that if a genetic problem cannot be treated, the extra pecuniary
cost to the parents might be a very small part of the total injury the defendant caused. Capron,
supra note 4, at 658.
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Under that view, however, no one could sue. Because the injured party
(the later unborn-child) does not exist, she cannot recover for her dam-
ages. Although the parents still could conceive and bear additional
children, none of them could complain because defendant's negligence
did not prevent their existence. 2 6 But that, the argument would go,
does not warrant unjustly enriching the impaired child who was born. 257
It is perhaps paradoxical to suggest that a fiction captures reality
better than hard facts. Efforts to identify the potential later child as
the "real" plaintiff, however, merely obscure reality. Employing a
fiction in this context produces a more "realistic" result. Shifting fo-
cus to the later child ignores the. fact that the impaired child suffers
the direct effects of the defendant's negligence, that she is the available
and existing person who has been most seriously affected by the coun-
selor's negligence.258 No amount of rhetoric can make the unborn child
more "real" than the living victim of the defendant's error. Recovery
by the impaired child is not unjust enrichment merely because another
potential victim was never born and cannot recover.259
Further, fixation on genetic identity creates a paradox. We can
identify the rightful position-a healthy, younger child in the family.
We also know the rightful position did not come to pass because of
the genetic counsellor's negligence. The difference between the rightful
position and the existing state of affairs is substantial and reasonably
ascertainable. Yet we cannot assess the damages against the negligent
party because we cannot find the right recipient. One child would be
unjustly enriched and the other simply does not exist.
256. Realistically, the birth of an impaired child is likely to decrease the total number of
children a family seeks. Capron, supra note 4, at 656.
257. This argument leaves open only the slightest theoretical possibility that a later healthy
child might recover for any diminution of parental support and attention caused by the
devotion of resources to the older impaired child. The only court to address such a claim
rejected it. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 117, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1987). The Azzolino decision is somewhat aberrant in that the court
rejected not only the child's and the siblings' claims, but also the parents' claim. Id. at 110,
337 S.E.2d at 533. See infra notes 319-325 and accompanying text (discussing the siblings'
claims).
258. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 933 (Tex. 1984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring and
dissenting) (the child is "the real victim of the malpractice"); see also Turpin v. Sortini, 31
Cal. 3d 220, 238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982) (noting the anomaly of
denying the child recovery for "the child's own medical care").
259. The United States Supreme Court has been willing to overlook the identity of the
parties when it is necessary to correct substantive wrongs. Thus, the court permits white
landowners to assert equal protection rights of racial minorities to challenge racial restrictive
covenants, because insisting on a minority plaintiff might force courts to enforce such
objectionable clauses and leave the wrong unremedied. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
257 (1953). The need to remedy certain wrongs can overcome even the case and controversy
requirements of the Constitution, permitting the courts to decide cases when the decision will
not affect the parties involved if the subject matter is capable of repetition but likely to evade
review. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Philosophers have questioned the moral significance of the iden-
tity of the genetic tissue involved.m Fixation on genetic identity can
produce apparently absurd results. This contention can be illustrated
by way of a review of Derek Parfit's discussion concerning whether
society today owes future generations a moral obligation to conserve
resources.26' Although intuitively, such a moral obligation seems clear,
a social policy that conserves resources may alter the identity of the
future generation. 2672 The people who populate the resource depleted
world never would have lived but for the policy of depletion. They
may be better off alive in a depleted world than never born in a boun-
tiful world. The policy of consumption may deplete resources vora-
ciously without harming anyone.263 Thus, focusing on the identity of
the members of future generations can become a license to ignore the
interests of future generations as a whole.
Focusing on the identity of the child who might have been born
later invokes arguments that, followed to their logical extreme, license
morally objectionable conduct. Positing a subsequent healthy child in
the rightful position injects a level of reality into the damage calcu-
lation. It is a fiction, but a fiction that serves to help us approach
reality. Focusing on the identity is a fact, but a fact that drives us to
surreal moral conclusions.
The law need not attach significance to the fact of identity. This
simple fiction can eliminate some of the intractable questions of the-
ology and philosophy that have daunted courts to date. By providing
the courts with a manageable alternative measure of damages, this
approach would permit them to achieve the goals of the tort system,
at least in cases in which the child can successfully establish that she
would have preferred nonexistence.
B. A "Perfect Baby" Warranty?
Comparing an impaired child to a healthy but younger child risks
increasing the number and type of suits for genetic counselling torts.64
260. Parfit, supra note 251, at 167-68.
261. Id.
262. The choice between conservation and consumption will affect, among other things,
which people meet, marry, and procreate; when they decide to procreate; and when and with
whom their offspring decide to procreate. The policy changes the identity of the future
generation. The greater the difference between the two policies, the greater the impact upon
marriage and procreation choices. Even a relatively modest difference, carried over several
generations, will have profound effects on the identity of the individuals born. Id. at 168.
263. See Schwartz, Obligations to Posterity, in OBiGAnToNs To Ftrrrma GNEmRAoNs 3,
11 (R. Sikora & B. Barry ed. 1978).
264. The concerns in this section apply to both the misrepresentation rightful position (a
healthy child born in year one) and the family's rightful position (a healthy but younger child),
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The comparison arguably could produce damage awards for children
who, though healthy, are born with a less than perfect trait that ap-
pears contrary to a genetic counsellor's earlier representations that it
would not appear. 20 Courts have expressed fear that recognizing the
child's cause of action, even in an extreme case, might lead the courts
down a slippery slope that eventually would permit recovery for any
"less than perfect birth." 2  Yet as with any slippery slope, a court
that is equipped with a good supply of pitons should have no fear of
falling.267
An example illustrates the concern. Suppose parents expecting a
child consult a physician concerning the child's gender. The physician
negligently performs an amniocentesis test 268 and erroneously informs
the parents that they will have a son. 269 The parents' subsequent law-
suit alleges that if the parents had known the child was a daughter,
they would have aborted and tried again for a son. 270
Intuitively, this does not seem like a valid claim. If asked whether
the child would have been better off never born rather than being born
female the automatic responsewould be an emphatic "NO!" Genetic
counselling torts make sense in cases of severe genetic defects. The
described more fully in Part III of this Article. The only difference is the timing of the child's
birth. The text discusses a healthy but younger child, noting various timing implications. The
misrepresentation measure raises the same issues, but without these timing concerns.
265. Feinberg, supra note 13, at 75-76.
266. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978).
267. See Robertson, supra note 245, at 117; Schauer, supra note 135, at 379-80.
268. For the purpose of this illustration the exact form of negligence is immaterial.
Depending upon the standard of care the medical profession establishes for itself, the failure
to mention the possibility of having an amniocentesis test could be negligent if circumstances
indicate its use. Some medical professionals, however, question the reasonableness of a medical
decision to perform such genetic tests merely to determine the gender of the child. See
Milunsky, supra note 19, at 66; Brody, Personal Health-Taking the Mystery out of Childbirth:
Prenatal Diagnoses for Sex Education, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990, at B7 (nat'l ed.).
269. Alternatively, parents who are negligently advised that they will have a daughter might
sue upon the birth of a son. For purposes of the illustration, the damage issues are easier to
frame in terms of an unwanted daughter, given the prevailing difference between the average
earnings of men and women. See 36 U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. EmPLOYMENT & EARNNS No. 1, at
219 (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter LABOR STATISTICS].
270. The following discussion focuses on the child's claim since the parents probably suffer
no damages. The difference in expense between raising a healthy daughter and a healthy son
seems insignificant. Purchases unique to one gender or the other may balance. Moreover, it
is unclear that either gender causes parents more emotional distress (aside from disappointment
at the frustrated expectation). Some claims, however, may be plausible. If daughters, for
example, are more costly or more troublesome than sons, the parents may state a claim. Also,
the difference in timing of the birth could justify some recovery since the later-born son would
have incurred expenses sometime after the daughter was born. The parents' expense of
undergoing a second or third pregnancy to obtain a son (arguably a pecuniary savings) may
outweigh the relatively small time value of the childrearing expenses.
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absence of a preferred trait271 does not cry out for judicial redress in
the same way severe genetic defects do.272
Comparing the existing daughter to the expected son, however,
may produce a recovery. Under current conditions, it is probable that
the son would have had greater expected earning potential as an adult.273
Thus, the child more likely than not has suffered a loss of earnings
over the course of her life.2 74 Traditional tort remedies handle the case
easily: if the child had never been born, she would have earned nothing
and, thus, suffers no loss. The misrepresentation approach, however,
forces us to compare the daughter to the son.
Courts possess numerous means to handle such claims. They may
require plaintiffs to prove injury as an element of liability.2 75 Alter-
natively, they may apply the economic loss doctrine to preclude re-
covery.? 6 Courts may find that the plaintiff's damages are so speculative
271. "Preferred" here refers to the preference of the parents, as alleged in the complaint,
not any societal judgment that one gender is preferable. The example may suggest serious
concerns about whether the parents have accurately identified the child's best interests. See
supra notes 62-63 and accompanying lext. Such allegations may pose an appealing case for
the appointment of a guardian ad item to evaluate the child's interests independently.
272. See Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App. 3d 1, 14-15, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 93-94 (1983)
(refusing to extend Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982),
to cover a healthy child). At the margin, the line between the presence of a defect and the
absence of a desired trait may blur. See e.g., Powledge, Commerce and the Future of Gene
Transfer, in Gaancs AND THE LAW III, supra note 19, at 75, 77. The example I have offered
in the text of this Article does not fall anywhere near the margin.
273. Recent statistics measuring median weekly earnings during 1988 suggest that women
in the work force earn about 70% as much as men in the work force on a per capita basis.
LABOR SrATrs, supra note 269, at 219.
274. Other elements of the damage calculations probably balance. As noted previously,
child-rearing expenses are unlikely to vary as between the genders. See supra note 270. It
seems probable that a child does not suffer more or less distress because of her gender. Life
has its share of joy and pain for both genders. There seems little basis on which to permit
the jury to conclude that the daughter will suffer more pain or distress than a son born a
year later would have suffered. And if the joy of a healthy life outweighs the pain in an
absolute sense-that is, if healthy life on the whole is a benefit-then the discounting to
present value would be a net gain for the daughter who rather than having to wait a year or
two, feels her net joy now.
275. Courts could require the child suing as an individual to prove injury, a standard
element of misrepresentation actions. The paradox of finding no injury when remedial rules
would award substantial damages was discussed in Part I.B. of this Article. See supra notes
91-127 and accompanying text.
276. A daughter who seeks the income she would have made if she had been a son
identifies an economic loss. Absent physical injury, such losses may not be compensable in
tort. See, e.g., Seeley v. white Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 23 (1965); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 86, 435 N.E.2d 443,
453 (1982).
The economic loss doctrine may not apply. Some states allow recovery for economic loss
caused by an intentional misrepresentation at least in a business setting. See, e.g., Moorman,
91 Ill. 2d at 88-89, 435 N.E.2d at 452. The misrepresentation aspects of genetic counselling
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that the claim must fail. 277 Even if certain, damages may be so small
that courts invoke the maxim "de minimis non curat lex" ("the law
disregards trifles") in order to dispose of the claims. 278 Even if courts
permit the plaintiffs to proceed, juries seem unlikely to view such claims
with sympathy. 279
torts may produce a similar exception. Alternatively, the plaintiffs may allege a physical injury.
The difference between being born male and being born female certainly is physical, but courts
are likely to balk at calling the difference a physical injury.
277. See RESTATrEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRS § 912 (1979). The speculative nature of an
impaired child's claim for lost earnings was discussed earlier. See supra notes 225-228 and
accompanying text. The healthy daughter can avoid some of that speculation, but only if the
court: (a) postpones judgment until the daughter's educational achievement, aptitudes, and
career proclivities become apparent; and (b) makes certain assumptions about her hypothetical
brother's achievements, aptitudes, and proclivities. Even then, some speculation remains. The
plaintiff's damages depend on wage differentials between the genders 18 to 70 years after her
birth. Evidence of wage differentials today may not satisfy her burden of proof. Even if it
does, defendants may challenge the validity of figures extrapolated from the average earnings
for women and men to the earnings of specific individuals. Many women earn more than
many men. (My wife earns twice as much as I do. Every female attorney who works for a
major law firm undoubtedly takes home more than all but the most successful male cab
drivers or custodians.) This female child may earn more than her hypothetical brother would
have earned-or any difference may be recoverable in a discrimination claim. The speculation
necessary to permit any recovery may cross the boundaries allowed under current common
law practice.
278. See, e.g., Harris v. Time, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 449, 458, 237 Cal. Rptr. 584, 589
(1987); Urban v. Village of Inverness, 176 Ill. App. 3d 1, 530 N.E.2d 976 (1988) (Murray, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). If plaintiffs prevail, the recovery may be small
because the wage differential must be discounted twice to reach present value. First, the son's
income must be discounted to the year the daughter would earn the income in order to account
for the time value of the income she earns sooner. Second, the difference between each year's
income will need to be discounted to the date of judgment-anywhere from 18 to 70 years.
The difference seems likely to be quite small once the discount is applied. Even if the potential
recovery is not de minimis, the return may not be large enough to entice plaintiffs or attorneys
into bringing such a claim. The reader should note that for the sake of simplicity, this argument
assumes that the son and daughter would have entered the work force at the same age.
Differences in the ages at which each of the two children would have begun work could either
increase or decrease the effect of discounting. This difference also enhances arguments that
the damages are too speculative.
279. Parents who testify that they would have aborted if they had known the fetus was
female are likely to encounter some backlash from a jury that may reject the claim out of
hand.
Reliance on the conscience of the jury has drawbacks. Some juries may recognize the claims
if they feel animosity toward the defendant or an attorney, special sympathy for a plaintiff
or witness, or less moral indignation than predicted. These inconsistent results may or may
not relate to differences in the injury sustained by the child. In addition, the cost of defending
a suit through a jury trial, the outcome of which is never certain, may make a defendant
especially vulnerable to a strike suit brought by a plaintiff who has a weak claim but knows
the defendant may settle rather than incur the expense of litigation. That possibility, of course,
exists in all tort litigation and much business litigation. There seems no more reason to reject
the genetic counselling tort claims of children on this basis than to deny recovery to any other
accident victim.
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Courts also could employ the policies that urged recognition of
the child's claim in order to limit its scope. Impaired children and their
families suffer catastrophic losses that can be spread by shifting the
burden to the defendant. No such disaster befalls the child who lacks
a preferred trait. She incurs an opportunity cost-the lost opportunity
to have the desired trait a year later. That loss is microscopic in com-
parison to the out-of-pocket losses incurred by children born with se-
vere genetic defects. Moreover, the need to spread that opportunity
cost is rather elusive.
Deterrence goals also offer a distinction, albeit a thin one. To
encourage the optimal level of precautions, the law must impose upon
the tortfeasor the cost to society of the tortious conduct. It is unclear
that society suffers any loss from the birth of a healthy girl instead
of a healthy boy. Even if prevailing wage differentials represent dif-
ferences in productivity, 280 society would be far worse off with a 100
percent male population, productivity notwithstanding. Thus, the so-
cietal cost of this negligence may approach zero. Even if the individual
suffers some lost opportunity cost, society may not feel the need to
encourage genetic counsellors to include that loss in their calcula-
tions.21
As genetic science progresses, one can imagine that a variety of
"imperfect baby" claims might arise. Science may discover a genetic
predictor of beauty or specific desirable or undesirable physical traits
like eye color, hair color, and tendency toward obesity. What happens
when parents told they would have a slender, blue-eyed blonde instead
raise an obese, brown-eyed brunette? Discrimination based on physical
appearance is rampant and legal. If a study can demonstrate a wage
difference, should the courts permit the child to maintain an action
for genetic counselling torts?
Examples of other possible feared future claims further fuel the
fears of already skeptical courts. Can a family that is told to expect
an intelligent child sue when the child exhibits below average intel-
ligence? Discrimination based on intelligence often equates with rec-
ognizing merit, something the law encourages-or, at least, does not
prohibit. If claims for lost income are cognizable, the damages may
be real and substantial.
280. Wage differentials probably reflect discrimination and its legacy rather than produc-
tivity differences. In addition, one should not rely exclusively on wages to measure productivity,
since labor markets systematically exclude a broad range of productive activities outside of
employment for wages.
281. Concerns for fairness, generally limited to the individual interests rather than societal
interests, see Fletcher, supra note 16, at 568-69, may not offer a distinction useful in this
context.
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Some of the arguments suggested above may bar these claims. 2
Yet, some of the claims may meet these requirements, particularly if
elements beyond lost income can be shown. 283 Policy considerations
may not limit the action. When a child of low intelligence is born,
society may suffer a real loss-a loss it may or may not28 wish to
deter.
Today these claims seem untenable. Juries contain imperfect peo-
ple and a plaintiff may have trouble persuading a jury that her life
is not worth living, that she never should have been bom-especially
if her life resembles or surpasses theirs. Moral values may reinforce
this tendency. Unless societal values drastically change in the next few
years, juries are unlikely to return verdicts favorable to parents who
claim they would have aborted a fetus if they had known the child
would have grey eyes or merely average intelligence.
If societal norms do change, perhaps the law should change with
them. Consider the following scenario. Science advances to permit
sophisticated genetic predictions but genetic counsellors negligently
employ these techniques and mislead parents seeking to make pro-
creative choices. Furthermore, science does not advance far enough
to permit treatment or selection of the traits predicted, leaving abor-
tion as the parents' only option. And finally, society evolves to the
point that juries are willing to compensate the aggrieved child when
the parents testify that they would have aborted if they had been prop-
erly informed. Under these circumstances, should courts immunize the
genetic counsellors from suit? Today, we may think so. But if to-
morrow's society feels differently, why should courts stand in the way
282. See supra notes 275-280 and accompanying text. Is a child "injured" by lacking genius
or beauty? Are the damages reasonably certain? After discounting, will the damages justify
the court's time to resolve the dispute? Will the juries reject the claim?
283. Children feel distress when picked on or ostracized by their peers. One cannot doubt
that unattractive people or less intelligent people may face some of this social stigma during
their childhood or lifetime. If the child could have been born later with the preferred trait, a
measurable amount of distress may exist due to the child's lack of the trait.
The distress may not exceed the distress that accompanies any life. Peer pressure and teasing
among children are common. "Smart Nerds" may suffer as much abuse as "Dumb Jocks."
Attractive people may be dismissed as "pet rocks" or "brainless hunks" as often as unattractive
people are tormented with epitaphs such as "tubs of lard" or "dogs." These empirical
suspicions regarding the relative level of distress do not affect the viability of the cause of
action. They identify issues subject to proof before a jury. A reasonable jury might conclude,
in any giveni case, that the relative distress weighs in favor of the plaintiff and award a
recovery.
284. At some point, moral concerns over genetic engineering, euthanasia, and efforts to
create a superspecies may enter deliberations. See, e.g., Nelson, The Human Problem of
Human Genetic Engineering, in GEaTICS AND THE LAW III, supra note 19, at 81. Logically,
however, these concerns justify regulating these practices as a whole, not flatly denying recovery
to the individuals unfortunate enough to suffer from carelessness.
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of that social evolution with doctrines designed to preclude liability?
More to the point, why should courts try to fathom tomorrow's
enigma today? Remote possibilities should not prevent current efforts
to relieve wrongs. Rules of law that fail to deter negligent genetic coun-
selling today perpetuate the societal costs the negligent conduct cre-
ates. The future might produce suits that today seem a ridiculous
caricature of the cause of action, but we should not distort the law
in a way that denies justice today merely because justice might be dis-
torted in some other way in the future. The approach to genetic coun-
selling torts described here would set the law on a better path under
today's circumstances. If we trust the common law process, the out-
rageous possibilities we imagine today never will occur. Moreover, the
legislature seems likely to intervene long before the results become
absurd.2 5
Science may moot these issues before they become real problems.
Once science permits altering human genetic composition, physicians
may be able to cure genetic defects during embryonic stages.2 6 Genetic
mapping may permit parents to choose an appropriate sperm and egg
to create an embryo, thus maximizing their chances of contributing
desirable genes to the child. Such developments obliterate the differ-
ence between negligent failure to diagnose the genetic condition of an
embryo, egg, or sperm and any other tort action. Negligence will cause
the injury to that particular child, who could have been born healthy
if properly diagnosed and, treated. The metaphysical comparison of
impaired life to nonexistence will become a relic of the past. Even-
tually, even relatively insignificant traits such as hair color or obesity
may be selectable or alterable. Parents may contract with a physician
or genetic engineer to produce or to alter an embryo to certain spec-
ifications. As crass as it may sound today, under these conditions the
law might better handle breaches by genetic engineers under a breach
of warranty theory rather than under tort law.2 Even if damages would
285. Some courts today defer to the legislature rather than permit the child to recover.
See,' e.g., Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 58-59, 412 N.W.2d 232, 243 (1987). Professor
Zacharias persuasively argues that courts often need to initiate the evolution of tort in order
to stimulate a political dialogue in which the legislature will participate and, ultimately, lend
its guidance. See Zacharias, supra note 14, at 714-15; see also Ursin, supra note 214. The
circumstances he identified fit genetic counselling torts quite well. Legislative reactions to
judicial decisions in this area confirm Professor Zacharias' analysis. The relevant state statutes,
with the exception of California's, see CAL. Civ. CoDE § 43.6 (West 1982), have subverted
the policies of the tort system in favor of anti-abortion policies. Given that record, concerns
for the slippery slope seem wildly exaggerated.
286. Robertson, supra note 245, at 117-18.
287. Of course, the parents' ability to reject or to revoke acceptance of the "product"
might be limited severely. This, of course, would depend on the adoption practices followed
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be relatively small, the physician who promises to produce certain re-
sults ought to pay for the costs incurred as a result of his or her
failure. 288
Behind all these concerns about the future, however, is injustice
masquerading as foresight. Today, genetic counselling torts occur, or
are alleged to occur, in substantial numbers. The resultant suffering
of the victims is clearly evinced in reported court decisions. Existing
legal rules, sensitively applied, should produce recoveries for the child.
Courts, however, have misapplied or reformulated rules governing
damages in ways that severely limit the availability and size of damage
awards. Judges latch onto plausible, but unnecessary or even erro-
neous, philosophical dilemmas and rules of damages to rationalize the
result. The slippery slope argument invoked by the courts serves as
one more smokescreen for decisions based on private morality or re-
ligious views.
III. The Family's Rightful Position
The analysis in Part II.A. regarding unjust enrichment suggests
an additional step that might aid clear thinking about genetic coun-
selling torts. The family's rightful position includes a healthy, younger
child rather than an older, impaired child.m The damages to the fam-
ily as a whole more accurately reflect the cost of the defendant's neg-
ligence and thus should dictate the degree of care society requires of
defendants in order to avoid such accidents. These assertions suggest
that the law should explicitly recognize the family entity as the plain-
tiff.290 Such a step would eliminate concern over whether the parents
in the future. A large number of persons willing to adopt less than perfect babies would make
it easier for parents to reject the baby that failed to live up to the warranty and to seek
another.
288. Cf. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583-89, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186-90 (1973)
(plastic surgeon held liable for reliance damages for negligently performed surgery).
289. This formulation derives from the traditional tort rule, not the misrepresentation
approach. If the misrepresentation had been true, a healthy child would have been born in
year one, not in a later year. The family's rightful position differs from the traditional tort
analysis only by taking a long-term view and examining the consequences that follow termi-
nation of the initial attempts at procreation.
290. Professors Hafen and Teitelbaum have drawn the attention of the scholarly community
to the evolving status of the family entity in jurisprudence and society. See generally Hafen,
The Family as Entity, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 865 (1989) (recognizing that we need legal
reforms that will help restore a sense of caring commitment to family relationships); Teitelbaum,
Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rav. 1135 (assessing legal developments during
the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries of family law). To my knowledge, however,
neither has proposed the kind of formal recognition of the family as an entity akin to a
corporation that this article suggests.
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or the child should recover for any given element of damages. The
family has been injured; the family can recover.
Recognition of the family as the proper plaintiff would abate the-
oretical concerns about the identity of the individuals involved. When
the child. must sue individually, negligent genetic counsellors can ex-
ploit the difference between the plaintiff (who arguably was not in-
jured by being born) and the injured party (who was not born and
thus lacks standing). 291 The problem disappears if the -family can sue
as an entity. The entity, not the individuals, deserves recovery. By
analogy, the shareholders of a corporation at the time of judgment
in favor of a corporation need not be the same as those at the time
injury occurred, regardless of whether those earlier shareholders re-
ceived compensation for their cause of action when they sold their
stock to successors. Similarly, we need not take notice of the exact
constituency, of the family at the time of judgment, as long as the
family unit is identifiably the family injured by the defendant's neg-
ligence.
This approach would minimize several anomalies that arise as a
result of differentiating the parents' cause of action from the child's.
First, the child-the most direct victim of the negligence-would have
a legal claim td"the award because she is a member of the family. A
judgment granted to the parents individually does not entitle the child
to share the recovery as of right. The parents may use the award for
their personal desires rather than for the benefit of the child. 29 If the
parents were always willing and able to provide sufficient care for the
child, the fact that a child could sue as a family member would be
of little moment since she presumably would benefit through her par-
ents' award. In some cases, however, impaired children might lack
medical care, training, services, or comforts that the jury calculated
into the recovery because the parents devoted the award to their own
uses. In more extreme cases, the parents might take the money and
run, placing the child for adoption or otherwise seeking to abandon
the financial responsibility for the child's needs.293
One hopes such cases would be rare, but one need not rely on
hope alone. By either making the award to the child (with the parents
291. See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
292. Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 934 (Tex. 1,984) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring &
dissenting).
293. The parents who won in Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), attempted exactly that, but acted prematurely. They placed the child for
adoption before damages were set and therefore lost any entitlement to future expenses. Weiss,
supra note 37, at 515-16. The case eventually settled for $2,500, an amount likely to produce
underdeterrence by failing to include the true costs of the defendant's error. Id. at 516 n.50.
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or a guardian as trustee) or to the family unit-invoking fiduciary
obligations on the part of those who use the family's funds to do so
for the good of the family-the law can protect the child's interest
in the recovery. 294
Second, this approach can meet the child's needs throughout her
life. The cost of the child's support and maintenance as an adult fall
initially upon a member of the family, whether that person is a parent
or the child herself.295 Thus, the family should recover these costs from
the negligent defendant. This aspect of recovery sometimes eludes courts
considering only the parents' cause of action.29 Recovery obviates the
need for the state to assume the support of impaired children who
reach the age of majority-an obligation apparently assumed by courts
who deny the parents recovery for expenses incurred by the child after
the age of majority. By denying compensation for the full cost of the
tort, the courts again risk underdeterrence.
Furthermore, a unitary cause of action brought by the family
would eliminate any concern about duplicative recoveries in those states
that recognize actions by both the parents and the child. Pecuniary
costs, for example, are incurred to care for the child. In reality, such
costs are paid by the parents, yet the child and the parents each have
a claim to recover those costs in their actions. A single award to the
family eliminates any confusion the jury might face trying to separate
294. Some courts have attempted to address this concern within the parents' cause of
action. While limiting the recovery to the parents' own damages, the courts impose a trust on
the award in favor of the child. Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 259, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (1985)
(court ordered that award be placed in trust for child's use and benefit); see also Phillips v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1320 n.10 (D.S.C. 1983) (parents expressed interest to
preserve award for son's benefit; parents' counsel required to submit plan effectuating that
intent).
The "trust," however, contorts the remedy for genetic counselling torts rather ironically.
The approach implicitly recognizes that the child, not the parents, suffers the primary injury.
If the parents truly suffered the damages, then the money should be theirs free of any trust
limitations. How much simpler (and more honest) to permit the child to recover the funds
directly! Recognizing the family unit as the plaintiff accomplishes all the advantages of the
contorted trust, but at the same time lets the court look at the entire picture: the family's
damages. This honest approach may produce a larger recovery than courts prefer, but it avoids
making nonsense of the legal principles upon which recovery rests.
295. Some states make the parents responsible for the needs of a child beyond the age of
majority if the child cannot care for itself. E.g., Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 245, 513 A.2d
341, 350 (1986). In those states the parents may be able to recover (in their own action) the
costs they will incur during the child's adult life. Id.
296. E.g., Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 807-08, 505 N.E.2d 947, 948, 513
N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (1987). Even courts that permit recovery of extraordinary expenses during
majority years do not clearly include normal care and support costs that the parents would
not incur but for the tort. See, e.g., Smith, 128 N.H. at 245, 513 A.2d at 350 ("parents may
recover extraordinary costs incurred both before and after the child attains majority," but
failing to mention normal costs of care following majority).
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the amounts each party deserves. 297 Existing rules designed to preclude
double recovery may effectively avoid this problem as well.298 A single
action by the family unit, however, would help minimize any con-
fusion of the jury, or of the judges who must interpret the jury's award.
The clarity may constitute only a small advantage, but in light of the
other multiple advantages to recovery by the family unit, one worth
noting.
Fourth, a unitary action might keep damage awards somewhat
smaller than separate recoveries for the parents and the child.2" Emo-
tional distress awards may be smaller when the family's distress is con-
sidered as a whole, rather than piecemeal. Arguably, much of the
parents' distress overlaps the child's distress.3 0 In addition, a jury may
focus more clearly on the total recovery when making a single award
to the family than it would if there were separate awards for the par-
ents and the child. A defendant need not face two punitive damage
awards, one for the parents and one for the child, even in cases of
intentional wrongdoing. 30'
297. Jury confusion would be significant in at least two situations. First, the jury might
award pecuniary costs to one party-the child or one parent. If so, reversal of the award to
that party on appeal might preclude recovery for those elements of damages. (The child, for
instance, cannot recover them because the jury awarded them to the parents. The parents
cannot recover because, for example, the statute of limitations precludes their action as
determined on appeal.) Some rules of law, such as the statute of limitations, will affect the
parties' claims differently, making reversal as to one party possible even in a consolidated
action. Second, the jury might award the pecuniary expenses to each party. Such double
recovery, if permitted to stand, would overdeter defendants and provide plaintiffs with a
windfall. Cf. R. PosNER, supra note 3, § 6.10 (emphasizing the need to compensate losses
fully in order to maintain the credibility of the tort system). Each danger increases if the
parents' and child's actions are tried separately. That may happen if, for example, the court
dismisses one action and the other proceeds to trial before an appeal of that ruling.
298. The California Supreme Court assumed that the parents recover before the child
comes of age and the child recovers thereafter. The Washington Supreme Court's decision was
not so clear. Compare Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 237 n.11, 643 P.2d 954, 965 n.ll,
182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 n.11 (1982) with Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460,
479-80, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983). But see Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 355-56, 478 A.2d
755, 764 (1984) (parents' recovery barred by statute of limitations; child recovered for entire
life). Judges can interpret such awards to be alternative and enter a judgment on one but not
both of them or remit them if they are too large. This safeguard requires the judge to
accurately sever the doubled pecuniary recovery from any amounts included by the jury for
each plaintiff's emotional distress or pain and suffering. The lack of precision in calculating
such amounts may make it difficult for the court to recognize when the jury has awarded the
pecuniary expenses to more than one plaintiff, let alone to segregate the appropriate imounts"
when entering judgment.
299. Smaller awards have no intrinsic advantage over larger ones. Concerns for the medical
malpractice crisis, the insurance crisis, and tort reform (among others) may explain some
courts' reluctance to expand liability to encompass genetic counselling torts. See Wilson v.
Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893 (1988).
300. See infra note 330.
301. Most genetic counselling torts will not involve intentional misconduct warranting
punitive damages, although some might. See Capron, supra note 4, at 630-31 n.43.
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Most importantly, the damages easily would be measured and the
courts could avoid the philosophical quagmires in which they have
been mired for over a decade. The court and the jury can understand
what is expected of them, without recourse to unknowable, and per-
haps unresolvable, philosophical differences. Thoughts about the size
of verdicts merit empirical study, but the cleaner analysis of the uni-
tary action stands out without regard to the actual effect on the judg-
ments.
Recognizing the family as an entity capable of suing in its own
right involves a host of additional questions that must be answered.
The idea requires a significant change in the way we view the plaintiff
in these cases and perhaps the way we view individuals within a family.
This is not a modest proposal. The following sections discuss some
of the more obvious concerns that the approach raises.3 °2
A. Defining the Family
In order to recognize the family entity as the appropriate plaintiff,
the court must be able to define the family. That definition determines
whose injuries should be considered in assessing the amount of the
recovery and who is entitled to share in the recovery.
Some cases will present obvious answers. A married couple living
together with the impaired child and no other children clearly con-
stitutes a family. Expenses incurred by any member of the family de-
crease the whole family's assets. Such expenses should be compensable
regardless of which family member actually pays the bill or receives
the benefit. Similarly, distress to any family member increases the dis-
tress of the family as a whole. The family should recover an amount
sufficient to compensate each family member for the distress that in-
dividual suffers.
Unmarried parents living together with the child also pose little
conceptual difficulty. The parents face the same pecuniary exposure
and much, if not all, of the same distress that a married couple would
confront. 303 As long as the family stays together, the lack of state sanc-
302. Ultimately, these concerns may create such difficulty that courts would prefer to keep
the actions for parent and child separate. Recognition of the family as the plaintiff, of course,
is not essential to clarifying the analysis and reaching consistent recoveries in genetic counselling
torts.
303. An unmarried couple that does not view the relationship as permanent might feel less
distress. Each parent may take some comfort in knowing that the relationship is not a marriage
and can be ended with less difficulty than a marriage if the problems (including those involved
in raising an impaired child) become too taxing. That prospect may offer a comforting "way
out" that either reduces distress (and, presumably, the recovery for distress) or that poses an
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tion for the living arrangement should not undermine the family's abil-
ity to recover. Any other rule would license genetic counsellors to act
negligently resulting in injury when advising unmarried couples. °4
The possible instability of unmarried couples raises two possible
concerns in this context. First, the jury, by overestimating the length
of time that the parent would remain with the family unit, might over-
estimate the amount of future distress a parent will suffer. Second,
a unitary recovery on behalf of the family may be difficult to divide
among the members if the family ceases to be a unit.
Fear of inaccurate estimates of family longevity should not affect
this analysis. The problem exists in the married couple scenario'0 5 and
in the context of other torts.306 In addition, the possibility that a parent
additional danger that hicreases distress for one or both parents. Moreover, an unmarried
couple that stays together until litigation is complete (which may take years) probably views
their relationship as permanent.
304. But see Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MicH. L. Rev. 463 (1983). Professor Hafen
argues that states have an interest in protecting married families to a greater degree than
unmarried families. Id. at 471. He does not specifically address genetic counselling torts and
only briefly refers to tort recovery by unmarried plaintiffs generally. Id. at 562-63. His concern
that a federal court had permitted a claim for loss of consortium by an unmarried plaintiff
seemed based primarily on "the common law's historic fear of unlimited liability," which
might justify limits on who can recover for certain injuries. Id. (citing Bulloch v. United
States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980)). That concern, embodied in wrongful death statutes
and decisions, may not apply to genetic counselling torts, at least not in the context under
discussion here. The parent-child relationship limits liability, even when no formal relationship
between the parents exist. To my knowledge, no state denies recovery for "wrongful birth"
to unmarried parents-although the problem simply may not have arisen yet. If unmarried
parents can recover as individuals, permitting the family unit to reco'er does not expand
liability. That expansion, if appropriate for married families, seems equally acceptable for
unmarried families. The "fear of unlimited liability" does not distinguish easily between injured
children born in and out of wedlock.
Professor Hafen's other concern, that "the very lack of long-term commitment that char-
acterizes cohabitation would make the valuation of a cohabitation claim imjossible to fix,"
id. at 563 n. 478, raises no greater problem. It applies to the parents' claims, but not to the
child's. The child always will suffer the impairment, even if a parent can escape by abandoning
the would-be family. The child's damages are the easiest to fix under the proposal advanced
in this Article. The injury to a parent poses no particular valuation difficulty except to the
extent that an unmarried parent may leave the family before incurring some of the injury for
which a lump sum jury award included compensation. See infra notes 305-307.
305. Marriages frequently end before death. If a jury assumed that the marriage would
endure, the award to a married couple also may overestimate the amount of distress to a
departing member of the family. No one would suggest that a married couple with a child is
not a family merely because the parents eventually might divorce. Nor should married parents
be unable to recover for their injuries merely because they might separate someday.
306. Presumably any claim for loss of consortium assumes a continuing relationship. If
the assumption proves incorrect-if one spouse leaves the other and seeks consortium else-
where-tort remedies may overcompensate, regardless of whether a car accident or a genetic
counselling tort produced the initial injury. A jury also can overestimate or underestimate the
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might abandon the rest of the family and thus shorten the period dur-
ing which she suffers distress does not necessarily produce an excessive
recovery. 07 Finally, permitting the parents to sue individually exac-
erbates the problem; the jury might award the departing parent too
much for both pecuniary losses as well as emotional distress. Thus,
although the relative instability of unmarried families poses a few po-
tential difficulties in the jury award context, the problem seems as
tolerable in this setting as in any other.
Distributing the recovery in the event of a subsequent dissolution
poses greater problems. For married families, the distribution of mar-
ital assets, including the proceeds of a jury award, can be dealt with
in divorce proceedings.308 The law has been less successful in super-
vising the dissolution of unmarried couples and their families.3°9 An
action for child support may not give the court jurisdiction to divide
the property the couple acquired while together, including the tort
recovery. 10 To the extent that the noncustodial parent has placed
duration of any direct physical injury, from a broken bone or whiplash to asbestosis or
quadriplegia. In cases of permanent injuries, the jury may overestimate life expectancy, and
thus overestimate the amount of distress and lost earnings.
307. Running away from the problem may not lessen the distress that results from the
birth of a severely impaired child. The distress may follow the parent, regardless of the
distance the parent puts between herself and the child. In addition, the child's birth may be
an indirect cause of the dissolution. The abandonment, thus, may be an additional source of
distress to the family-distress that is also traceable to the negligence, but that the jury did
not consider or include in the award.
Such consequences may be too remote or speculative to include in a damage award, especially
if unanticipated at the time of trial. But if the negligence caused the dissolution, we need not
express undue concern that the award overcompensated the family for distress one parent did
not remain long enough to suffer, since the award also undercompensated the family for the
loss of the companionship and services of the departed parent. The two may not balance
evenly, but short of a method for reevaluating tort damage awards periodically, no system
can account for the unpredictable future contingencies that may affect the adequacy of the
recovery.
308. Alternatively, proceedings for separate maintenance, child support, and other awards
provide avenues for relief. This Article, however, will not propose changes in the institutions
of family law designed to protect members when the family dissolves.
309. Courts largely rely on contract principles to provide some means of redistributing the
wealth accumulated by an.unmarried couple. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481,
413 N.E.2d 1154, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980) (holding that an express contract between an
unmarried couple entitled one partner to recover for her domestic services); Hafen, supra note
290, at 563-64. Unlike divorce, contract actions only help if (and only to the extent that) the
parties at some point agree upon their mutual obligations.
310. Treatises only mention the support obligation. See, e.g., S. ScHATKN, supra note 80,
§§ 28.05-.06. Property can be attached in enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., Division of
Child Support Services ex rel. Harper v. Barrows, 570 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (Del. Super. Ct.
1990). In some circumstances, an action by one parent seeking partition of joint property or
recovery under an implied contract may reach property acquired during cohabitation. See,
e.g,, Carroll v. Lee, 148 Ariz. 10, 15-16, 712 P.2d 923, 928-29 (1986); Metten v. Benge, 366
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property purchased with the recovery money in her own name, the
court may be unable to reach an appropriate distribution of the orig-
inal jury award.3 '
The same maldistribution of the proceeds can arise in individual
actions by unmarried couples. Presumably, the jury awards each plain-
tiff the amount that will compensate for that individual's injury.312 The
jury cannot know and should not consider the circumstances that might
give rise to a subsequent dissolution. Thus, the jury may award a par-
ent or the child an amount that proves inappropriate in light of a sub-
sequent dissolution. 313
Perhaps recognition of the family as an entity that can sue and
recover in its own name requires some procedure governing the dis-
s6lution of the entity. Divorce law and the laws governing corpora-
tions and partnerships provide such procedures. Courts could fill the
gap by holding family members to fiduciary obligations analogous to
those of partners or corporate officers and directors-at least when
unmarried people sue as a family for genetic counselling torts. 31 4 To
some extent, courts that impose a trust on the parents' recovery al-
ready imply such a fiduciary obligation.3 5 Recognizing the family en-
N.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Iowa 1985); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 529, 405 N.W.2d 303,
313 (1987). But cf. Cummings v. Cummings, 376 N.W.2d 726, 730 (Minn. App. 1985) (affirming
trial court's disregard of property acquired during premarital cohabitation in court's dissolving
the marriage and dividing property).
311. A paternity action may not proceed quickly enough to provide the necessary protection.
A prodigal parent might squander the recovery before the court could award support to the
infant, leaving the infant to rely only on the (perhaps inadequate) income and assets of the
parent.
312. The problem also can affect individual actions if the jury groups any parties into a
single award. The problems of dividing the amount among the parties when an unmarried
couple breaks up will remain even though each plaintiff technically brings her own action as
an individual. In practice, attorneys seem likely to plead a single action by the parents, rather
than seek separate recovery for each. Courts and juries seem likely to accept such pleading
and make undivided awards, rather than consider which family member deserves any given
element of the recovery. Thus, the problem may inhere in permitting unmarried couples to
sue, not in a pleading rule that permits the family to sue as a unit rather than individually.
313. For instance, any amount awarded for future pecuniary expenses should follow the
child and the custodial parent. There is no guarantee that a jury will frame its award
appropriately. It may award the pecuniary recovery to the parent then providing the financial
support, although that parent may or may not become the custodial parent following disso-
lition.
314. See Note, Azzolino v. Dingfelder: North Carolina Court of Appeals Recognizes
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims, 63 N.C.L. Ray. 1329, 1343-44 (1985) (authored
by Douglas Peck) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of imposing fiduciary duty). A
parent absconding with family funds would be liable to the remaining family members for
breach of that duty. Alternatively, the court could appoint an independent guardian or trustee
to administer the recovery.
315. See supra note 294.
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tity as the plaintiff merely corrects the perspective for the purpose of
measuring the award, rather than merely limiting the concept to the
spending of the award.
Those families, whether married or unmarried, that dissolve be-
fore judgment is rendered in the tort suit pose a more difficult the-
oretical question, but perhaps an easier procedural issue. The
noncustodial parent or parents no longer appear to be a member of
the plaintiff family. 316 Yet a noncustodial parent may have incurred
substantial pecuniary or emotional injuries prior to the dissolution of
the family. Despite its apparent counterintuitiveness, if the family is
the appropriate entity to sue, the noncustodial parent's prior injuries
will be compensated only if the noncustodial parent is recognized as
a member of the family.
Again, an analogy to corporate law may be helpful. Many states
permit corporations to sue and be sued for a period of time following
their dissolution, 3 7 despite the fact that technically no corporation
exists. Permitting a family that dissolved prior to judgment to pursue
the action in the family name seems appropriate by comparison. Al-
location of the award actually becomes easier when the family has
dissolved before judgment. The tribunal can distribute the award with
reasonable knowledge of the facts surrounding the dissolution. 318
The family entity may include children other than the impaired
child. Siblings may seek recovery for genetic counselling torts, con-
tending that the impaired child absorbed a disproportionate amount
of their parents' time and resources, thus depriving them of the serv-
ices and affection they would have received if the child had been
healthy. 319 Recognition of the family as the plaintiff would require
including damages to siblings in the award. 20
316. The possibility that both parents may be noncustodial implicitly supports the conclusion
that the impaired child is the core of the family for purposes of recovery for the genetic
counselling tort.
317. See, e.g., CAL. Cosp. CODE § 2010 (West 1977) (corporation that is dissolved
nevertheless exists to defend action); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1983 & Supp. 1988)
(corporate entity may be sued for up to three years after its dissolution); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32, para. 12.30(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (dissolution does not prevent suit against corporation);
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 1006(a)(4) (McKinney 1986) (corporation can be sued regardless of
dissolution).
318. The court may treat the allocation of the award as an equitable matter for its own
decision or submit the issue to the jury.
319. Siblings have sought recovery on a similar basis, alleging that they received less
parental attention than they would have received if the child had not been born. Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 105-06, 337 S.E.2d 528, 530-31 (1985). In Azzolino the court rejected
the claim without substantial discussion. Id. at 117, 337 S.E.2d at 537; see also Cox v.
Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 158-60, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834, 839-41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (court
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The siblings' claim, however, does raise a potential for double
recovery. The family's recovery includes compensation for the ad-
ditional supervision or care an impaired child requires over the care
and supervision that a healthy child would require.3 2' The services rep-
resent a pecuniary loss, measurable by the amount the parents would
need to spend in order to provide the care and services through a paid
nurse, therapist, or other caregiver.32 If the parents use the award to
obtain such services, or if the parents obtain such services with their
own funds before receiving the award, the siblings will not suffer any
rejected siblings' claim when unplanned child resulted from negligently performed vasectomy).
Recharacterizing the rightful position from no child to a healthy child in order to fit the
misrepresentation approach would reduce the siblings' losses, but would not moot their claim.
A healthy newborn, will reduce significantly the amount of parental attention the siblings can
expect. An impaired child, however, might require even more parental attention than a healthy
sibling, reducing the attention the siblings receive below what they would have received in the
rightful position.
Although measuring the reduction may be difficult, human experience includes some basis
for estimating the time a healthy new baby needs and the consequential reduction in attention
to the other children in the family. The issue only arises in families with other children; the
family may have its own experience with the time required by healthy children.
320. The scope of the family could extend beyond siblings. The family might include other
relatives living in the same household. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (striking down as unconstitutional municipal ordinance defining family as not including
a grandmother).. The family could include the extended family, regardless of residence. The
family even could include unrelated persons who share the household. Cf. Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (defimition of family a matter f legislative discretion).
Issues surrounding the scope of the definition of family seem resolvable, and they certainly
pose no inherent obstacle to recognizing family plaintiff status.
321. See supra note 218.
322. Even if the parents elect to provide the additional services themselves, the monetary
recovery for their time should at least equal the cost of obtaining an outside provider. Cf. S.
SpemsE, supra note 226, § 10.2 (detailing methods of calculating the economic value of the
services provided by wives and mothers). If the parents elect to provide the additional care
themselves, that time comes from somewhere-from their business pursuits, from their time
for sleep or leisure, or from their care and supervision of the siblings. The way in which
parents elect to incur the loss of time may vary in ways that could produce different measures
of loss: (1) lost money to hire a caregiver for the impaired child; (2) lost money to hire a
caregiver for the healthy siblings; (3) lost income from business opportunities foregone; (4)
lost enjoyment of life from decreased leisure time; or (5) loss of parental care and supervision
suffered by the siblings. Rational parents would not elect to provide the care themselves if the
cost of hiring a caregiver was less than the loss to their other interests. R. PosNa, supra note
3, § 6.11, at 178. The parents' decision represents a practical indication of their mitigated
damages-the loss most easily accepted by the family.
Precise damage calculation would require identifying the specific loss for each family and
compensating only that mitigated amount. Problems abound: (I) quantifying the amount of
lost time; (2) evaluating some of the losses (such as leisure time) in monetary terms; (3) proving
the losses with certainty (such as business opportunities foregone); and even (4) identifying
which losses particular parents incurred (when parents reduce time in several areas to provide
care for the children). Individual damage assessments seem unduly complex. Recourse to the
relatively simple and assessable amount that a professional caregiver would charge seems
desirable in this context.
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loss of care over and above the inevitable loss associated with the birth
of a healthy child.23 If the parents elect to provide the additional care
themselves rather than obtain an outside provider, then recovery of
extraordinary care costs compensates the siblings 2.32 Thus, the siblings
already are provided for if the family's award includes an amount for
the additional care the child's impairments will require.3 2
B. Measuring Entity Pain and Distress
Recognizing the family as the plaintiff seems to clear the way for
plaintiffs to recover for emotional distress. The family's rightful po-
sition includes a younger, healthy child rather than an older, impaired
child. In some cases, an impaired child may bring the family more
joy than a healthy child. 32 But family members may demonstrate that
323. If the parents hire other caregivers and still do not spend additional time with the
siblings, that suggests that the parents would have spent that time on their own business or
leisure pursuits even if the newborn had been healthy and had not required additional care.
Thus, the birth did not cause the siblings any loss.
324. In this scenario, the compensation must be intended for the siblings because the
parents suffer no loss. Absent the tort they would have devoted more time to parenting the
siblings. This must be true; otherwise the siblings suffered no loss of parental time. Instead,
the tort caused them to devote more time to parenting the new child. In either event, the
parents would have spent their time parenting. Aside from any intangible differences in the
utility of parenting one child as opposed to another, their rightful position did not change as
a result of the tort. Thus, the recovery of any amount for the extraordinary care required by
the newborn can only be justified as attributable to the siblings' claim of lost parental attention.
The calculation of the award may not perfectly match the siblings' injury. Looking forward,
the recovery will permit the parents to obtain the additional care as needed. Past losses,
however, raise complications. The money may not measure the siblings' sense of alienation
from the parents. In addition, their claim for loss of past parental attention does not necessarily
equal the amount for which their parents could have prevented the loss (that is, the amount
needed to hire assistance caring for the newborn). The avoidable consequences doctrine can
explain why the family cannot recover more-but only if it would have been reasonable for
the parents to have paid for such assistance out of their own funds pending judgment.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 918 (1979). If the parents are rational economic actors,
they will have purchased additional care unless the cost of the care would have exceeded the
loss to the siblings, cf. R. PoSNER, supra note 3, § 6.10, at 176, implying that the formula
would overcompensate rather than undercompensate the siblings. If the parents' liquid assets
are limited, however, it may not be reasonable to expect them to pay for an outside caregiver,
even when the siblings will incur greater losses, since the loss of attention may not require
payment the way other creditors do. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 918 comment e
(1979). In some cases, permitting the siblings to demonstrate their past losses may be justified,
despite the complexities that make the cost of care a much more manageable measure of
recovery. See supra note 322.
325. See infra notes 326-331 and accompanying text (addressing emotional distress claims
by the parents and siblings).
326. Impaired children seem less likely to break their parents' hearts by becoming addicted
to crack, running away from home, or committing other grievous sins that torment parents.
The circumstances will vary from case to case. "One mother of a boy with a relatively mild
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the impaired child generates distress: direct and sympathetic distress
in the parents and siblings, 327 and pain and suffering in the impaired
child herself.3z2
Recognition of the family's entity status, however, requires a de-
termination of the family's distress as a whole, not necessarily the
distress of each individual family member. In considering emotional
distress, misrepresentation law, partnership law, and corporation law
do not provide analogous rules that can guide the formulation of ge-
netic counselling torts. The law governing business relationships gen-
erally does not permit recovery of intangibles such as distress or pain
and suffering. 329 The family entity, however, seems particularly sus-
case [of Down's syndrome] says bringing him up has been 'the most enriching experience of
my life.' But another, whose son was far more severely damaged, says that had she known
what lay ahead, 'I would not have the child."' Goodman, Identifying Genetic Defects and
Dealing with Them, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1990, at C18, col. 3 (review of ABC News Special
"The Perfect Baby").
327. Recognition of family status disrupts tort rules limiting distress to those who suffer
impact or occupy the zone of danger. See Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (impact doctrine forecloses mother's recovery for pain and suffering and
mental distress); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 260-62, 512 N.E.2d 691,
707 (1987) (zone of danger rule forecloses parents' recovery for emotional distress). These
approaches, which are designed for individuals, create a perplexing puzzle for courts who seek
to determine whether the family suffered a physical impact or occupied the zone of danger.
The concept of a "zone of danger" has little meaning as applied to genetic counselling torts
because they are based on misinformation. Some courts, however, already have recognized the
appropriateness of emotional distress claims for parents in a genetic counselling tort. See supra
note 39. This Article will leave for others to work out the question of how courts would
reconcile allowing or not allowing emotional distress with both this precedent and the precedent
regarding "zone of danger." See generally Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a
Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HAsTmis
L.J. 477 (1984) (Dillon and its progeny cases are flawed because they both affirm the concept
of compensating all foreseeable plaintiffs for the negligent infliction of emotional distress and
then provide criteria that do not correspond with foreseeability); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HAsTNrs L.J. 583
(1982) (examination of case law suggests that two principles should govern cases in which
persons suffer emotional distress due to fear for others: foreseeability and seriousness).
328. One can imagine contrary arguments. A mentally impaired child literally may find
that ignorance is bliss. Her inability to comprehend her own situation may remove any
emotional sting from the condition. If the condition does not involve painful physical
complieations-a possibility in Down's syndrome and perhaps other genetic conditions-the
parents may find the child's love completely satisfying. Moreover, the removal of certain
expectations for the child's future development and direction (i.e., certain academic or career
decisions may be unnecessary) may relieve the parents of some burden. Yet, these facts will
vary from case to case, requiring resolution by a trier of fact. They pose no realistic legal
impediment to the recognition of the cause of action or the recovery of damages for emotional
distress in cases where distress does exist.
329. See, e.g., RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) oF TORTS §§ 549, 552B (1977) (limiting recovery for
negligent misrepresentations to pecuniary losses); RSTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 353
(1981). Both Restatements admit exceptions. The fact that sections 549 and 552B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts appear in a chapter entitled "Misrepresentation and Nondisclo-
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ceptible to emotional injuries, especially in the context of genetic coun-
selling torts.
Treating the family unit as the sum of its parts for purposes of
calculating damages seems the most direct and most easily adminis-
tered approach to measure recovery. Distress, which by its nature is
so completely intangible (especially when without physical manifes-
tations), defies analysis of whether the distress of the family equals
the sum of the distress of each of the individual family members. a0
Totaling each individual's distress accords with existing precedent con-
cerning theories of community distress. 3 1 This approach also makes
the smallest change from the existing framework of individual recov-
eries. Although subjective injuries do not easily consolidate into a
measure for the family as a unit, using the family entity does simplify
analysis when one set of expenses affects several family members.
sure Causing Pecuniary Loss" apparently limits their application to transactions that do not
threaten physical harm. 3 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS ch. 22. Misrepresentations threat-
ening or involving a risk of physical harm are treated elsewhere in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. See id. §§ 310-311, 557A & comment a. The limitation of recovery to pecuniary
losses apparently does not apply to them. Similarly, § 353 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts permits recovery for emotional disturbance if "the breach also caused bodily harm
or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a
particularly likely result." RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981); see also Jarvis
v. Swan Tours, I Q.B. 233, 237-38 (C.A. 1973) ("[i]n a proper case damages for mental
distress can be recovered in contract").
330. To some extent, distress breeds distress. Parents feel additional distress because their
child feels pain and distress. Siblings, too, may echo the impaired child's distress in a
sympathetic reaction, though perhaps to a lesser extent than the parents. The parents' distress,
however, may cause the siblings considerable additional distress. (If the impaired child also
suffers increased distress in a reaction to parental distress, the feedback loop is complete,
generating an ever increasing spiral of distress.) Arguably, if recovery compensates the impaired
child for her distress, the cause of the parents' (and the siblings') sympathetic distress has
been "remedied" and, in theory, no longer exists. No additional recovery for such distress
may be necessary. An award based on the sum of each member's distress may include double
recovery for such "derivative" distress. But parents and siblings probably suffer some distress
independent of the impaired child's pain. In addition, money does not actually reduce distress;
it merely compensates the victim for the distress. Compensating the child therefore neither
eliminates the cause of the parents' and siblings' distress nor compensates them for their
distress. On balance, the simplest assumption may be the best: award the family an amount
sufficient to compensate each member for the distress each member suffers. The subjective
nature of distress, and of efforts to quantify it, may frustrate efforts aimed at more precise
analysis. No matter how clear we try to be in assessing distress, in the end the jury awards
an amount that feels right-and the judge ultimately decides whether to order remittitur.
331. See United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir.) (In a suit for conversion,
the court held that "[plain and suffering is a personal and individual matter, not a common
injury, and must be so treated."), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958). This approach, however,
may weigh against recognizing the family as the appropriate plaintiff in the first place. See
id.
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C. The Rightful Family
The assumption that parents would have sought and borne a
healthy child if the defendant had provided competent genetic coun-
selling warrants further discussion. On its face, the assumption seems
plausible, but not irrebuttable. Some parents might not seek another
child after genetic counselling prompted them to abandon the first
effort. 332
The rightful position varies with the success of subsequent efforts
to obtain a healthy child. 333 The difference significantly affects the
measure of damages. If the rightful family would not have included
an additional child, the court should apply the shorter view of tra-
ditional tort rules concerning damages. If the rightful family would
have included an additional child, then the family measure described
in Part III more accurately assesses the proper damage-award.
Courts may prefer to avoid applying different remedial rules to
separate cases involving the same tort. A single measure would sim-
plify the issues at trial. It would avoid the confusion created by a range
of hypothetical questions and answers concerning the conditions under
which the parents would or would not have decided to have another
child if they had received accurate genetic counseffing. 3 4 Jury instruc-
332. The desire to avoid bringing an impaired child into the world and raising her may
remain strong. Moral objections to abortion might induce parents to give up plans to have
children. Furthermore, even couples who endure an abortion of a fetus diagnosed as bearing
a genetic defect may have moral or personal objections to subsequent abortions in the face of
the now known risk of abnormality and, hence, may avoid conception to obviate thit risk.
While artificial insemination, surrogacy, or adoption could be used to avoid any genetic risk,
moral or personal objections to these options may exist.
Economic constraints also might limit the number of parents who could or would choose
to employ these alternatives. Even the need to monitor the next pregnancy and perhaps treat
or abandon the embryo could present an economic impediment.
333. If the parents eventually would have been unwilling or unable to obtain a healthy
child, the rightful position consists of a family without (more) children. If the parents eventually
would have had a healthy child but for the negligence, the rightful position consists of a
family with a healthy, younger child.
334. The inquiry into what a family would have done if they had received proper genetic
counselling in the first instance is inherently speculative. People asked what they would have
done months or perhaps years earlier (a deposition or trial probably will occur years after the
event) had the facts been different, can offer only speculation that is infused with the knowledge
of what actually has happened and perhaps tinged by dreams of what might have been. Parents
may be unable to state categorically that they would have had another child if the defendant
had given proper genetic counselling and they had abandoned the first effort. The parade of
possible factors that would have influenced the decision-financial, moral, and psychological-
would produce lengthy, probably usiclear, and perhaps inconsistent testimony. The cynic also
might suggest that a lawyer's advice concerning what answers will produce the biggest recovery
would influence a parent's testimony. For the jury to remember, understand, evaluate, and
reach a proper conclusion from this .testimony would be no small task.
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tions also could be streamlined. The court could tell the jury the single
measure of damages, instead of forcing the jury through a maze of
alternatives that would depend upon whose testimony the jury believed
in response to hypothetical questions about post-counselling procre-
ative choices.
Courts cannot completely avoid speculative testimony even by
adopting a single measure of damages for all such cases. The causation
issue also requires speculative testimony. 335 Plaintiffs must persuade
the finder of fact that, but for the defendant's wrong, the impaired
child would not have been born. Defendants must be able to probe
that testimony and juries must be able to evaluate the credibility of
the parents' responses. The family deserves no recovery if the child
would have been born despite the genetic counsellor's failure to meet
the professional standard of care. Thus, some speculation is inevitable.
Such speculation, however, seems less important in selecting the
measure of damages to employ. Liability does not turn on the measure
of damages, only the amount of the recovery. Assuming that Part I
of this Article has been persuasive, either approach seems likely to
produce a substantial recovery.3 36 Moreover, defendants who may face
the "wrong" measure of damages337 seem ill-positioned to complain.
Even if the measure of recovery embodies an incorrect presumption
about the parents' subsequent procreative choices, the defendant's
negligence created the uncertainty by depriving the parents of the op-
335. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 745-46 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). As used
here, the term "speculation" describes the difficulty inherent in reconstructing the past based
on counterfactual assumptions. The use does not involve the legal principle that damages must
be proven with reasonable certainty and cannot be "speculative." See RSTATEMENTr (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 912 (1979). Damages are no more speculative here than in a product liability case
in which the plaintiff testifies that if the instructions had contained a clearer warning she
would not have used the product in a way that produced an injury. That testimony, which
requires the plaintiff to "speculate" on how she would have reacted under different circum-
stances, is an essential element in proving causation, but does not make the damages "spec-
ulative."
336. Defendants might prefer the traditional tort rules, which offer them an opportunity
to offset the nonpecuniary damages that often swell tort recoveries. That approach, however,
provides a greater pecuniary award. Under either measure, the plaintiff would recover the
extra expenses for treating the genetic condition (or its symptoms) and the extra care and
training the child requires. The increase stems from recovery of the costs to raise a normal
child under tort rules. That increase would offset a good part of the benefit. In states like
California, which limit nonpecuniary recoveries in medical malpractice cases, CAL. CIrv. CODE
§ 3333.2 (West Supp. 1990), the recovery under traditional tort rules might be higher than
under the misrepresentation measure or the family's rightful position.
337. That is, a measure of damages based upon an unrealistic assumption about the
procreative choices the parents would have made if they had received correct genetic counselling
in the first place.
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portunity to make the real procreative choices that, by the time of
trial, have become merely hypothetical possibilities. 338
Arguments for a single measure of damages apply with equal force
to either measure. One can simplify the issues and avoid the hypo-
thetical inquiry by assuming either that the parents would or would
not have had additional children if the defendant had advised them
correctly. The family's rightful position described here incorporates
into the measure of damages a presumption that the parents suc-
cessfully would have renewed their procreative efforts. That approach
offers several advantages. 339 Courts that prefer to make the opposite
assumption can apply the shorter view of traditional tort rules and
compare the family's situation with the impaired child to their situ-
ation with no additional children.
Either rule, however, deserves consistent application. Today courts
apply the pecuniary measure from the misrepresentation rule without
considering what that remedial approach implies for the complete
measure of recovery. They limit the parents' recovery as if the alter-
native was a healthy child, but deny the child's claim because the al-
ternative was no child at all. Courts offer no principled explanation
for their selective recourse to the misrepresentation measure only when
it limits recovery.
338. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946) (when the tortious
act precludes a precise computation of damages, "[tihe most elementary conceptions of justice
and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his
own wrong has created" (citations omitted)). This principle, of course, does not require that
a court preclude defendants from presenting evidence that might show a different amount of
damages would be appropriate. At the same time, courts presumably are free to adopt rules
governing the measure of damages even if those rules embody certain assumptions that a party
might hope to disprove. For example, courts regularly hold that the consequential damages
for the failure to pay a sum of money when due are fully compensated by interest, even in
circumstances in which the plaintiff may demonstrate substantial losses in excess of the amount
of interest the money would have earned. E.g., Meinrath v. Singer Co., 87 F.R.D. 422, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). Rules limiting the recovery of consequential damages generally, even when
they demonstrably result from the defendant's wrong, reflect the willingness of courts to permit
rules to supplant proof. See, e.g., Wolf v. Cohen, 379 F.2d 477, 479-80 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(plaintiff's recovery for breach of real estate sales contract limited to difference in market
values, not profit on resale deal plaintiff had obtained). Similarly, wrongful death recovery
limited to pecuniary losses assumes that the value of continued life to the decedent was zero.
R. Posture, supra note 3, § 6.12, at 182. Courts do not balk at embodying that demonstrably
(and intuitively) false assumption into the measure of damages. Unlike the rule resolving
uncertainty against a defendant whose conduct creates the uncertainty, most of these rules
tend to limit, rather than augment, the plaintiff's recovery. Either presumption proposed in
text would have a more balanced effect: limiting one type of damages (pecuniary or nonpe-
cuniary) but expanding the other.
339. See supra notes 289-302 and accompanying text.
January 1991] WRONGFUL LIFE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
By focusing on the family as a whole, courts can build consistency
into the measure of recovery. With the family as plaintiff, only one
action with only one rightful position exists, and it either includes or
does not include a younger, healthy child. Thus, in the former case,
the recovery will exclude normal child-rearing expenses but include the
child's suffering as compared to a healthy child. Alternatively, in the
latter circumstance recovery will include all child-rearing expenses and
the family's pain and distress, but offset against the joys of life and
parenthood. Courts seem less likely to vacillate between different
measures within a single action.
D. Statute of Limitations
Permitting the family to sue as an entity may affect how the stat-
ute of limitations operates in genetic counselling torts. Individual causes
of action present no problem. The parents' action normally accrues
immediately upon the birth of the child.314 The child's action, when
it exists, may remain viable until the child reaches the age of majority341
depending upon the existence and interpretation of each state's tolling
statute. States commonly toll a minor's cause of action until she reaches
the age of discretion and can decide whether to bring suit or waive
the opportunity.3 42
Recognizing the family as the plaintiff, however, may end such
tolling. The family can sue immediately. Although the child lacks the
mental capacity to evaluate the claim, her parents, who act on her
behalf in all her affairs, can seek legal advice, evaluate the potential
lawsuit, and make decisions concerning the advisability of proceed-
ing.3 43 Under these circumstances, the cause of action can accrue im-
mediately upon discovery of the injury.
This aspect of family entity status may reduce the number of
claims. Some plaintiffs appear to pursue the child's claim specifically
340. Some latent defects may require application of the "discovery rule." See, e.g., Nelson
v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922-24 (Tex. 1984). Under the discovery rule, the time within
which to file an action does not begin to run until the plaintiff either knows or should know
of the injury she suffers, thus having reason to investigate any legal remedies available. See
id. at 920. In general, however, conditions severe enough to produce liability probably will
appear fairly soon after birth. For example, in Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 344, 478 A.2d
755, 758 (1984), the parents learned that the child suffered from congenital rubella syndrome
within a month after the child's birth.
341. Procanik, 97 N.J. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762.
342. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 352 (West Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
J 13-211 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); N.Y. Civ. PPAc. L. & R. § 208 (McKinney 1990).
343. Indeed, reported claims by children are brought by their parents during the child's
infancy. For a variety of obvious reasons, parents are unlikely to wait until a child matures
in order to allow the child to elect whether to bring the case.
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to take advantage of the tolling provisions benefitting minors after the
statute of limitations barred the parents' cause of action.3"
Eliminating or reducing the threat of perpetual liability of the
defendant constitutes a significant advantage of family entity status.
Recognizing the child's action may frustrate some of the policies of
the statute of limitations. Actions brought more than eighteen years
after the genetic counselling occurred raise all the horrors of stale
claims: faded memories, lost or discarded documents, missing or dead
witnesses or defendants, bankrupt defendants, disputes over the iden-
tity of the insurance carrier, and a panoply of additional concerns.
By forcing the family to bring the claim sooner, family entity status
can avert the drawbacks engendered by recognition of the child's claim.
This "advantage" appears to come, however, at the expense of
the child's interests. The express exception to many statutes of lim-
itations demonstrates that states are willing to tolerate stale claims in
order to protect the minor's opportunity to make her own decisions
regarding whether to pursue the claim. Tolling prevents the parents
from prejudicing the claim before the minor reaches maturity.345
The minor's opportunity to make her own decisions seems less
compelling in genetic counselling torts. Many impaired children will
not achieve the mental capacity needed to evaluate their claims at age
eighteen or at any other age. They always will require a parent or
guardian to assert claims on their behalf. Since the tolling exception
offers virtually no advantage to the child's autonomy in these cases,
permitting the family entity to sue offers a net benefit by forcing ge-
netic counselling cases into court before they become stale.3" Barring
difficulty discovering the injury, a problem that is handled adequately
by the discovery rule, parents can evaluate a claim as thoroughly shortly
after the child's birth as they can after the child reaches the age of
majority. Tolling the family's claim seems unnecessary.
E. Protecting the Child's Interest
The award to the family unit does not necessarily ensure that the
recovery benefits the child.347 The child, as a member of the family,
344. See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762; Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 922-23.
345. Actually, the parents still may prejudice the claim by bringing suit and handling it
ineptly or settling it badly. Once parents bring the claim, however, the court can offer the
child some protection by appointing a guardian ad litem to prevent parental bungling.
346. If the parents themselves are minors, the statute might appropriately toll until they
reach the age of majority. That delay should not affect the policy of the statute of limitations
as much as the inevitable eighteen-year wait for an impaired child to reach adulthood.
347. One objection to permitting only the parents to recover arises from the possibility
that they may not use the funds for the child's benefit. See supra notes 292-294 and
accompanying text.
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certainly has a claim on any recovery obtained in the family name.
But unless courts impose fiduciary obligations on the parents to use
the funds for the benefit of the family, and particularly the benefit
of the impaired child, a recovery in the family name may be no better
than a recovery by the parents individually, and may be less effective
than recovery by the child individually.
Courts can find ample basis for imposing such fiduciary obli-
gations. If the family is an entity analogous to a corporation or a
partnership, the parents as the managers of the entity may owe anal-
ogous duties to the members of the family. 348 Alternatively, courts
could impose a trust-constructive, implied, or actual-on the pro-
ceeds of the litigation. 349 Use of funds for purposes that do not benefit
the family then would be actionable under trust law. 3-° Such duties
could provide a basis for recovery of any misappropriated funds. 351
Moreover, family law itself provides some protection if the family
dissolves through divorce. 352
Practical concerns may limit protection of the child's interest in
the judgment. The child cannot retain an agent other than the parents
to supervise the administration of the fund and complain about any
waste. A guardian ad litem appointed to oversee the litigation nor-
mally would lose authority at the conclusion of the action, when pa-
rental oversight of the fund commences. The court or the parents could
arrange for a financial guardian, but that seems wasteful in the vast
majority of cases in which no reason exists to suspect misappropri-
ation. 35 3 The court may become involved in the family's affairs during
divorce proceedings, 354 but normal family expenditures, even very large
ones, may evade supervision by any independent protector of the child's
interests.
Any other effort to protect the child's interests encounters these
same barriers. Permitting the child to bring an action in her own name
348. Such fiduciary obligations may be limited as narrowly as necessary for the proper
administration of the assets belonging to the family-that is, the damage award. Perhaps
children also should be subject to such fiduciary duties.
349. See supra notes 294, 314 and accompanying text.
350. See RESTATmSENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 170 (1959).
351. Unless, of course, the parents become judgment-proof as a result of their waste of
the funds. If the award is substantial, it seems likely that waste of the funds would produce
some property the child could attach under constructive trust doctrine, perhaps even if the
parents become insolvent.
352. See J. GREEN, J. LONG & R. MupAwsm, DmoLuTrION OF MARRIAGE § 10.04 (1986);
J. OxLxwi, DrvoRcE, SARAToI AND THE DITmurIToN OF PROPERTY § 5.01 (1990).
353. See Note, supra note 314, at 1343-44 (discussing drawbacks of guardianship).
354. Practically speaking, as long as one parent remains faithful to the child's interests,
any serious abuse of trust may find its way into court.
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gives the child exclusive title to a portion of the fund as her individual
property, which the parents cannot use except for the' benefit of the
child. But the child's ability to supervise the use of those funds en-
counters the same obstacles. Some agent must act for the child: either
the parents, with the practicality problems noted above, or an in-
dependent party, with the resultant expense. Insofar as the court need
not extend fiduciary obligations within the family, recognition of a
separate action on the child's behalf may offer marginally more re-
liable protection for the child's interest in the proceeds of the suit.
The differences in this regard may be relatively small. On the whole,
entity status leaves the child better off than if genetic counselling torts
are limited to the parents' own claims, and no worse off than if the
child could sue in her own name.
Conclusion
Scholars do not always agree on the purposes tort law serves. But
theories based on deterrence, cost-spreading, and fairness all seem to
support permitting the child victim of a genetic counselling tort to
recover. Most courts that have addressed the issue, however, have de-
nied any such recovery.
Courts do not always agree on why a child should be denied re-
covery for a genetic counselling tort. Some trip over the means of
proving an injury or damages. Some announce rather vague public
policies in favor of the sanctity of life. But all courts treat the issue
on a rather superficial level, exploring neither the tort policies the ac-
tion would serve nor the legal doctrines upon which they rely.
This Article has illustrated that neither policy nor doctrine need
interfere with the child's recovery. Courts overcame their concern for
the sanctity of life in the context of right-to-die cases. Today, most
courts and people acknowledge that, at least under some circum-
stances, life may not be preferable to the alternative. Debate over the
circumstances that deprive life of its value is likely to continue per-
petually. Although one cannot expect complete agreement, as long as
courts admit that a person may be better off dead or never born, the
child's genetic counselling tort claim should survive long enough to
permit the trier of fact to evaluate the specific circumstances that might
support the allegation.
Legal doctrine already provides courts with the means of eval-
uating the child's claim. Straightforward application of traditional tort
remedial approaches, complete with the benefits rule, leaves plaintiffs
ample room to prove their damages. Similarly, an alternative measure
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based on the remedial approach applied in misrepresentation cases
permits plaintiffs to demonstrate their entitlement to recovery. A more
creative approach that permits the family to sue as a single entity opens
yet another avenue to clearer analysis of the issues presented by genetic
counselling torts.
Despite these possibilities, courts have gone out of their way to
reject the child's claim and to unrealistically limit the parents' re-
covery. One can understand the political forces that push courts in
that direction: the medical malpractice and insurance crisis; scholarly
attacks on the tort system in general and awards for emotional distress,
pain and suffering, and punitive damages in particular; mobilization
of anti-abortion groups as a political force; and fears about genetic
engineering and other unknown scientific advances that may bring us
closer to 1984351 or Brave New World.356 These forces, however, re-
quire more meaningful and thoughtful action than merely denying the
child's claim. When tort law responds, it should respond in a prin-
cipled way, with measures that reform tort principles generally, not
decisions that exclude one class of victims from the opportunity to
recover under tort rules of allegedly general application.
Remedial principles deserve consistent application. More to the
point, litigants deserve consistent application of remedial principles to
their cases. Consistently applied, remedial principles make genetic
counselling torts manageable, if intricate, cases.
355. G. ORWF.LL, 1984 (1949).
356. A. HuxLEY, BRAVE NEw WoRLD (1946).
[Vol. 42
